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The political history of the South can be charac­
terized by the region's determination to prevent blacks 
from exercising their political rights. Southern politi­
cians in their continuous efforts to limit black partici­
pation in politics have inadvertently allowed the blacks 
to exert a much greater influence than any other minority 
would ordinarily have exerted. It would be difficult if 
not impossible to point to a period in southern history 
when blacks, whether slave or free, did not exert a notice­
able influence in southern political decisions. Not only 
have politic;', been molded by the blacks, but the social 
and economic ideas have similarly been influenced.
Of the numerous political adventures designed by 
southerners who were bent on excluding blacks from enjoying 
full citizenship privileges, none was more typical than 
that of the Dixiecrats. Created as a regional party this 
group of southerners sought to redirect the course of the 
Democratic party. While many southerners had long been 
dissatisfied with the increasing centralization trend 
exhibited by the federal government, the civil rights mes­
sage of President Harry Truman was the primary factor that
caused them to break with the party and run their own 
presidential candidate.
This work is an attempt to trace the origin, devel­
opment and actions of the Dixiecrat party with emphasis on 
its role in the 1948 presidential election. While this 
election has received considerable attention by historians 
attempting to explain Harry Truman's upset victory, little 
has been written concerning the right wing bolt from the 
Democratic party. By exploring this area, the election 
results are more understandable. The nature of the Dixie­
crat party further illuminates southern conservatism and 
its role in American political history. Since this right 
wing conservatism is still evident today, a close review 
of it at an earlier stage of its growth may serve to explain 
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THE ROLE OF THE DIXIECRATS IN THE 1948 ELECTION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
For a major part of the period since the Civil War 
the South has been solidly Democratic. "The South" as 
the term is used in this study refers to the eleven former 
Confederate states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Tîxas, and Virginia.
The origin of the "Solid South" can be traced to 
the pre-Civil War days. In the ante-bellum South the 
aristocrats, big planters, and slaveholders, tended to 
belong to the Whig party while the small farmers supported 
Andrew Jackson and the Democratic party. The issue of the 
extension of slavery into the territories, however, gave 
rise to the Republican party in 1854. When the Whig party, 
weakened by internal dissension over sectional issues, be­
gan to decline, the Republican party arose in the election 
of 1856 to replace it as the opposition party to the Demo­
crats. Meanwhile the Democratic party, also divided over 
the extension of slavery into the territories, split into
1
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northern and southern wings. In the i860 nominating con­
vention the southern delegates, like the Dixiecrats of 
1 9 4 8 , withdrew and nominated their own candidate, John C. 
Breckinridge of Kentucky, for President. Again, though, 
like the Dixiecrats, the southern dissenters of i860 
failed tc alter the election results and the newly-formed 
Republican party won the election. After the demist of 
the Whig party, its former members made several futile 
attempts to create a third party but most eventually 
though reluctantly joined the ranks of their former ene­
mies, the Democrats.
By the end of the Civil War all "respectable 
southerners" were Democrats. To be a Republican was to 
a traditional Southerner tantamount to treason. Such an 
individual was immediately suspect to his neighbors and 
was in all likelihood ostracized from his community. Not 
only had the Republican party defeated the South during 
the war, but following the war it sought to impose its 
rule on the South. Much bitterness developed over issues 
such as the lot of the freedmen. As northern Republicans 
insisted that political equality be accorded to the blacks, 
southerners banded together more strongly than ever to re­
sist such moves. White southerners, feeling their way of 
life threatened, rallied to the Democratic party in ever- 
increasing numbers, thus the Democratic party became a 
refuge for southern white supremists. The Negro was not
3
only the key to the creation of the one-party South but 
was the very heart of southern politics. Although southern 
politics is sometimes referred to as a politics of cotton, 
free trade, agrarian poverty or planter and aristocrat, it 
is in actuality a politics of race.^
Just as the dominant theme in the South during 
Reconstruction was a fear of the Negro, stories about 
Reconstruction shaped the opinions of many southerners 
who dutifully passed those attitudes on to future genera­
tions. From the southern point of view the Reconstruction 
era was a dismal time for the South; it was a period during 
which evil, power-seeking scoundrels dominated the politi­
cal process. In the South, according to this thesis, scal­
awags, carpetbaggers, and radical Republicans, who were 
totally incompetent and thoroughly corrupt, dominated the 
various state governments. These elements elevated the 
illiterate blacks to positions of control, then, using 
them as puppets, proceeded to treat white Southerners as 
a conquered people. These conditions which "forced de­
cent" white Southerners to unite in a single party in 
hopes of saving southern civilization were in large part 
responsible for the rise of the one-party South.
While this negative stereotype of Congressional 
reconstruction is inaccurate, it is true that many
Vladimir Key and Alexander Heard, Southern Politics 
in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19^9),
p. 5- Hereinafter referred to as Key, Southern Politics.
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government officials were ignorant and unscrupulous. Tax 
rates surged upward as did state debts while many carpet­
bag officials quickly acquired fortunes. For example,
Henry Clay Warmoth, governor of Louisiana, in I8 6 8 , while 
being paid a salary of $8 , 0 0 0  made $1 0 0 ,0 0 0  the first
year. Corruption of this sort, however, was not confined
2to the South but was a national phenomenon. Nonetheless 
such incidents reinforced the many myths concerning Recon­
struction that were propagated in the South years after 
Reconstruction ended. One of the more persistent myths, 
that Negroes ruling in the South were responsible for the 
corruption that existed, was untrue. In the first place 
blacks did not rule alone for none of the radical govern­
ments contained a Negro majority. Negroes controlled 
neither both houses of any state legislature nor the 
governor's mansion of any state. Important governmental 
offices held by blacks were few: there was only one state
supreme court justice, two United States Senators, and 
fifteen Congressmen.
Another popular idea held tenaciously by southerners 
was that nothing constructive was accomplished by the radi­
cal governments. Contrary to this notion, many positive 
and lasting accomplishments can be attributed to these
Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwin, The South 
Since Appomattox: A Century of Regional Change (New York :
Oxford University Press, 1967)1 p. 37• Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Clark, The South.
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governments. They encouraged public education, court, 
county, and tax reforms, and advocated political and 
social equality for blacks and whites alike. Although 
many recent studies have rejected a negative interpreta­
tion of Reconstruction, they have made no imprint whatso­
ever on the majority of southerners who are either unaware 
of them or simply dismiss such views as Yankee propaganda. 
In spite of the accomplishments of the period. Reconstruc­
tion was a traumatic experience for the South. The racial 
bitterness aroused at that time continued to deprive the 
Negro of his civil, economic, social, and political rights. 
And as Reconstruction ended, the two primary goals of 
white southerners, terminating Negro power and ridding 
the region of foreign control, were achieved. To maintain 
this status quo of white solidarity supportive myths and
3legends were kept alive.
Alongside the harsh and mythical southern view of 
Reconstruction, there arose during the postwar days the 
myth of the ante-bellum golden age. As C. Vann Woodward, 
leading southern historian, describes it, "one of the most 
significant inventions of the New South was the 'Old South' 
--a new idea in the eighties, and a legend of incalculable
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, l8?7- 
1 9 1 3 , Vol. IX of A History of the South, ed. by Wendell 
Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton 
Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1951), p . 51* 
Hereinafter referred to as Woodward, The New South.
Lpotentialities.” The "Lost Cause” was celebrated by 
newspaper accounts of Confederate heroes, by the erection 
of statues in memory of the war dead, the organizing of 
Confederate Veterans and the Daughters of the Confederacy, 
and by fictional writers of both the North and South. By 
glorifying the old South, realities were forgotten and 
white southerners were tied even more closely together.
The myth makers ignored the varieties of ways of life 
that existed, portraying all white southerners as aristo­
crats. In reality, of course, only the few were cultured 
and wealthy in sharp contrast to the backward and unedu­
cated majority who suffered from severe economic and cul­
tural deprivations.
The leaders--sometimes called redeemers or bourbons 
--of the New South perpetuated these myths in hopes of 
strengthening their positions of influence. They were 
usually merchants, bankers, railroadmen, and lawyers-- 
industrialists rather than agrarians. While pretending 
to champion free trade, the legend of the Lost Cause and 
states' rights, they actually supported subsidies for 
railroads and tax exemptions and special privileges for 
industries. The small farmers knew that these leaders 
did not represent their interests but still fear of the 
Negro demanded white unity.
^Ibid., pp. 154-55
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The Bourbons, aware of this fear, capitaliz upon 
it to abort incipient revolts from the Democratic party. 
From the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century the 
South voted Democratic nearly all the time. In the period 
I8 7 6-I944 only two of the southern states voted Republican 
twice in presidential elections. Florida voted Republican 
in 1866 and 1928, and Tennessee voted Republican once 
during the period; South Carolina and Louisiana in I8 7 6 ; 
North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia in I9 2 8 . Four states, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi maintained a 
straight Democratic voting record for the whole period.^
Despite the voting record, cleavages in the South 
did exist. Major differences between the "Black-Belt 
gentry and hillbilly commoners" were evident.^ With the 
termination of Reconstruction, Independent movements break­
ing away from the Democratic party occurred in many of the
southern states. As early as I8 8O a series of "Independ­
ent" movements, manifestations of agrarian discontent, had 
begun to spread throughout the southern states. Although 
the Greenback party, advocating soft money, had appeared 
in 1 8 7 6 , most others had been too concerned at that time
with the main parties to take note of their program. Later
numerous debtors in the South found the Greenback soft
^Key, Southern Politics, p. 10. 
^Woodward, The New South, pp. 7 6-7 6 .
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money policy appealing and by the I878 elections sent
fifteen Greeubackers to Congress. Soft money, however,
was not the only issue which fostered southern Independent
movements. Independents had espoused a liberal program of
equality and suffrage for the blacks and called for an end
to the corruption which often involved the overturning of
whole elections.
With the rise of Independent movements in the South
new hope came to the almost defunct Republican party. To
meet this challenge the Democrats raised the familiar cry
7of "white supremacy" and "party regularity." The possi­
bility of an Independent-Republican fusion loomed large 
reviving the fear of a renewed radical program in the 
South, a factor that alone was sufficient to defeat the 
coalition. With the return of prosperity in 1879, Green- 
backism began to decline only to be replaced by a new soft- 
money panacea known as free silver. This issue was capi­
talized upon by a new political party, the Populists. 
Formally launched in I8 9I as a combination of southern and 
western farmers and laborers, the Populists called for 
fair elections, graduated income tax, prohibition of child 
labor, expansion of public education, an improved system 
of roads, a revamping of the tax system, a ten-hour work
gday and an expansion of the currency. Southern planters
7 8Clark, The South, p. 6 6 . Ibid.. p. 70.
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who had supported the farmer's earlier organization, the 
Alliance, now joined with industrial and financial urban 
groups in opposition to the new party. The Populist party 
by and large attracted members from the lower economic and 
social classes. This seeming split in the Democratic ranks 
brought the threat of "Negro domination" to life once again.
To be a Populist, however, involved changing politi­
cal parties. This might well mean in the I8 9O 's "a falling-
off of clients, the loss of a job, of credit at the store,
9or of one's welcome at church." Nonetheless the existence 
of the Populist party was not only a challenge to the one- 
party system of the New South but a threat to the racial 
relations as well, for Populists addressed themselves to a 
most difficult and dangerous task--the union of black and 
white farmers. While enjoying only limited success in this 
endeavor, they did, at the outset, make repeated efforts to 
gain equality for the blacks. In the election of I8 9 2 , 
when Democrats bought great numbers of black votes, many 
Populists became disillusioned with Negroes, some to the 
point of becoming anti-Negro
By 1896 the Populist program was incorporated into 
the Democratic platform thus sealing the fate of the new 
third party. Although the South remained Democratic, the 
complexion of the party had been forced to acquire a more
^Woodward, The New South, p. 244. 
l°Ibid., p. 3 5 2 .
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progressive look. The decline of Populism also marked the 
retirement of many of the "Bourbons" and sent the masses 
of its supporters to fill the progressive wing of the Demo­
cratic party. Many Populists, who attributed their defeat 
to the selling of black votes to the Democrats, were now 
uniting with the planters to remove legally the blacks from 
politics through a scheme based on the Mississippi Plan.
This movement legitimized practices long used in the South 
and particularly in Mississippi. It required that in order 
for the Negro to vote he must meet a residence requirement, 
pay a poll tax four to nine months in advance of voting, be 
free of having committed certain crimes, and pass a literacy 
test. The Negro was legally disfranchised, yet when his 
vote was needed by those in control he would be allowed to 
vote.^^ As a result the Negro could not exercise a direct 
influence on politics, but because he remained a threat to 
white supremacy, he remained the hidden but dominant factor. 
At the turn of the century then the Negro emerged clearly 
as the determining factor in southern political history. 
Since no major issue would be decided apart from him he
was "the one and only factor that preserved the one-party
„12 system."
As the progressive movement of the early 20th cen­
tury reached the South, reforms were made but not for the 
Negro. The establishment of the primary which allowed the
^^Clark, The South, p. 77- ^^Ibid., p. lOG.
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masses a choice of candidates carefully exci ded black 
participation by requiring party membership in order to 
vote. Since blacks could not be party members, they could 
not vote in the primary, which in the South was actually 
the election since the Republican opposition was always 
nominal at most.
Tied to the limited main goal of smothering the 
black and his role as citizen, the Southern political na­
tional leadership declined in quality. With a Democratic 
but unsophisticated electorate, politicians found oratori­
cal talent coupled with racism a formula for success. Im­
passioned racist pleas to preserve white supremacy appealed 
to the masses of southerners, thus opening the way for the 
demogogues. Southern demogogues, typically portrayed as 
insincere opportunists without moral or political princi­
ples, were frequently conscientious social reformers.
Often strong and colorful, many such individuals were in-
■ Vterested in the social reforms that had been left undone 
by the conservative redeemers.
Although some of these politicians were race baiters 
and charlatans, most worked for the welfare of their con­
stituents. James K. Vardaman, the governor of Mississippi 
sometimes known as the "Great White Chief," made such re­
forms as ending convict leasing and increasing common
13school appropriations and teachers' salaries. Vardaman's
^^Ibid., p. 122.
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successor, Theodore Bilbo, though a racist of questionable 
moral character, achieved important tax r e f o r m s . B e n  
Tillman and Cole Blease, both ex-governors of Mississippi, 
Ellison D. "Cotton Ed" Smith, Senator from South Carolina, 
and Tom Watson, Senator from Georgia, were some other of 
the better known southern demogogues. Huey P. Long, the 
most extraordinary of all the so-called demogogues, re­
lied not on the race baiting theme of his fellow southern 
politicians, but on the planning and accomplishment of his 
social and economic program which included improvement of 
public highways, public education, the building of state 
hospitals, aid to the poor, pensions for the aged, and 
shorter working hours. Sheared of their racism many of
these men might have been ranked with the nation's leading 
15progressives. '
While Progressives sought reforms on all levels of 
government. Republicans sought to make their party accept­
able to the South. Intellectuals and industrialists who 
longed for the return of the two-party system to the south 
encouraged the "lily-white" movement in Republican ranks. 
This was an effort to minimize the role of the Negro in 
hopes of its being attractive to white southerners. Theo­
dore Roosevelt, vacillating in his attitude toward the 
"lily white" movement in the South, appointed southern 
Democrats to office but when it became apparent that this
l^Ibid., p. 1 2 3 . ^^Ibid., p. 1 2 1 .
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endangered his control over Negro delegates to the Republi­
can convention, he reversed his stand. When southerners 
heard of Roosevelt's invitation to Booker T. Washington 
for dinner, his southern strategy was lost. William Howard 
Taft successfully revived Roosevelt's "lily-white" program 
initially but lost the South when he supported the Payne- 
Aldrich tariff, a high protective tariff which the South 
saw as a betrayal to their economic interests.
In 19 1 2 the Democrats finally succeeded in capturing 
the presidential election of 1912 with a southerner, Wood­
row Wilson. With his election the South again found itself 
represented in such national offices as cabinet positions, 
ambassadorial appointments, the supreme court, and commit­
tees in the Senate and the House.
With the end of the first World War the South ex­
perienced a period of expansion in industry and urbaniza­
tion. Along with this was a growing class consciousness 
and a budding labor movement which appeared as an ominous 
sign to many. The Bolshevik revolution and the experiences 
of the war caused many Americans to have an exaggerated 
fear of alien ideologies and movements. To protect the 
United States from the communist threat, various laws re­
stricting individual freedom were passed. As the public 
became increasingly fearful of threats against its system, 
it entered a period of national hysteria known as the Red
l^ibid., pp. 130-32.
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Scare. Anyone who advocated change or deviated in the 
slightest from the "American way" was treated as a poten­
tially disloyal citizen.
In the South this era of social unrest gave rise 
to a new Ku Klux Klan not limited to the South but par­
ticularly strong in that region. At its peak of strength 
in 19251 the Klan controlled in varying degrees the gov­
ernments of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, California, Oregon, 
Indiana, and Ohio. Excesses credited to the Klan, however, 
marked the beginning of its decline. Outside the South 
the Klan's major appeal was anti-Catholicism, a prejudice 
emphasized when the Democrats nominated Alfred E. Smith 
of New York, a Catholic and a wet, for the presidency.
The Democratic candidate presented southern voters with a 
real dilemma. Smith's background emd personal beliefs 
along with a seemingly radical program were all the things 
that the South despised. On the other hand, Herbert Hoover, 
the Republican candidate, a dry and a Protestant, genuinely 
appealed to the South. Many southerners solved their di­
lemma by becoming "anti-Smith Democrats," that is, by 
voting Democratic on the state level and not voting at all 
for the presidency.
This presidential contest of I928 resulted in break­
ing the Solid South for the first time since I8 7 6 . Hoover 
carried Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, and 
Texas. Only Arkansas, the home state of Joseph Robinson,
15
Smith's vice-presidential candidate, and the deep South 
remained loyal to the party. According to Vladimir Key's 
state-by-state analysis, the white voters in the counties 
of the black belt areas of the South remained most loyal 
to the Democratic ticket. Conversely, the counties with 
few blacks were the very areas which shifted to Hoover. 
Mississippi and South Carolina, the two southern states 
with the largest proportion of blacks, were the states 
where Hoover won his lowest votes. The significance of 
the 1 9 2 8 southern bolt to the Republican party is that 
the counties with a heavy black population remained loyal 
to the Democrats, partly because of tradition and partly 
because they feared that the Republicans might alter the 
status of the southern Negro. Whites outside the black 
belt could now vote according to their principles with 
regard to the other issues such as religion and prohibi-
17tion rather than on the Negro factor alone.
Hoover's victory warned that southerners would no 
longer support just any candidate who happened to run 
under the Democratic banner. Furthermore, this election 
revealed that the Republican party was no longer radical 
but had indeed become conservative. Its strength lay in 
the rural areas of the North and West while the Democrats 
derived the bulk of their support from urban areas. The 
Democrats, as a consequence, had become increasingly
^^Key, Southern Politics, p. 3 1 8.
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liberal. Since the South was rural and conservative, it 
could fit well into the Republican mold except for tradi­
tion and their fear of the Negro. From 1928-1944 the 
South would be Democratic in presidential elections but 
would gradually drift further and further away from the 
Democratic ideology. Meanwhile the northern wing of the 
Democratic party, the base of its national power turned
increasingly toward attaining the black, the foreign, and
X 8the labor vote.
With the breaking of the Solid South in 1928 many 
southerners prematurely prophesied that the era of the 
one-party South was ending. But these optimists failed 
to understand the embedded fear that southerners harbored 
in regard to black rule. Also the depression of 1929 con­
tributed to the defeat of Republican resurgence in the 
South, an area as hard hit by the depression as was any 
other region of the country. Because of the extreme eco­
nomic distress of the 1930's tne Republican vote of the 
South reached an all time low. Since Hoover and Republi­
canism had become the symbol of the depression, the South 
was again solidly in the Democratic column voting for 
Roosevelt whom they saw as the only alternative to a com­
plete national breakdown.
Although some southerners had initially opposed 
Roosevelt, some including Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana
1 A^”lbid., pp. 318-29.
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and John Nance Garner of Texas--ultimately the vice- 
presidential nominee for the Democrats--supported him. 
Cordell Hull, senator from Tennessee and one of Roose­
velt's chief links to the South, bound other influential 
southerners such as Pat Harrison of Mississippi and Harry 
Byrd of Virginia to him. Without the support of these
important southern leaders and the people of the South,
19Roosevelt could not have been elected.
Perhaps Roosevelt's rural background combined with 
the urgency of the depression masked the similarities be­
tween the programs of Roosevelt and Smith. Roosevelt's 
summer home at Warm Springs, Georgia, gave him a special 
understanding of the problems of the South. Southern 
people, especially the Georgians who had witnessed his 
struggle with polio, greatly admired him. Furthermore, 
many southerners had viewed Roosevelt's innovations in 
New York during his tenure as Governor as evidence of his 
willingness to experiment with new ideas and could there­
fore conclude that as President he would be able to cope
20with the problems of the depression. As President, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt promised a New Deal for all classes 
and regions of the country. Roosevelt believed that if 
the nation were to survive the depression, massive
^^Frank Friedel, F . D . R. and the South (Baton 




governmental intervention and aid would be necessary. To 
distribute this aid to those in need, a whole host of agen­
cies was created.
Relief supplied by the New Deal was openly welcomed 
by the South at first. The implementation, however, of 
the New Deal in the South eventually brought about some 
ambivalent reactions because New Deal government planning 
and regulation ran counter to the states' rights doctrine 
of the South. Still, southerners realized that their re­
gion was in dire need of the aid that such governmental 
programs could extend to them, and southern congressmen, 
many of whom held key positions in the 1 9 3 0 's supported 
this series of welfare measures. To meet the grave eco­
nomic situation caused by the depression, other congress­
men, perhaps victims of the personal charm of the Presi­
dent, were aJso persuaded to support his program whole 
21heartedly.
The success or failure of the New Deal in the South 
varied widely according to the type of program and the 
specific area in question. The National Industrial Recov­
ery Act, though generally unenforceable, aided some of the 
hardest hit southern industries. It suggested the aboli­
tion of child labor and encouraged wage supports and maxi­
mum working hours. Many southern laborers were given the 
opportunity of working under these labor codes. To the
2^Ibid.
19
South the Agricultural Adjustment Administration which
limited production, meant an increase in the price of
22cotton, grain, and cattle. It was the landowner, how­
ever, and not the tenant, who was the prime benefactor 
of this program. When Roosevelt became aware of the in­
equities of the program, he made plans to alter it in 
such a way as to aid the tenant farmer and the share­
cropper. But nullification of the whole program by the 
Supreme Court in 1935 ended this effort. In the mean­
time, the landowners felt favorably disposed toward the 
Roosevelt Administration.
The Works Progress Administration, Civilian Con­
servation Corps, and National Youth Administration pro­
vided work relief for the South. The rural South re­
ceived the benefits of electricity: some by the Tennes­
see Valley Authority and others by the Rural Electric 
Association. In summation, the effectiveness of the New 
Deal programs varied from gross mismanagement to efficient 
progressive improvement.
After the immediate economic crisis had passed, 
southerners slowly began to realize that the New Deal was 
a threat to the traditions and institutions of the South. 
Although the philosophy of the New Deal was completely 
capitalistic and its welfare state an insurance to the 
idea of private property, opponents often charged socialism.
O O Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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The New Deal measures consisting of a strongly centralized 
national government seemed to be displacing the revered 
southern notion of states' rights.
Furthermore, the growing liberalism of the New Deal 
with its appeal to the southern sharecropper, the laborer, 
and the Negro alarmed influential states' rights groups. 
Southern congressmen who had supported the economic pro­
grams of the New Deal now had strong reservations concern­
ing the social implications of New Deal ideology. After 
1936 many farmers began criticizing the WPA programs for 
increasing their labor costs while many other farmers lost 
their farms when the overproduction of cotton caused prices 
to drop. A dichotomy in the voting habits of southern con­
gressmen became clearly discernible as they supported farm 
measures such as price supports and subsidies but opposed
labor legislation, social security, the WPA, and black
n • ̂ 23equality.
Until 1936 no one dared openly to oppose Roosevelt. 
But in January, I9 1 6 , ct wealthy Texas lumberman, John H. 
Kirby and his group, the Southern Committee to Uphcl the 
Constitution, held a "Girass Roots Convention" in Macon, 
Georgia. The purpose of this meeting was to coalesce op­
ponents of New Dealism ind possibly give impetus to a 
Talmadge for President boom. Eugene Talmadge, former Gov­
ernor of Georgia, had begun criticizing the centralization
^^Clark, The South, p. 240.
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24trends of the New Deal. Members of this group sent 
invitations to "Jeffersonian Democrats" and states' rights 
advocates in seventeen southern states, but the outcome 
was a disappointment when the meeting failed in its objec­
tive of placing anti-New Deal men in key offices in south­
ern states. For example, in the Georgia election, E. D. 
Rivers defeated Talmadge for governor and Richard Russell 
was elected to the Senate. Both were Roosevelt men.
Another factor which alienated southerners from 
New Deal Democrats was the abolition of the two-thirds 
rule. At the 1936 Democratic Convention the two-thirds 
requirement necessary for nominating presidential candi­
dates was abolished. Only a bare majority could now nomi­
nate, and so the South's veto power over the party's presi­
dential candidates was seemingly ended. The "Jeffersonian 
Democrats," angered by this move, met again, this time in 
Detroit, to determine a course of action. They decided on
an anti-Negro, anti-Communist platform and distributed
25separate electoral tickets in some of the states. This 
action accomplished little other than showing dissatisfac­
tion with the Democratic party. In spite of the differences
24George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1946, Vol. X of A History of the South, ed. by Wendell 
Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, I9 6 7 ), p. 6 1 6 .




of opinion Roosevelt had to depend upon southern committee 
chairmen in Congress to pass his legislation, and for the 
rest of the New Deal era, southern congressmen and Adminis­
tration representatives struggled over new legislation.
As the New Deal changed from recovery to reform 
southerners began to take a more critical view of such 
programs as the Works Progress Administration, Social Se­
curity, the Wagner Act, the Housing Acts of 1937i and the 
Fair Labor Standards System of 1938. Stronger opposition 
crystallized as the economic situation improved. Governor 
Talmadge and other southerners became increasingly skepti­
cal of the growing paternalism of the New Deal. When 
Roosevelt proposed to create jobs for the unemployed, he 
made sure that pay for this work would be above the amount 
offered by relief but lower than wages for other types of 
employment. Still critics charged that the programs were 
worthless, inefficient, and simply a means by which big 
government would gradually gain control of the labor force. 
The Social Security program, consisting of old-age and 
survivors' insurance, was also designed to implement the 
other relief operations. Critics viewed this program as 
un-American: it was highly "socialistic" in chat it abol­
ished the American ideals of individualism and personal 
responsibility. White southerners saw it as a system to 
which they would be paying for the upkeep of "indolent 
blacks." Low-cost housing projects? were also advocated
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by the Roosevelt administration. To Roosevelt this was 
a means of revitalizing the construction business and 
related industries. Congressmen from rural areas fre­
quently opposed the bills on grounds that in addition 
to being socialistic and financially irresponsible, it 
would primarily benefit northern industrial centers, not 
rural areas. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, es­
tablishing a minimum wage and a maximum work week with 
time-and-a-half for overtime, also aroused opposition.
Some critics viewed it as a conspiracy by which President 
Roosevelt hoped further to increase his own power. Since 
the South had long paid lower wages than the North, north­
ern businessmen wanted the act to rid them of the cheap- 
labor competitors of the South. Southerners opposed any 
bill that might lead to non-discriminatory pay for all 
jobs performed.
Many from the South viewed the New Deal as a threat 
to the constitutional ba?is of the United States. Roose­
velt himself caused a constitutional crisis when he failed 
to estimate the amount of furor that his court packing bill 
would provoke. Dismayed at the ease with which the Supreme 
Court was cutting away at New Deal legislation, Roosevelt 
decided to "pack the court" according to his own tastes.
William E. Leuctenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the New Deal, in The American Nation Series ed. by Henry 
Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (New York: Harper 
and Row, I9 6 3 ), pp. 124-37, 262-6$.
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Southerners saw at stake the fundamentals of the Constitu-
27tion and particularly states' rights. Southerners like 
Carter Glass of Virginia feared that should Roosevelt be 
granted powers to enlarge the court he might appoint po­
litical friends who had ideas similar to those of Harold 
Ickes. Ickes who had repeatedly denounced the South's 
segregated school system and others with such alien phi­
losophies might well reverse the entire direction of the 
court and undermine the sacred judicial decisions upon 
which southern society was based. However, Roosevelt's 
court plan was doomed to failure. Garner's compromise,
which embodied the section concerning minor court re-
28forms, was the final product of the court bill.
Southern arguments questioning the constitutionality 
of the New Deal became increasingly prevalent. Many of 
these arguments, phrased in legal terms, were actually a 
cover for the emotional issue of race. Southerners knew 
that Roosevelt's aid to the poor meant aid to the blacks 
in the South. Similar aid to northern blacks would enable 
them to vote for the New Deal and more reform, a frighten­
ing prospect for most southern supporters of the status 
29quo.
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^Ibiu., pp. 6 1 9-2 3 .
Tindall, Emergence of the New South, p. 621.
2 8.
‘“̂ Friedel, F. D. R. and the South, pp. 71-73-
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Nevertheless, economic policies and increasing cen­
tralization of governmental agencies served to arouse ac­
tual southern opposition to Roosevelt more than did the 
issue of race. In the fall of 1937 Senator Byrd called 
a meeting of ten Democrats and Republicans for the purpose 
of opposing Roosevelt. This group sent out a ten-point 
"conservative manifesto" calling for revisions of taxes, 
a balanced budget, and a decreased role of the federal 
government in the economy and in the lives of individuals.
It also called for more attention to be given to the 
rights of the states. Clearly a conservative bloc now 
existed but Roosevelt managed to get some measures through 
the session in 1 9 3 8 .^^
In 19 3 8 Franklin Roosevelt embarked upon his famous 
purge of the Democratic primaries in hopes of getting more 
progressive southerners in the party. Roosevelt believed 
that it was essential to the health of the nation that the 
economy of the South be strengthened by his liberal legis­
lation. He undertook a tour through the nation emphasizing 
the Deep South during which he spoke in behalf of supporters 
of the Administration. He succeeded in eliminating only one 
opponent. Surprisingly enough, partially because of the 
economic recession and partially due to intra-party bicker­
ing, he did not alienate the South as a whole with these
^^Tindall, Emergence of the New South, pp. 624-25
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tactics, even though the outcome of the 1938 elections, 
with the election of anti-New Deal men, showed disapproval 
of the New Deal.^^
It was the gravity of the world situation in 19^0 
that assured Roosevelt of his continued residence in Wash­
ington. Dissident Democrats earlier had dreams of substi­
tuting Garner for Roosevelt. By opposing various measures 
and actions of Roosevelt, Garner gradually became the sym­
bolic head of the anti-New Deal group, giving substance to 
talk of Garner for President, In 1939 he announced himself 
as a contender for the Presidency, but all of Garner's 
hopes were dependent upon Roosevelt's decision not to seek 
a third term. At the convention when it became clear that 
the President would run, Roosevelt won the nomination with 
hardly a semblance of opposition. The South did, after 
all, approve of his foreign policy.
Although the Second World War delayed the burgeoning 
southern revolt, the South did balk at Roosevelt's 1940 
vice-presidential choice, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa. Wal­
lace denounced racism and was a devout liberal New Dealer. 
When Roosevelt threatened to withhold his candidacy if 
Wallace was not approved, most of the South gave in. How­
ever, some southerners from South Carolina, refusing to 
give in, formed the Jeffersonian Democratic party which 
supported Wendell Wilkie and the traditional principles of
^^Ibid., pp. 626-30.
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the Democratic party. In Texas a similar No Third Term 
Democratic party appeared with Wilkie as their choice, 
but these moves were of little significance in the long
32run because Roosevelt carried both these states easily.
With the congressional elections of 19^2 there was
a definite anti-New Deal trend nationwide and conservatives
filled many of the vacancies. In January, 1943, when the
new Congress convened, southern Democrats were rebelling.
They proceeded to make assault after assault against the
New Deal measures. Governor Frank Dixon of Alabama hinted
at a third party of conservative southern composition.
According to him, plans for a break with the Democratic
party were in the air. Governor Sam Jones of Louisiana
listed a series of southern grievances: war industries
were centered in the North; freight-rate differentials
were unfair to the South; federal money was poured into
the North; and public housing went to the North. These
complaints serve to illustrate that the South, while giving
lip service to the ideal of states' rights and denouncing
centralized government, really objected to centralization
only when they were being excluded from the benefits of it.
At the Southern Governor's Conference in Tallahassee
in the spring of 1943 the two Governors again hinted at in- 
3 3surgency. It was not until 1944, however, that revolt
within the Democratic party reached major proportions.
^^Ibid., pp. 692-94. 33lbid., pp. 724-25.
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That year revolt flared openly in three states--Missis- 
sippi, South Carolina, and Texas. In Mississippi, a slate 
of uninstructed electors was placed on the November ballot. 
The purpose was to get other southern states to follow 
suit and unite the southern electorate so they could gain 
control of the electoral college, thereby supplanting the 
old two-thirds rule. The Mississippi delegation denounced 
universal suffrage and civil rights. Still, the Missis­
sippi delegates voted for the Democrats in the electoral
34college fourteen to one. In South Carolina, the slate 
of electors appearing under the label "Southern Democrats," 
promoted Byrd for President.
It was in Texas, however, that the movement was of 
major importance. Brewing for a series of elections in 
Texas was a split between the left and right wings in the 
state Democratic party. This split became apparent in 
1 9 4 4 during the state May convention at which Texans tra­
ditionally name national convention delegates and presiden­
tial electors. In 1944 anti-Roosevelt men controlled the 
state convention thereby causing a third of those present 
to walk out and subsequently to hold a rump convention at 
which they named a conflicting set of delegates. At the 
national convention that summer both groups were seated 
snlitting the Texas votes. When Roosevelt was named at
34Thomas Sancton, "White Supremacy--Crisis or Plot?" 
The Nation, CLXVII (July 31, 1948), 12$. Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Sancton, "White Supremacy."
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the national convention, the Texas Regulars concentrated
their opposition on Henry Wallace, who was far too liberal
to suit them. Due to these southern pressures. Senator
Harry Truman, of Missouri, considered by the South a
border state man with conservative leanings, became the
35new vice-presidential nominee for the Democrats.
At the September state convention, where Texans 
officially announced the outcome of the summer primaries 
and adopted a platform, pro-Roosevelt forces won control 
and named pro-Roosevelt electors. The Texas Supreme 
Court upheld this action. The right-wing electors, who 
were anti-Roosevelt but uncommitted otherwise, were listed 
as "Texas Regulars" on the general election ballot. This 
bolt by Texas Regulars in 19^4 represented the first ef­
fort in recent history of any southern group to leave the 
national Democratic party without joining the Republican 
party.
In 1946 the Texas Regulars rejoined the Democratic 
party but maintained their right-wing point of view. Bu­
ford Jester, more moderate than several other hopefuls, 
was supported by the Texas Regulars for Governor. Jester 
also had the support of some of the pro-Roosevelt Democrats 
who feared his opponent, Homer P. Rainey. Rainey, a
B. Wheildon, "The South and the Presidency," 
Editorial Research Report, XIV (March 24, 1948), l8l.
^^Key, Southern Politics, p. 257*
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champion of academic freedom, had been fired from the 
presidency of the University of Texas in 1^44 for being 
too radical and in 1946 made an unsuccessful bid for the 
governorship. Although Rainey was no radical, he was por­
trayed as one and this portrayal served to discredit other 
liberal candidates as well. The liberal-conservative 
camps in Texas that emerged in 1944, 1946, and 1948 fol­
lowed a familiar line. The Texas Regulars were the most 
outspoken of Rainey's opponents in 1946 whereas the lib­
eral leaders in 1948 had been Rainey men in 1946. In 
1948 Congressman Lyndon Johnson, a liberal New Dealer, 
vied with Governor Coke Stevenson, a conservative, for 
the Senate. The conservative-liberal factions were
clearly evident in this election which Johnson won by a
37mere eighty-seven votes.
In the 1948 May convention the struggle over presi­
dential electors was the exact opposite of the 1944 strug­
gle. At this convention Truman electors were selected, 
forcing the conservatives to fight to control the Septem­
ber convention which hopefully would enable them to select 
electors who supported South Carolina's Senator Strom 
Thurmond. Their efforts, however, failed. The failure 
of conservative Texans to secure Thurmond electors indi­
cated the degree of loyalty of one section of the South to 
the Democratic party. The liberal-conservative split in
^^Ibid., pp. 256-58.
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Texas and the Texas Regular movement should have been 
studied more closely by the dissident southern leaders.
It would have revealed the importance of controlling the 
party machinery of the state if a southern bolt was to be 
successful. Many southerners, it would be demonstrated 
later, would unquestioningly vote for the Democratic sym­
bol, the rooster in the South, not for the man or ideology
o orunning under the emblem.
o QJasper Berry Shannon, Toward a New Politics in 
the South (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1 9 4 9), pT 62; and Alexander Heard, A Two Party South? 




Discontent with the liberal direction in which the 
Democratic party was moving was rife within its ranks long 
before 1948. However, the economic depression followed by 
the continuing international crisis, served to muffle the 
dissatisfaction. The prospect of receiving federal patron­
age also provided an incentive for otherwise dissident 
Democrats to keep their criticism limited simply to loyal 
opposition. Southerners, though skeptical of Truman's 
welfare state program which they saw as an extension of 
the New Deal, would not have deserted the Democratic party 
had it not been for one aspect of this program: civil
rights.
The issue of civil rights was not a phenomenon 
unique to the United States for a world-wide human rights 
movement was in progress. Colored peoples all over the 
world were rising up and asserting themselves. The fact 
that the United States wanted to project a model of democ­
racy to the world as her major ideological weapon in the 
cold war undoubtedly affected the civil rights movement.
32
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If the United States expected to gain the support and re­
spect of the newly liberated blacks around the world, it 
was imperative that she improve her domestic situation.
Civil rights, especially for the Negro, received 
new hope during the Roosevelt era. Although Roosevelt had 
not been as active as he might have been in promoting the 
cause of civil rights, Negroes, the group suffering most 
from the depression, felt that his programs of relief and 
recovery were especially helpful to them. Blacks were en­
couraged by the President's reception of Negro visitors 
and his speaking engagements at Negro institutions. The 
overcoming of his physical handicap gave many blacks the 
hope that they too might overcome the handicaps society 
had given them.
Roosevelt was careful to acknowledge blacks in ways 
that gave them prestige but little power. For example, in 
making governmental appointments Roosevelt habitually sought 
the service of black specialists and advisers. Although 
other Presidents had relied on black advisers to a certain 
degree, Roosevelt used a far larger number whom he placed 
in positions of seeming importance. In reality, however, 
his "Black Cabinet" or "Black Brain Trust" members occupied 
few high positions of trust in government.
To satisfy Negroes in 1939 Roosevelt created a civil 
rights section in the Department of Justice. Although some 
8 , 0 0 0  to l4,000 complaints of racial injustice were received
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yearly, few were acted upon.^ Leslie Fishel, scholar of 
black-white relations, notes that "Roosevelt's actual com­
mitments to the American Negro were slim. He was more a
2symbol than an activist in his own right." This view can 
be supported by examining the gap between what Roosevelt 
said or impli_ed and what he actually did in regard to the 
Negro.
Roosevelt frequently intimated the need to aid the 
Negro without specifically mentioning him. In his annual 
message to Congress in 1935 he discussed the under-privileged 
but he did not designate the Negro. In that same year he 
warned WPA auministrators not to discriminate against workers 
because of race, religion or politics. And in two other pub­
licized statements Roosevçlt "paid lip service to the accom-
3plishments of the race." But as Fishel points out: "his
eye was ever on the balance of political forces and he never
4voluntarily came out foursquare for the Negro."
According to Roy Wilkins, Roosevelt helped the Negro 
"only insofar as he refused to exclude [him] from his general 
policies that applied to the whole country."^ Even on the
^William Loren Katz, Eyewitness: The Negro in Ameri­
can History (New York: Pitman Publishing Company, 196?),
p. 427.
^Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., "The Negro in the New Deal 
Era," in Twentieth Century America: Recent Interpretations,
ed. by Barton J . Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1 9 6 9 ) 1 p . 290. Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Fishel, "The Negro in the New Deal Era."
^Ibid., pp. 295-97. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 288.
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issue of poll tax, Roosevelt, who personally favored abol­
ishing it, never hinted at a federal law to usurp this 
power from the states. Although he undoubtedly felt real 
compassion for the underdog he was too astute a politician 
to risk such involvement. Northern sources had long pres­
sured Roosevelt to support the much needed anti-lynching 
laws, but he was hesitant. After a particularly shocking 
case of lynching in California, where the victims happened 
to be white, Roosevelt made a statement condemning the 
action. Still, he made no request for federal legislation. 
According to Fishel, Roosevelt refused "because he needed 
southern votes in Congress on other matters."^
In 1 9 4 1 , A. Philip Randolph, president of the Broth­
erhood of Sleeping Car Porters, threatened to march on 
Washington in hopes of making evident the need for job 
equality for blacks. Under the pressure of the proposed 
march, on June 25> 1941, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
8802 forbidding discrimination in defense industries and 
establishing the Committee on Fair Employment Practices 
(FEPC). To satisfy the South he announced in Birmingham 
that it was "a war order, and not a social document."^ 
Furthermore, the South had little reason to be concerned 
because the FEPC was unenforceable for the most part.
g
Ibid., p . 2 9 1 •
^Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, pp. 715-14
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Yet the New Deal Administration with its programs, 
which inadvertently helped blacks, and with verbal state­
ments directed at Negroes, won votes for the Democratic 
party. By 1934, it was clear that Negroes were severing 
their traditional ties to the Republican party. Since 
the Republican party made only meager efforts to win the 
black vote, Negroes had little choice in selecting a major 
party to support. Republicans could not convincingly 
promise federal relief, nor were they willing to support 
civil rights legislation that might win the blacks to
gtheir ranks. The Republican party, still nourishing 
dreams of breaking the solid South, was, therefore, un­
willing to take any action which might alienate potential 
southern supporters.
If President Roosevelt soft-pedaled the race issue, 
his wife, Eleanor, did not. She spoke and acted from a 
sincere belief in equality for all races. She invited 
racially mixed groups to the White House for tea and re­
peatedly defended blacks in public. Acting as an inter­
mediary between Roosevelt and the representatives of black 
groups, Mrs. Roosevelt drew more official attention to the 
Negroes than that accorded by any previous Administration. 
It was Mrs. Roosevelt who gained an audience with the Pres­
ident for Walter White, NAACP official concerned with the
o Fishel, "The Negro in the New Deal Era," p. 300.
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passage of an anti-lynching bill. Then again when the 
DAR refused to let Marian Anderson, Negro opera singer, 
perform in Constitution Hall, it was Mrs. Roosevelt who 
had a hand in securing the use of the Lincoln Memorial 
for Miss Anderson's concert. With his wife serving in 
such a capacity, Roosevelt did not feel obligated to 
bring up unnecessarily the topic of race and thus lose
9political support from certain segments of the nation.
There were others of importance in the Roosevelt 
Administration who also worked for Negro rights. One of 
the most outstanding was Harold Ickes, the Secretary of 
the Interior. Active in the National Association lor the 
Advancement of Colored People, he was president of the 
local chapter in Chicago for a time. By naming respon­
sible Negroes to positions in the Department of Interior, 
he set an example of racial non-discriminatory hiring. 
Also it was Ickes who was responsible for Roosevelt's 
appointment of William Henry Hastie, a Negro, as a fed­
eral judge in the Virgin Islands.
Although Roosevelt extended the powers of the fed­
eral government more than anyone since Lincoln and asso­
ciated to an extent with blacks, he was also able to keep 
the South in line. Flurries of southern revolt occurred 
but these were small and spasmodic. Even Strom Thurmond
^Ibid., p. 295•
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admired Roosevelt enough that he displayed Roosevelt's 
picture in his office long after he had removed the one 
of Truman that once had hung alongside it.
Yet it was during the Roosevelt Administration 
that Negroes were allowed to participate more fully in 
the social and economic life of the nation. This was 
especially true of the war years when blacks became in­
creasingly active in demanding equal rights and equal 
opportunities. Roosevelt, however, handled the question 
of civil rights without excessively antagonizing either 
the South or the black community. By expressing support 
ioj. lacks he satisfied them and by not implementing a 
concrete civil rights program, he pacified the South.
It was during the war and because of the war that 
the blacks made their greatest progress toward attaining 
civil liberties. While wartime conditions amplified the 
status of civil rights in general, efforts to continue 
segregation in the armed forces called attention to the 
nation's reactionary racial p o l i c i e s . I n  December of 
1 9 4 1 , the War Department stood on record as refusing to 
desegregate the Army. But by November, 1945, an Army 
committee, after studying the matter thoroughly, re­
quested the integration of its divisions. It was not 
until the Truman Administration, however, that actual 
desegregation of the armed forces was achieved.
^^Clark, The South, pp. 314-29-
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Under the exigency of war Negroes contributed to 
Allied victories by working in factories a t .home and 
fighting abroad. Over a million blacks, men and women, 
served in all branches of the armed forces. Seven thou­
sand Negroes served as officers, and Negro entertainers 
such as Louis Armstrong and Lena Horne helped to break 
the color line by touring the Army camps with USO troops.
There were then specific aspects of the war which 
called attention to the domestic state of civil rights 
in this country. Many Americans who were aware of the 
master race theories and practices of the Germans were 
awakened to the meaning of racial discrimination. Negroes 
and whites saw the incompatibility in American ideals and 
practices. The United States was fighting a world war to 
win freedom and equality for people around the globe, and 
yet it denied these same basic rights to a portion of its 
own population. The war experiences changed the attitudes 
of many southern blacks who had government jobs or who 
served overseas and enjoyed a degree of equality. They 
began to reject the second class treatment they received in 
the South. Even white southerners who served in the war 
frequently returned with new ideas on the matter of race.
Social acceptance of blacks and political and e<'o- 
nomic opportunities in the South, though still limited, 
became more general than ever before. Personal safety 
and security of blacks gradually increased. Lynching,
ko
one of the most outrageous of racial crimes, appeared to 
be ending: the recorded number in 19^2 was five and in
1949 it had dropped to one. Negro leaders seeking anti- 
lynching legislation during and after the war organized 
the Southern Regional Council in Atlanta in 1944 to combat 
prejudice. Another favorable development for blacks dur­
ing the war was the awareness of both major political par­
ties of the significance of the issue of civil rights and 
black votes.
These gains made by blacks were not achieved with­
out some friction and opposition and because of the striv­
ings of the blacks for equality, the period was one of 
racial unrest, national discriminations, and increased 
tensions. Rumors spread throughout the South that black 
men would harm white women with impunity since white males 
were serving in the war in such large numbers. Stories of 
"Eleanor Clubs," formed by Negro women who were to stop 
working in white kitchens at a given time, spread anxiety 
among southerners. There were also rumors that blacks 
were arming themselves with ice picks for a major uprising. 
Time proved these stories to be baseless. Nevertheless, 
with all its changes, the war did bring a major racial 
crisis to the South. But racial tensions were not con­
fined to the South. Negroes who moved to northern indus­
trial areas and to the West cost in search of employment 
clashed with urgan dwellers. Riots or near-riots occurred 
in New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles in 1943 and 1944.
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At the end of the war, Negroes, most lacking sen­
iority in industry due to recent employment, lost their 
jobs with the closing of wartime businesses. When the 
FEPC ended in 1946, they lost all semblance of protection 
against discrimination. In spite of efforts by the CIO 
and AFL to end racial injustice in labor unions, discrimi­
nation persisted. Since blacks were the last to be hired 
and the first to be fired, chronic unemployment became a 
way of life. This economic deprivation forced many Negroes 
into tenements or shacks and in some cases drove them into 
criminal activities.
As blacks were becoming increasingly aware of the 
need to expand their civil rights, Harry S. Truman assumed 
the presidency. His domestic program, the Fair Deal, which 
he clearly outlined to Congress on September 6, 1945, antag­
onized southerners. He advocated public housing, a fair 
employment practices law, future TVA's on the Missouri and 
Arkansas rivers, an increase in the minimum wage law and 
an expanded social security program. The Truman program, 
as understood by many southerners, sounded like the blue­
print of a highly socialistic system of government.
If the Fair Deal was an extension of the New Deal, 
the most notable progress beyond the New Deal was in the 
area of civil r i g h t s . , According to the traditional
Barton J. Bernstein, "America in War and Peac: 
The Test of Liberalism," in Twentieth Century America: 
Recent Interpretations, ed. by Barton J. Bernstein and
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interpretation as presented by Truman, he had long felt 
a sincere desire to help his fellow man, black as well as 
white, and his voting record in Congress seemed to support 
this view. He had opposed tabling an anti-lynching bill 
in July, 1937 1 a position which he maintained throughout 
1938. In 1940, he backed the Amendment of the Selective 
Service Act which was to prevent discrimination in the 
service. He also encouraged outlawing the poll tax in 
1942. In spite of his apparent support for civil rights 
measures some historians such as Barton Bernstein, con­
tend that Truman's record in this area was not as impres­
sive as it could have been. When Truman was a senator, 
Bernstein explains, he was not particularly interested in 
blaeks, and in fact even thought segregation and equality 
compatible. Bernstein recorded that Truman only "occa-
12sionally supported FEPC and abolition of the poll tax.” 
While Truman condemned racial violence, Bernstein said he 
refused to do much other than pay lip service to the cause 
of the blacks until politics entered the picture. Although 
it is true that Truman was not a leading civil rights advo­
cate in his public service days prior to the presidency, he
Allen J. Matusow (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
Inc., 1969)5 p . 364. Hereinafter referred to as Bernstein, 
"Text of Liberalism."
12Barton J. Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy: The
Truman Administration and Civil Rights," in Politics and 
Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. by Barton J. 
Bernstein (Chicago : Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1970), p. 272.
Hereinafter referred to as Bernstein, "Ambiguous Legacy."
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was at least concerned with the plight of the Negro. Af­
ter becoming President, Truman's handling of civil rights 
issues became suspect. Political expediency appeared to 
supersede other motives in determining the course that he 
followed in 1948.
His first measures in the presidency included cau­
tiously extending legal rights and personal protection to 
blacks. During the first year he occupied the presidency, 
Truman did not firmly assert himself on civil rights, per­
haps, because he feared splitting the already tenuous 
Democratic coalition of labor, blacks, and southerners.
While Truman diligently supported a permanent FEPC which 
he knew Congress would refuse to pass, he was less ener-
13getic in enforcing the temporary FEPC created by Roosevelt.
Nonetheless, in December, 1945, Truman issued an 
Executive Order on "Continuing the Work of the Fair Employ­
ment Practice Committee." In part it ordered the committee 
to investigate and make suggestions in the form of a report 
to the President concerning discrimination in industries 
engaged in the production of military supplies, or to those
l4involved in the change to a peacetime economy. The tem­
porary FEPC was at least better than none at all.
Without doubt the social and political climate of 
the period pressured him into action. As President, he
^^Bernstein, "Test of Liberalism," p. 366. 
l4News Release, December 20, 1945, George Elsey 
Papers, Discrimination File.
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occupied the office at a time when foreign affairs were 
of utmost importance. Truman thought it inconceivable 
that Americans could protect a color line domestically 
while continuing to deal with Asian and African peoples. 
According to him, we should "practice what we preached," 
and as he wrote in his memoirs, he did all that he could 
toward this end.^^ Even Bernstein concedes that Truman 
who was "prodded by conscience and pushed by politics" 
made more far-reaching promises to blacks than had any 
previous President.
Truman was active in several areas of furthering 
black civil rights. In 1946, he appointed a committee to 
study discrimination in higher education. This committee 
called for an end to the inequalities and various forms 
of racial discrimination that existed. Although integra­
tion in the armed services started during the closing 
years of the war, Truman gave direction and impetus to it 
in the postwar period. As a result of the report issued 
by a committee appointed by Truman in 1948 called Freedom 
To Serve, the Army, now cognizant of the committee’s rec­
ommendations, adopted non-discriminatory policies in regard 
to jobs and personnel. The growth of racial violence and 
political pressures forced the President to act favorably
Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II 
of Memoirs (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956),
p. 183. Hereinafter referred to as Truman, Memoirs, II.
^^Bernstein, "Test of Liberalism," p. 366.
45
to a request made by the NAACP in 1946. As spokesman for 
the NAACP Walter White along with other liberals informed 
the President of the lynchings and injustices to which 
Negroes were being subjected in the South and prevailed
17upon him to appoint a committee to investigate the matter.
On December 5i 1946, Truman appointed a special com­
mittee to report on the status of civil rights in the na­
tion. According to his instructions this committee was 
established not for one particular minority group but for 
all racial and religious groups. He requested that the 
committee submit a report consisting of recommendations 
which would provide more "effective means and procedures
for the protection of the civil rights of the people of
1 o
the United States." On January I5 , 194?1 Truman ad­
dressed the members of the Committee on Civil Rights, 
noting that it was time that the United States implemented 
the Bill of Rights. Acknowledging that much progress had 
been made, hj urged that more be done to insure the civil
19rights of all citizens. Later, speaking at the annual 
meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People on June 29 1 1947> the President declared
^^Walter White, A Man Called White, The Autobiog­
raphy of Walter White (New York: Viking Press, 1948),
pp. 330-32.
18President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure 
These Rights (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1947), p p . vii.
Hereinafter referred to as To Secure These Rights.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, p. I8I.
46
that all Americans should be free to lead the kind of
life they choose; a man "should be limited only by his
responsibility to his fellow countrymen" and by "his
20ability, his industry and his character." How Truman 
really felt about racial policies would continually be 
debated among contemporary politicians and historians. 
Nevertheless, Truman did establish the committee whose 
report would have far-reaching political implications.
The composition of the committee was significant 
in that had Truman so desired he could have appointed 
moderates or even conservatives, thereby insuring that 
only mild recommendations would be made. Instead, he 
appointed prominent liberals whose recommendations and 
actions he could not control. The administration re­
ferred to the committee as Noah's Ark because it con­
sisted of two blacks, two women, two Catholics, two Jews,
two businessmen, two southerners, two labor leaders, and
21two college presidents.
During the committee's ten-month meeting period 
no administration representative sought to influence the 
report. Possibly Truman wanted a strong set of recommen­
dations so that when he outlined his own program it would,
22by comparison, appear mild.
^^Ibid.
21Bernstein, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 2?8.
p pIbid., pp. 281-83.
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When the report was completed, the focus of it 
clearly was on the blacks in the South because their 
civil rights were compromised more than any other group.
The four-part report began with a background of the ideal 
of civil rights followed by a presentation of its status 
in 1947. It attempted next to explain the government's 
role in attaining these rights and finally it presented 
thirty-four bold recommendations. Significantly, at the 
beginning, the report acknowledged the necessity of four 
basic rights. Essential to the individual as well as 
society, these were the right to the safety and security 
of the person, to citizenship, to freedom of conscience 
and expression, and to equality of opportunity.
One of the chief threats to the safety and security 
of the individual was lynching. In spite of a steady de­
cline of this practice from 1882-1947, there still had not 
been a year without at least one reported incident. Lynch­
ing victims were most often black and might have been
guilty of nothing more than petty theft or perhaps of no
2 3crime at all except that of "being black."
Individual security was also found to be threatened 
by police brutality, the administration of justice, and 
involuntary servitude. The report cited specific cases of 
prisoners beaten senseless and even killed by law officers, 
The judicial process, as pointed out by the report, often
23To Secure These Rights, pp. 20-23
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ended for blacks in perfunctory trials or fines or sen­
tences heavier than those levied on whites guilty of the 
same crime. In citing cases of involuntary servitude in 
Alabama and Mississippi the report found that debts or 
prison sentences sometimes lured the poor and defense-
24less into conditions of near slavery. The report fur­
ther condemned the wartime evacuation of Japanese-Americans 
as a threat to the safety and security of the individual.
Under the heading of abridgment of citizenship 
rights numerous examples were cited. White primaries, the 
poll tax, literacy requirements and intimidation were noted 
as the most common methods of discouraging black suffrage 
in the South. The report also paid special attention to 
the problems of citizenship of residents of Alaska and 
Hawaii.
Equality of opportunity was one of the most fre­
quently abused of all the civil rights. Not only was it 
difficult for minority groups to obtain employment, but 
once hired, the minority worker was usually paid less than 
other workers. The main areas of discrimination involved 
education, housing, and public accommodations. Many public 
parks, beaches, playgrounds, movies, restaurants, and other 
public and private services were closed to blacks. These 
situations were found to be most prevalent in the South. 
Findings of the committee revealed that eighteen states
^^Ibid., p. 30.
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prohibited this kind of discrimination while twenty states 
compelled it. The District of Columbia was an area, ac­
cording to the committee, where civil rights were abused
excessively; the committee concluded that the situation
25in the nation's capitol was "intolerable."
To insure these basic rights, the committee decided, 
was the responsibility of the federal government. After 
outlining the constitutional basis for federal action in 
this area, the repor noted the historical precedents for 
appraising and altering civil r i g h t s . T w i c e  earlier, 
during the Revolutionary era to I789 and in the period of 
the Civil War, the state of civil rights had been care­
fully evaluated and changed. According to the Civil Rights 
Committee a change was in order.
The committee enumerated moral, economic, and inter­
national reasons for making such reforms. Morally, the 
report read, it was essential to reaffirm traditional demo­
cratic ideal-s by putting the theory of freedom into prac­
tice. Economically, as long as discrimination was prac­
ticed in business, only a part of the work force was being 
utilized, and thus, Americans were not "achieving maximum 
production" levels. With a prestigious international 
status, domestic racial incidents had more widespread im­
plications than ever before. As a model for democracy 
throughout the world, the United States could hardly
^^Ibid., p. 3 2 . 2^Ibid., pp. 107-35
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overlook such blatant deprivation of civil rights, as the 
committee had discovered.
The committee, in conclusion, offered thirty-four 
recommendations under six major headings. Under the first 
of these major headings they pointed out the necessity of 
strengthening the machinery for the protection of civil 
rights. The section in the D e p a r t m e n t  of Justice dealing 
with civil rights should be expanded to provide for the 
establishment of regional and special offices. This would 
mean an increase in appropriations and personnel, includ­
ing more professional state and local police forces. They 
recommended the establishment both of a permanent Commis­
sion on Civil Rights and of a Joint Standing Committee on
2 7Civil Rights in Congress.
The next major recommendation included the enact­
ment of laws against police brutality, lynching, and in­
voluntary servitude. They called for the abolition of poll 
taxes, discriminatory tactics against minorities to deny 
them suffrage, a modification of federal naturalization 
laws, and an end to segregation in the Army.
Another recommendation asked that Congress clarify 
loyalty requirements so as not to jeopardize the civil 
rights of federal employees. But the most significant, 
and to the South the most infamous, recommendation called 
for integration of all aspects of American life. In public
^^Ibid., pp. 151-55.
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and private schools, in health services, in housing, and 
in interstate transportation, segregation should cease.
The report emphasized that neither job employment nor 
public accommodations should be operated on a discrimina-
28tory basis. Specifically, the committee requested that 
the District of Columbia reform its civil rights practices 
to insure freedom and equality to all its residents.
And the final recommendation of the committee was 
the initiation of an educational campaign to inform the 
public of the importance of preserving and extending civil 
rights for all citizens. The committee hoped that educa­
tion of the public on matters of prejudice would facilitate 
the implementation of these recommendations.
Although the President's Committee on Civil Rights 
submitted their recommendations in October, 194?, no action 
was taken until February 2, 1948. At that time, Truman, 
upon the urging of presidential advisor, Clark Clifford, 
delivered his civil rights message to Congress. Truman's 
decision to make these proposals was influenced by the
threat of a third party led by Henry Wallace, a factor
29which forced Truman toward a more liberal position.
His request, moderate in nature, incorporated only ten 
of the thirty-four proposals suggested by the committee.
The President's suggestions were as follows:
28 Ibid., pp. 166-70.
29Bernstein, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 282.
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1. Establishing a permanent Commission on Civil
Rights, a Joint Congressional Cbmml'ttee o'n 
Civil Rights, and a Civil Rights Division 
in the Department of Justice.
2. Strengthening existing civil rights statutes.
3. Providing Federal protection against lynching.
4. Protecting more adequately the right to vote.
5. Establishing a Fair Employment Practice Com­
mission to prevent unfair discrimination in 
employment.
6 . Prohibiting discrimination in interstate trans­
portation facilities.
7. Providing home-rule and suffrage in Presidential
elections for the residents of the District of 
Columbia.
8 . Providing Statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a
greater measure of self-government for our 
island possessions.
9. Equalizing the opportunities for residents of
the United States to become naturalized citizens.
10. Settling the evacuation claims of Japanese-
Americans . 30
Mild as these recommendations seem in retrospect,
they hit the South like a bombshell. All of the pent-up
dissatisfaction that southerners had been harboring toward 
the New Deal-Fair Deal programs was unleashed with blind 
fury. Fiery orations by politicians, preachers, and ordin­
ary citizens were heard from all parts of the South. The 
longer Truman's message was discussed in the South the more 
exaggerated and distorted it became. One example of the
gross misrepresentation that occurred can be seen by a full-
page advertisement that was carried in the Birmingham News, 
May 2, 1948. A portion of this was as follows:
10Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, 1948, Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Mes­
sages, Speeches and Statements of the President (Washing­
ton : G.P.O., 1964), pT 126. Hereinafter referred to as
Truman, Papers.
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Defeat Truman's Civil Rights Program 
Safeguard Segregation!
What "Civil Rights" Means to you:
President Truman has asked Congress to pass 
his "Civil Rights" Program--aimed at the destruc­
tion of the South's segregation laws. Here is 
what this program calls for :
1. Abolishment of segregation in all public 
schools--both as to children and teachers.
2. Abolishment of segregation in all colleges, 
including church schools, such as Judson, Howard, 
Birmingham-Southern and Huntingdon.
3. Abolishment of segregation in State- 
supported colleges such as Alabama, Auburn, Monte- 
vallo, and the Teacher Colleges.
4. Abolishment of segregation in restaurants, 
hotels, picture shows, street cars, buses, barber 
shops, beauty shops and swimming pools.
5. Compulsory employment of negroes in every 
business establishment (up to approximately kO% 
in Jefferson County) and the discharge of present 
employes where necessary to achieve a ratio of 
employment in all businesses of 60% white employes 
and kO% negro employes.
6 . Compulsory association of whites and negroes, 
working side by side in offices and factories, food, 
drug and department stores.
7. Compulsory upgrading of negro employes to 
positions of supervision over whites in the same 
racial ratio.
8 . Enforcement of these requirements by fine 
and jail sentences.31
"Prohibiting discrimination in interstate transpor­
tation facilities" was the only direct reference to segre­
gation that the President had made. In regard to this 
point, Truman pointed out that the Supreme Court had al­
ready declared state laws that required segregation on 
public carriers in interstate travel to be unconstitutional 
Truman did not even allude to ending segregation in beauty
^^Heard, A Two Party South? pp. I6I-6 2 .
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shops, movies, restaurants, churches, schools, or swimming 
pools. In regard to the request of fair employment prac­
tice legislation to end discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, or national origin, there was nothing said about 
applying these requirements to all businesses, public or 
private.
Out of the ten proposals made by Truman, the South 
was only concerned with four. They focused their atten­
tion on their own interpretation of the proposals to elim­
inate segregation, to abolish the poll tax, to pass an
anti-lynching law, and to enact a fair employment practice 
32law. Southern opposition as expressed in their rhetoric 
centered around these four points, all most distasteful to 
the South.
Some efforts were made by the Truman Administration 
to soothe the South. On February 4, presidential aide 
Charles Murphy approached Alben Barkley, the Senate minor­
ity leader, with an "omnibus" civil rights bill, but Barkley 
advised that they wait until the southerners calmed down; 
the bill was never introduced because the South never calmed 
down. Truman also retreated in that he was slow to take 
action against discrimination in federal employment and 
against segregation in the armed forces. These two matters 
were finally introduced in late July.
"Know All the Facts About Truman's So-Called Civil 
Rights Program, and What It Means to You," States Rights 
Clipping File, Mississippi State Archives. Hereinafter 
referred to as "Know All the Facts."
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The administration's strategy was to begin with a
strong program and then modify it in order to satisfy the
right wing of the party. Truman even agreed to use the
generalized and meaningless 1^44 platform on civil rights
in 1948. Negroes, desirous of a stronger plank, still
supported Truman because his program "was unmatched by
33any twentieth century president."
Most of the country had mixed reactions to the 
President's message, but in the South condemnation was 
solid. The day after the message was delivered, the Ku 
Klux Klan, in Swainsboro, Georgia, burned a fiery cross
34in protest. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated 
incident but rather one that was repeated in several 
other small southern towns. Most southerners did not 
read the committee's report nor could they distinguish 
between what the report said and what Truman requested 
in his Congressional message. Undoubtedly, there was a 
great deal of genuine confusion on the part of some 
southerners. Others exaggerated the meaning of Truman's 
message by explaining what they thought it would even­
tually mean. To generalize about the motives of the 
various southern leaders is difficult. Some capitalized 
upon the fear of their constituencies in hopes of gaining
^^Bernstein, "Test of Liberalism," p. 368.
34 "The South: War Between Democrats," Newsweek,
February I6 , 1948, pp. 24-25. Hereinafter referred to as 
"War Between the Democrats."
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political power for themselves; other, genuinely alarmed 
at the growth of the power of the federal government, sin­
cerely felt a need to warn the public. Whatever the rea­
sons for the distortions, they grew progressively stronger 
with the passage of time and their audience grew increas­
ingly more receptive to their rhetoric.
Since many southerners were unfamiliar with what 
actually had been said by Truman and by the committee, . 
they relied on what their representatives told them. It 
is essential, then, to examine closely the rhetoric of 
the political leaders of the South. To many southerners, 
the program was, according to Hodding Carter, in the New 
York Times, "a politically motivated and all-out offensive 
against the conglomerate of laws, customs and attitudes
35which give expression to the doctrine of white supremacy."
Southern Congressional reaction to the civil rights 
message was vociferous. Some seventy-five Congressmen, who 
represented the ten southern states and the two border 
states of Kentucky and Tennessee, signed a resolution con­
demning the civil rights program. The thrust of the reso­
lution was concerned with the usurpation of the rights of 
the states by the federal government. Senator Overton
ISHodding Carter, "The Civil Rights Issue As Seen 
in the South: A Mississippi Editor Analyzes the Factors
That Lie Beneath the Great Controversy," New York Times 
Magazine, March 21, 1$48, pp. 15, 52-55* Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Carter, "Civil Rights Issue."
"Five Days that Shook the Democrats," Newsweek, 
March 1, 1948, pp. I5-I6 .
57
Brooks of Louisiana stated that Truman had "cast the die,"
and "crossed the Rubicon," and now was "marching on the
Southland with the battle cry of social, political, and
37economic equality of the Negro and the white man." To 
Brooks, war had "been openly declared by the chieftain 
of the National Democratic Party against the traditions
o Qand Caucasianism of the South." Numerous similar denun­
ciations were heard across the South. Mississippi's Sena­
tor James Eastland roared, "This proves that organized 
mongrel minorities control the Government." Gene Cox,
representative from Georgia cried that it "sounds like
39the program of the Communist Party." Representative 
William M. Colmer of Mississippi expounded that the logi­
cal extension of the Truman program would mean that the 
federal government would eventually control every single 
action of every citizen. Implementation of the civil 
rights legislation would mean:
. . . the creation of a Federal police force, which,
in effect, would become an American version of the 
Hitler gestapo. Its agents, not unlike Stalin's 
secret police, would rove about the Nation policing 
elections, meddling with private business, inter­
fering in lawsuits, breeding litigation, keeping 
the people in a state of duress and intimidation.
37Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 19^8,
A 1512.
^^Ibid.
39 "The Congress: Congress' Week," Time, Febru­
ary 16, 1948, p. 25.
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and in effect, making of the Nation a police 
state.
Senator James Eastland explained that civil rights 
legislation was unnecessary because the South had no race 
problem. The "races live together in contentment," said 
Eastland. "Both races know and respect each other" and 
the "Negro receives a square deal. Both races recognize
1̂that the society of the South is built upon segregation."
Congressman Tom Murray of Tennessee urged all Con­
gressmen to read the report of the President's committee 
carefully. He warned that it was "the me-t revolutionary 
document of its kind that has ever been made." He con­
tinued to point out that the report was "full of slurs, 
libel, and misrepresentation and untruths about the South." 
Murray called the whole report an insult to the South and 
a document which was sanctioned by the Communists. Accord­
ing to Murray, the adoption of the civil rights program 
which would destroy all vestiges of states' rights and 
local rule would result in the formation of a totalitarian
k2government in the United States.
In accordance with the committee's suggestion that 
civil rights information be made available to the public, 
broadcasts were made for this purpose. Richard B. Russell,
p. 4270.
4oCongressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948,
^^Ibid., pp. 1193-98. ^^Ibid., p. 1702.
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Senator from Georgia, asked the Mutual Broadcasting System 
for time to answer these broadcasts. The network complied 
with his request and on March 23, 19^8, he and three other 
Senators aired the southern point of view. The thrust of 
their orations centered around four specific points: the
increasing centralization of government, the poll tax, the 
anti-lynching proposal and the FEPC. In his introduction, 
Russell commented in general on the program. He began his 
comments by objecting to the fact that the criticisms of 
the committee's report were directed solely at the South. 
Me objected to the composition of the committee charging 
that there was no one on the committee who represented 
the majority southern opinion. Although there were south­
erners on the committee, their opinions, according to Rus­
sell, were not reflective of the true South. Russell 
mourned the loss of local self-government and the creation 
of federal policemen who would enforce the new laws. He 
saw such extreme centralization as inevitably leading to 
"complete regimentation and to that disastrous loss of 
personal liberties which marks the centralized police 
state.
Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South Carolina de­
clared that since the Constitution specifically provided 
that the states determine qualifications for voting, the
^^Ibid., A 1863-64.
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repeal of the poll tax laws in any state would be illegal 
and in his words, a "serious departure from governmental
kkprinciples." Senator Clyde R. Joey of North Carolina, 
speaking against the anti-lynching bill, claimed that only 
one person in the United States was lynched during the en­
tire previous year. There were, however, according to his 
estimates, "over 13,000 murders, over 12,000 rapes and 
over 1 ,300,000 serious crimes"; yet the committee on civil 
rights had not so much as mentioned these facts.
In his analysis of the FEPC bill. Senator Lister 
Hill of Alabama called it a bill "to destroy civil rights." 
He thought it unconstitutional for the government to regu­
late the making of contracts in regard to hiring and firing 
of workers. The endless interrogations and investigations 
occasioned by such a bill would disrupt business "to the 
point where orderly plant management and efficient produc-
46tion would b -e impossible."
These comments by Senators Russell, Maybank, Joey, 
and Hill highlighted what the South labeled as the most 
offensive parts of the Truman program. How large an audi­
ence they had or how much influence their comments carried 
is impossible to estimate. But these were the views that 
were declared to reflect the southern opinion.
Even at this early point some southerners saw the 
need for drastic action. Harold Willingham, representative
^^Ibid., A 1865. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., A 1866.
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of Cobb County in the Georgia Legislature, proposed a plan 
of setting up a fourth party. His colleague, Representa­
tive Henderson Lanham also of Georgia, however, believed 
this was unwise and that the fight should be an intra­
party battle. Lanham advised that at the convention the 
South should demand the re-establishment of the two-thirds 
rule, the selection of a southerner for the Vice-Presidency, 
and the abandonment by the Democratic party of anti-southern
k?measures. Lanham's three demands were proposed at the 
Democratic Convention only to be ignored. There was, how­
ever, an interesting solution to the South's problem pro­
posed by a Republican Congressman who offered to make a 
deal with the southern Democrats. Mr. Clare Hoffman, in a 
speech to the House of Representatives, proposed that south­
erners make common cause with the Republicans. The Republi­
cans then would block civil rights legislation if the south­
erners would help them on other issues. This was the only 
way, he pointed out, that sound conservative government 
could be restored to the United States. Most southerners,
however, considered this a revolutionary proposal and dis-
48missed it with little, if any, serious consideration.
Southern reaction to civil rights in general was 
reflected in numerous pamphlets and papers which appeared 
with frequency all over the South. One such paper put out 
by the southern opponents of Truman's civil rights program.
^^Ibid., A 1890. ^^Ibid., p. 2335
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entitled "An Analysis of the Truman Program and the Report 
of the President's Committee on Civil Rights," was an ex­
pression of southern reaction to the proposals. First and 
foremost, the authors pointed out that the South had a 
peculiar kind of problem with the Negro that only those 
who lived in the South could ever hope to understand. Be­
cause of the heritage of slavery, the South should be al­
lowed to make its own laws concerning race. According to 
this paper, Truman's commission was established for reasons 
of political expediency— to win "the vote of the Negroes in 
those states where this minority block amounts to a balance 
of power between the two parties."
In another section entitled "The Far-Reaching and 
Not Generally Known Extent of the Report and Its Recommend­
ations," the reorganization of the Department of Justice so 
as to provide enforcement faculties for the law was regarded 
as particularly distasteful to the South. The first obser­
vation made on this proposal was that it "would result in 
the establishment of a Gestapo" that would invade all pri­
vacies and rights of individual citizens.
The pamphlet compared the anti-lynching proposal of 
19^18 to the Force Bill of the l8yO's. In conclusion, the 
report stated its displeasure with Truman as a nominee and
"An Analysis of the Truman Program and the Report 
of the President's Committee on Civil Rights," Montgomery, 
Alabama, State Department of Archives and History, Frank M. 
Dixon Papers, 1948 File.
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promised that the South would be united against his renom­
i n a t i o n . A n o t h e r  pamphlet, "Know All the Facts About 
Truman's So-Called 'Civil Rights' Program and What It 
Means To You," said that the Truman proposals, were not 
civil rights, "they are social and political rights just 
as much opposed to Southern traditions as any that were 
advocated by the carpetbaggers."^^
A state-by-state survey showed anti-Truman feelings 
to be most belligerent in the six states of the Deep South:
Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
5 2and Arkansas. In Arkansas, Governor Ben Laney expressed
an opinion that seemed to be typical of the feelings of
most of his constituents. He stated that he had no "an-
5 3tagonism toward any man or race, creed or color." He 
claimed he would support any program that would improve 
mankind, but that these men would have to accept the re­
sponsibility that accompanied privileges. Laney was not 
opposed to the elimination of the poll tax and felt that 
it would be done before long by all of the southern states, 
but he did want it done by the state government and not by 
federal order. Each state, he thought, should dictate its 
own form of registration and could manage to handle its
^^Ibid. ^^"Know All the Facts."
5 2 "War Between the Democrats," p. 23.
5 3Letter, Ben Laney to Vincent Cunningham, April 12, 
1948, Magnolia, Arkansas, Ben Laney Papers, Governor Ben 
Laney File.
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own affairs including the lynching issue without the aid
54of the federal government or any other state. Accord­
ing to the letters received by Laney, approximately 98
per cent of his constituents were favorable to his stand
55with regard to the Truman message. Although these atti­
tudes reflect the public mood in Arkansas only, it may be 
assumed that such attitudes were prevalent in some other 
southern states. Some of the public response was as radi­
cal as the following letter that Senator Allen J. Ellender 
of Louisiana received:
In brief, if the civil rights bill becomes a law 
it is then we begin sewing seeds for a mongrel, 
or unnamed, race. We are now trying to "make 
Democracy live" just to please Russia. The FEPC 
and the anti-segregation law will ultimately make 
our race anonymous, a race unknown to God Almighty.
Why not give these unfortunate people 2  reservation 
here in the USA, ^  suitable part of this country 
where they could run their own business, educate 
their offsprings to their highest standards. It 
would take 25 years to make the change but it would 
be worth the price and patience.5o
Fortunately most of the letters were not so hostile 
but many were filled with similar ideas. From Florida, 
Governor Millard F . Caldwell interpreted the whole civil 
rights program as an effort to alter the form of government
Laney Papers, Employ the Physically Handicapped Week File.
^ Letter, Ben Laney to M. F . Webb, June 11, 1948,
5 5Letters, Laney Papers, Employ the Physically 
Handicapped Week File.
^^Letter, Thomas Hilton to Senator Allen Ellender, 
December 30, 1948, Laney Papers, Governors Inaugural 
Addresses File.
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in the United States. He expressed great concern at a 
"Washington Gestapo to police the internal affairs of the 
several States." The powers that would enable the civil 
rights program to be enforced would also spy on the pri­
vate lives of the citizens, interfere with the operation 
of schools, churches, and even the homes. This force 
would determine what knowledge and beliefs the people 
would have and how they should live. Caldwell charged
that "the purpose of the legislation is political and not
5 7humanitarian, sociological or religious in nature."
Caldwell said that it was unfortunate that the 
front of civil rights was being put up by the administra­
tion at the expense of the minorities. He saw the whole 
program as a means of getting the minority vote. Caldwell 
asserted that federal interference "will invite discord 
and disorder" and "instead of encouraging a spirit of 
mutual helpfulness, the Civil Rights Program will array
J -  o
section against section and class against class."
While denouncing the civil rights program, many 
southerners began questioning the motives of Truman. The 
charge of political expedience was repeated again and 
again. That Truman was more concerned with the northern 
and the black vote than he was with the welfare of the
5 7Speech, Governor Millard Caldwell, April 6 , 1^48, 
Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
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nation was one of the most frequently repeated notions.
In Texas, Governor Beauford Jester said "the most unex­
pected and cruelest wound has come from the dagger blow 
of a trusted friend." As he saw it, the program "was 
proposed for the sole purpose of getting Negro votes in 
the so-called doubtful States.
Representative Lanham of Georgia accused Truman of 
not believing in his own civil rights program, but of ex­
pounding it to counteract the program of the extreme lib­
erals, led by Henry Wallace. Truman, Lanham charged, was 
out to win the Negro vote in the urban a r e a s . G e s s n e r  T . 
McCorvey of Alabama made similar charges by characterizing 
the "Civil Strife Program" as a "conscienceless betrayal 
of the South," the purpose of which was to win the Negro 
vote in the North and East. McCorvey added that it was 
difficult to imagine that "such unprincipaled political 
opportunists could live in this great country of ours."^^
Southern reactionaries felt that the man in the 
White House had betrayed them. In 1944 Franklin Roosevelt 
had chosen Truman, a border state man, who supposedly
Speech, Governor Buford Jester, April 20, 1948, 
Montgomery, Alabama, State Department of Archives and 
History, Governor Jim Folsom Papers, Democratic Party File.
^°Ibid.
^^Gessner T. McCorvey, "A Deep South States' Rights 
Democrat Views the 1952 Presidential Election," Dixon 
Papers, Unfiled. Hereinafter referred to as McCorvey, "A 
States' Rights Democrat."
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understood the problems of the South, as his vice-president, 
Now southerners discovered that Truman intended to alter 
the southern "caste system" and they were outraged. Propa­
ganda charged that the President advocated intermarriage, 
integration of the races at social functions and schools, 
and the eventual "mongrelization" of the races.
Truman's personal image in the South was shattered 
as grossly as was his civil rights program. After the in­
troduction of the program, the South abounded with slander­
ous literature on the personal life of the President. He 
was accused of being a crooked politician, of illegally 
securing the nomination for the United States Senate, and 
of being one of the "Four Horsemen of the Pendergast Ma-
62chine." The validity of such propaganda was accepted 
unquestioningly by radical southerners who thought nothing 
of the personal political risks that Truman was taking by 
supporting such a program.
An examination of tne political situation in 1^48 
exemplifies the problems inherent in Truman's action. He 
was faced with three divisions in his party: the radicals,
who followed Henry Wallace of the Progressive party; the 
liberals, like James Roosevelt and Hubert Humphrey of the 
Americans for Democratic Action; and the conservatives, 
who later formed the Dixiecrat party.
^^"Know All the Facts."
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Even though Wallace was being discredited by Commu­
nist support, since he could harness the votes of the left­
wingers and northern Negroes, Truman found it necessary to 
pay attention to some of the ideas he espoused, especially 
the drive for equality for blacks. Although the moderate 
liberals stood for a progressive type government which 
Truman could supply if Congress did not continue to thwart 
his every plan, they disliked the methods that Truman used 
to implement his ideas. They felt that he acted too slowly 
and was too moderate in his program.
The conservatives, primarily from the South, were 
historically committed to the Democratic party due to their 
age-old hostility toward the Republicans. It might have 
been possible to hold them in line with threats of with­
holding patronage or reprisals against those southerners 
in key positions, but it was difficult to guage correctly 
just how far the South would go in their opposition to 
Truman.
It seemed at the time that Truman would have been 
wise to pay lip service to civil rights without making spe­
cific proposals. Although so:..e of his advisers proposed 
such a course and repeatedly implored him to modify his 
civil rights message, the President would not agree to this, 
nor would he retreat later on the strong civil rights plank 
adopted at the Democratic Convention. John E. Barrière, 
member of the Research Division of the Democratic National
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Committee, explained that Truman disliked the strong civil 
rights statement but once it was adopted, felt obliged to
6 Qsupport it for political reasons.
A somewhat conflicting view was presented by presi­
dential aide, Samuel Brightman, and Jack Redding, Director 
of Public Relations for the Democratic National Committee, 
denying that politics was a chief consideration credited
Truman as having acted with sincere "conviction and cour-
64age in this area." Redding confirms Brightman's state­
ment. To the charge that Truman used civil rights to en­
hance his political power, Redding contended that the 
President had no ulterior motives but was just a plain 
man who did things in a clear and direct manner--a factor 
which perpetually confused political analysts looking for 
secret motives and plans.
If some of Truman's advisers suggested a moderate 
course on civil rights, it should be noted that the most 
influential of his advisers were more liberal. Clark 
Clifford, the President's most trusted liberal adviser 
assured Truman of the South's loyalty to the Democratic 
party and urged him to concentrate on winning the votes
Transcript of Interview, John E. Barrière, Decem­
ber 20, 1 9 6 6 , Truman Library.
64Transcript of Interview, Samuel C. Brightman, 
December 7-8, I9 6 6 , Truman Library.
^^Jack Redding, Inside the Democratic Party (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), p p . 129-33»
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of the urban North. In the Clifford Memo, the famous 
document outlining Truman's political strategy, Clifford 
advised him to take a more positive stand on the issue of 
civil rights for the purpose of winning the liberal and
l-T T , 6 6black vote.
Regardless of motives Truman made significant con­
tributions in the area of race relations. Perhaps he was 
not as progressive on the race issue as some would have 
liked, but when judged in historical perspective, he could 
be considered a pioneer. While he was not totally immune 
to playing politics, he did have a sincere interest in 
helping minority groups, and by sending his civil rights 
message to Congress and running on a strong civil rights 
platform for re-election, Truman displayed uncommon courage,
"Memorandum for the President," November 19, 
19^71 Truman Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Political 
File. Hereinafter referred to as Clifford Memo.
CHAPTER III
ISSUES AND IDEOLOGY
A major turning point in southern political history 
occurred in February of 1948 when Truman delivered his 
civil rights message. From this point on momentum for a 
southern bolt away from the Democratic party gradually in­
creased. The support of the national Democratic party for 
the 1948 civil rights message demonstrated that the admin­
istration and its supporters lacked empathy with the South.^ 
As far as the conservative southern Democrats were 
concerned the Republican party was little better than the 
Democratic party, for in 1944 the Republicans advocated a 
fair employment practices program. Conservatives from the 
South, who were disillusioned with the liberal and central­
izing tendencies of both major parties decided to form a 
separate political organization dedicated to the ideal of 
states' rights. Although the party itself did not take 
firm shape until after the Democratic convention was held, 
the impetus for the movement had long existed. Even after
E. A. Brown, "Why the Democratic Party is Disinte­
grating," Columbia, South Carolina, State Historical Soci­
ety, Burnet R. Maybank Papers, Democratic Party File.
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the actual formation of the States' Rights or Dixiecrat 
party there was a great deal of confusion that clouded 
the status of the Dixiecrats: were they a separate party,
were they a bolting group within the Democratic party, or 
were they, as their leaders claimed, the real Democratic 
party?
Traditionally, the rise of third parties in the
United States had come about when the major parties failed
to represent the ideas of a certain group. Although third
parties were of various types, the usual pattern was for
their protest to be absorbed by the major parties and for
2them then to disappear. The various types of third par­
ties included those sectional in nature, such as the La- 
Follette Progressives or the Farm Labor group; those with 
a single issue to espouse, such as the perennial Prohibi­
tion Party; those of a splinter variety lasting only for 
one election, such as the Roosevelt Progressives; and 
those that were outside the mainstream of American politi­
cal ideology, such as the Communist or Socialist parties.
The functions of third parties are enormous; they 
serve to call attention to new policies, to point up seri­
ous problems, to offer solutions, and to serve as critics 
of the two major parties. Sometimes they may hold enough 
of a balance of power in presidential elections to be able 
to bargain with both parties in order to gain acceptance
2Heard, A Two Party South? p. ,
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for at least some of their ideas. The weight of third
parties may be used to steal the victory from one party
and give it to another. Although this is a possibility,
however, only about six times have third parties actually
3influenced national elections.
Third parties have also served "as pilot plants
4for testing new ideas." Frequently, if a new idea or 
policy supported by the third party is favorably accepted 
by the public, a major party will often adopt it as its 
own. If this does not occur, the new idea is generally 
forgotten.^ According to the safety-valve theory, the 
function of minor parties can, if the majority is will­
ing to be tolerant, provide a healthy situation in a demo­
cratic society by offering a legitimate and organized 
channel of expression for discontent. The two-party sys­
tem may be strengthened if it absorbs some of the ideas 
of the third parties as is usually the case.^ American 
historian John Hicks writes that third parties have devel­
oped in periods of prosperity more often than in periods 
of depression. When one section of the country feels it 
is being mistreated by another section, the resultant
3William B. Hesseltine, Third Party Movements in 
the United States (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company,





7factor is sometimes the rise of a third party. This 
observation is applicable to the Dixiecrats.
Some minor parties have produced leaders who later 
became prominent Figures in the major parties: Thurlow
Weed, Thaddeus Stevens, and Charles Sumner are examples. 
Ex-Presidents Millard Fillmore, Martin Van Buren, and 
Theodore Roosevelt have headed three third party move­
ments. Two Vice-Presidents, John C. Breckinridge and 
Henry Wallace, ran for the presidency on third party 
tickets, and governors, lesser state officials, and un­
knowns have also headed minor party movements.
The Dixiecrat party, however, differed from other 
third parties in numerous respects. In the first place 
its aims were limited to presidential politics for one 
election year. Thus they began their work from the top 
down rather than from the bottom up. Most protest par­
ties such as the Greenback, Free Soil, Populists, and 
Progressives were left wing in nature.^ But working in 
reverse from the usual third party, the southern protest 
came from the right rather than from the left. The Dixie­
crat party was a sectional, single issue, splinter-type
^John D. Hicks, "The Third Party Tradition," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XX (June, 1933- 
March, 1934), 2?-20.
^Emile B. Ader, The Dixiecrat Movement: Its Role
in "~hird Party Politics (Washington, D.C.: Pub lie Affair s
Pr a s"sl 1955 ), p. 5*̂ Hê r einaf ter referred to as Ader, The 
r^xiecrat Movement.
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9party. Furthermore, it hailed the beginning of a new 
political form in the United States, "the organized party 
within a party, or a satellite party." This meant "some­
thing more than a pressure group, something less than 
full-fledged parties waging an independent campaign.
This uncertain status of the dissenters caused a 
confusion that pervaded the life of the movement. Like 
third parties, the States' Righters usually had little 
of the structural strength that the major parties had, 
and as their movement progressed the lack of local foun­
dations emerged as a prime weakness. The Dixiecrats 
served primarily to promote a minority viewpoint, a factor 
which limited its appeal. Because the party was sectional, 
neither major party could afford to support its cause with­
out losing some support in non-southern regions.
This sectionalism was a charge repeatedly denied by 
the Dixiecrats, yet there was little doubt concerning their 
geographical limitations. The States' Righters always dis­
liked the term "Dixiecrat" which gave a definite sectional 
label to the party without expressing the principles of the
cause. They preferred States' Rights Democrats or States'
12Righters as their official name. With time the term
Papers.
^Ibid., pp. 2-3 -
^^Hesseltine, Third Party Movements, p. 97*
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 31*
12 "Newsletter," Longview, Texas, Merritt Gibson
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"Dixiecrat," as used by the press, became one of derision.
Bill Weisner, telegraph editor of the Charlotte News,
coined the term when he was writing a headline for a story
on the SRD's and discovered that the word would fit nicely
there. Weisner thought of using the initials "SRD," but
said it might be interpreted as "Standing Room for Demo-
13crats" or sonething comparable. According to Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina that label "puts the States' 
Rights Democrats behind the eight ball in other sections 
of the Nation" and in fact was a "5-yard penalty in talk-
1^ing to the voters of the north, the Midwest and Far West." 
The States' Righters eventually became accustomed to the 
satire and adverse publicity that they received at the 
hands of the press, and oily the most reactionary news­
papers in the country supported their cause.
While most southerners appeared to be solely con­
cerned with the civil rights program of Truman, there were 
other issues that contributed to the southern revolt.
Among these were ownership of the tidelands, the southern 
heritage, the declining importance of the South in national 
politics, the changing ideology of the Democratic party, 
the increasing centralization of the federal government, 
and the changing southern economic situation. With all the
13The Charlotte News (Charlotte, North Carolina),
September 3, 1940. 
14Clipping, unfiled, Gibson Papers.
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attention paid by southerners to social and political 
issues, the economic issues, as significant but not so 
immediately evident, were not as widely publicized.
To some southerners, however, economic issues were 
of the utmost importance. Southwestern promoters of natu­
ral oil and gas concerns feared that Truman's determination 
to regulate their enterprises would cut into their profits. 
TVA competition and the possibility of further similar 
government projects frightened private electric power 
interests. And the biggest uproar occurred in 19^7 when 
the Supreme Court awarded control over the tidelands oil 
wells to the federal government. Oil companies immediately 
began campaigning for congressional action to return the 
tidelands to state regulation.
The tidelands oil controversy was an argument be­
tween the federal government and several individual states 
over the question of possession of the tidelands and their 
rich mineral resources. The definition of tidelands in a 
technical sense is that part of the shore that lies between 
high and low tide, but, in this controversy, it refers to 
lauds under the marginal seas, that is, three nautical miles 
out from the shore toward the sea. This dispute first arose 
around the turn of the century when oil was discovered off 
the coasts of California, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Florida. The states in question promptly began leasing 
these mineral rights to private oil companies and it was not
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until fifteen years or so later that the federal govern­
ment began to question the right of the states to do this.
During the 1930's the states fought the claims of 
the federal government to the submerged lands but the con­
troversy remained unsettled well beyond the Truman admin­
istration. In 1946 Congress passed a law, vetoed by Truman, 
designating state ownership of the tidelands. And the 
United States Supreme Court in United States vs. California 
in 1947 supported the administration's position by awarding 
the tidelands to the federal government.
By 1948 Congress was again considering a bill vest­
ing the title of tidelands to the states. Proponents of 
the bill feared that if the doctrine of "paramount rights" 
of the federal government prevailed in this case, it would 
become possible for the federal government legally to con­
fiscate other lands. The States' Righters saw in the tide­
lands decision "an alarming doctrine" by which the federal 
government "could take away these lands without reimburse­
ment to anyone, therefore, regardless of investments made 
in developing such lands.
The fate of the tidelands became a political issue 
in the election of 1948. The Republicans and the Dixie­
crats favored state control of the tidelands while the 
Democrats made no statement at all concerning the matter. 
Opponents of the 1948 bill in Congress charged that oil
^^States' Righter, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 6.
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lobbyists, prepared to spend millions of dollars, were 
hard at work in the so-called oil "grab." This charge of 
lobbying by the oil companies was true enough, but it was 
also true that lobbying against the bill occurred. Oppo­
sition to the bill stemmed mostly from the federal admin­
istration, the National Grange, and oil companies that 
wanted leases from the United States government. The 
states wanted only to control the mineral rights, not the 
operational facets of the area such as navigation, com­
merce, or national defense.
Several influential southern Democrats viewed the 
topic of the tidelands initially with great concern.
Since Texas was one of the states most directly affected 
by this issue, the governor, Buford Jester, was deeply 
troubled by the possible consequences of federal control 
of the tidelands. Jester saw Truman's efforts at confis­
cating the tidelands as "another dangerous blow aimed at 
states' rights and local self-government."^^ The exten­
sion of the federal government's actions in this matter. 
Jester said, would eventually result in the nationaliza­
tion of all the industries in the country. Since a large 
part of the millions of dollars grossed by the state of 
Texas from the tidelands was spent for public education.
^^Congressional Digest (October, 19^8), pp. 229-30
^^Speech, Buford Jester, April 20, 19^8, Folsom 
Papers, Democratic Party File.
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the withdrawal of this monetary source would jeopardize
18the future of the public school system. If oil in the 
interior was to be ruled by the same doctrine of federal 
dominion, then it would lead to the nationalization of 
all the important natural resources and industries of 
the states. To Jester this was an attack on "state sov-
19ereignty as much as state property."
Senator Tom Connally of Texas strongly supported
20the state's position on the issue of the tidelands.
Resolutions from almost all of the counties in Texas
were sent to Senator Connally in support of the Texas
21title to the offshore minerals. That the people of 
Texas saw in the issue a threat to one of the biggest 
sources of income is evident by the volume of mail re­
ceived by Connally. The Texas State Teachers Association 
distributed materials warning of the dire consequences
22that would follow should Texas lose the tidelands money. 
Although most Texans appeared to be quite concerned over
^^Ibid.
^^Speech, Buford Jester, December l 4 , 1948, Colum­
bia, South Carolina, South Carolinian Library, J. Strom 
Thurmond Papers, Correspondence In File.
20Letter, Tom Connally to Edward Crane, March 26, 
1948, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Tom Con­
nally Papers, Tidelands File.
21Resolutions, Connally Papers, Tidelands File.
22 "The Tidelands: A Heritage of Texas' Public
Schools," Connally Papers, Tidelands File.
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the issue, their concern did not manifest itself in the 
election of 1948, when Truman easily won the electoral 
vote in Texas. Even Governor Jester, who spoke repeatedly 
on the issue, failed to support the political parties that 
favored state ownership of the tidelands.
Representatives from other states were also con­
cerned about the tidelands issue. Gessner T. McCorvey, 
chairman of the state Democratic party of Alabama, called
it a program "to make Washington richer and the States 
2 3poorer." If the coastal states should be deprived of 
their natural resources and the money be used for educa­
tional purposes in all the states, then, he reasoned, it 
follows that all the other states should divide all their 
natural resources with the coastal states as well. McCorvey 
saw this as another in a long line of efforts to 'center
everything in Bureaucratic Washington to the exclusion of
24the powers of the Several States. . . . "
Truman's stand on the issue was made clear: money
from that resource "ought to go to people and not to a few 
oil millionaires."^^ As early as September 28, 194$, he 
issued two proclamations and two Executive Orders to the 
effect that the United States had control over the natural 
resources of the continental shelf. He then asked the
^^McCorvey, "A States' Rights Democrat."
^^Ibid.
25̂Truman, Papers, p. 228.
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Attorney General to sue the state of California in a test 
case in which the United States Supreme Court in 19^7 up­
held the federal government's "dominant rights" to this 
area of resources. This decision was reaffirmed in prin- 
ciple two other times by the court in 1 9 5 0 .
By 1 95 2 enough support had been harnessed in Con­
gress to pass a bill again giving the states ownership of 
the tidelands. Truman once again vetoed the bill. In 
1953 President Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act 
which divided the tidelands mineral resources between the 
state and federal government in such a manner as to favor 
the claims of the states. The submerged coastal lands 
within the historic boundaries of the states, three miles 
for Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi and three leagues 
for Texas and Florida, were awarded to the states. Fed­
eral jurisdiction was granted beyond these boundaries.
In i960 the Supreme Court in three decisions upheld this 
ruling.
This controversy over the tidelands gave birth to 
the conspiracy thesis, a name given it by the press. Ad­
herents of this theory maintained that the Dixiecrats had 
no sincere interest in states' rights but were mere puppets 
acting on behalf of the oil interests. To support this 
contention they cited the South's support of such central­
ized programs as R.E.A., T.V.A., federal road programs.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 480-87»
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public works, subsidies to farmers, flood control, school 
lunch programs, and numerous other similar federal pro­
jects, all of which were totally antithetical to the south-
27ern interpretation of states' rights. Cotirier-Journal 
staff writer, John Ed Pearce surmised that states' rights 
was really a cover up for what he called more "sinister 
interests," namely opposition to blacks and support of 
state ownership of the tidelands. Other political jour­
nalists even went so far as to claim that civil rights 
was a cover up for the single real issue--the fate of
28the tidelands. According to the conspiracy thesis 
the oil men used the Dixiecrats as a means of amassing 
great wealth and power for themselves at the expense 
of national interest. The value of the tidelands oil,
29estimated at thirty billion dollars, was no small matter.
The southern conservative oligarchy, once made up of 
planters, now consisted of utility executives, textile men, 
industrialists, bankers, and the oil barons, a group whose 
money filled the coffers of the Dixiecrat party. According 
to journalist Stewart Alsop, they were responsible for the 
tidelands issue receiving "at least as much attention at 
the various Dixiecrats' get-togethers as the civil rights
27 Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), October I3 ,
1948.
28 St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 1 8 , 1948.
^^Ibid., August 19, 1948.
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30issue." Tt is unknown exactly how much the oil men
contributed to the Dixiecrats or their reasons for doing
so. Men like H. R. Cullen, wealthy Houston oil executive,
along with the Humble Oil company allegedly were especially
31generous to the Dixiecrat campaign chest. Cullen, who 
earlier received a considerable amount of publicity due to 
his donation of $l60,000,000 to Texas charity, played a 
prominent part in the Dixiecrat saga. When the Dixiecrat 
convention was held in Houston, Cullen supplied a private 
plane for the use of the Dixiecrat Presidential candidate
32and a special train to Houston for Mississippi Dixiecrats.
Thomas Sancton, a political analyst, contended that 
the Dixiecrat movement was supported by "all the investing 
and managing communities, from the southern industrial me­
tropolis to Old Man Johnson's 'furnish' store at the un­
named crossroads." The states' rights revolt in Missis­
sippi was a kind of "political pilot plant for the large 
3 3corporations."
To give substance to the oil conspiracy thesis,
Alsop cited a story about Ellis Arnall, former Governor 
oi Georgia. Arnall stayed at an expensive hotel in New 
Orleans while attending a Sugar Bowl game and found to his
^^New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1948. 
^^"Political Notes," Newsweek, September 6 , 1948,
p. 9.
^^New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1948.
33Sancton, "White Supremacy," p. 97 «
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surprise as he attempted to pay his bill that it had al­
ready been paid by the Mississippi Pov/er and Light Company. 
Upon questioning the clerk he found that she had mistaken 
him for Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi.
In late August, the Democratic National Committee 
reported that Texas oil men had been plotting a southern 
revolt against Truman, not over civil rights, but over 
the tidelands issue. Civil rights was merely a facade.
Not having access to the actual list of financial con­
tributors, the Democratic National Convention claimed to 
have information proving that Texas oil men were the 
heaviest contributors to the Dixiecrat cause. The Demo­
cratic National Convention charged, though without sub­
stantiation, that these Texas oil men were "placing their
35private interests above party loyalty."
One columnist, viewing the oil men as selfish ex­
ploiters and manipulators of the Dixiecrats, saw that 
party "prostituting the ideal of states' rights to a pur­
pose that is beneath them and against the country's se­
curity. He felt that while the states' rights doctrine
was initially sound, it later became the "refuge of preda-
37tory interests." The columnist defined a states' righter
o 4New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1948. 
^^St. Louis Post Dispatch, August l8 , 1948. 
^^Ibid., August 19, 1948
37lbid.
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as "a pleader for a special interest who craves the power
3 8that is being exercised by a progressive opponent."
Another supporter of the conspiracy thesis was 
Charles G. Hamilton, leader of the loyalist forces (true 
Democrats) in Mississippi. He claimed that the intention 
of the oil lobbyists was to secure the election of Dewey. 
Hamilton, who saw civil rights as an excuse or cover up 
for the real issue, pointed out that Governor Fielding 
Wright of Mississippi had announced opposition to Truman
39even before Truman had delivered his civil rights message.
Such charges as these made by Hamilton were not iso­
lated or infrequent. Others charged that the oil interests
kowere concerned only with ensuring a Republican victory. 
Adherents of this belief, however, did not explain why the 
oil men did not simply support the Republican party which 
advocated state ownership of the tidelands.
These charges of conspiracy were answered by the 
Dixiecrat leaders such as Fielding Wright who denied that 
tideland interests had contributed at all. He said they
4l"have not contributed one dime to our fight." It seems 
that while there was some validity to this statement, a 
modification of it would have been closer to the truth.
3^Ibid.
39Letter, Charles Hamilton to author, March 4, 1970" 
^^St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 20, 1948. 
^^Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tennessee), July 21,
1948.
85
surpiise as he attempted to pay his bill that it had al­
ready been paid by the Mississippi Power and Light Company.
Upon questioning the clerk he found that she had mistaken
3khim lor Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi.
In late August, the Democratic National Committee 
reported that Texas oil men had been plotting a southern 
revolt against Truman, not over civil rights, but over 
the cidelands issue. Civil rights was merely a facade.
Not having access to the actual list of financial con­
tributors, the Democratic National Convention claimed to 
have information proving that Texas oil men were the 
heaviest contributors to the Dixiecrat cause. The Demo­
cratic National Convention charged, though without sub­
stantiation, that these Texas oil men were "placing their
35private interests above party loyalty."
One columnist, viewing the oil men as selfish ex­
ploiters and manipulators of the Dixiecrats, saw that 
party "prostituting the ideal of states' rights to a pur­
pose that is beneath them and against the country's se- 
curity." He felt that while the states' rights doctrine
was initially sound, it later became the "refuge of preda-
37tory interests." The columnist defined a states' righter
^^New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1948. 
^^St. Louis Post Dispatch, August iB, 1948. 
^^Ibid., August 19, 1948
37lbid.
86
as "a pleader for a special interest who craves the power
3 8that is being exercised by a progressive opponent."
Another supporter of the conspiracy thesis was 
Charles G. Hamilton, leader of the loyalist forces (truv 
Democrats) in Mississippi. He claimed that the intention 
of the oil lobbyists was to secure the election of Dewey. 
Hamilton, who saw civil rights as an excuse or cover up 
for the real issue, pointed out that Governor Fielding 
Wright of Mississippi had announced opposition to Truman
39even before Truman had delivered his civil rights message.
Such charges as these made by Hamilton were not iso­
lated or infrequent. ^O+^ggg^charged that the oil interests 
were concerned Republican victory.
Adherents of d not explain why the
men no^^H^H^^^^^^^^H^^^H^ublican
These
Dixiecrat leader^^^^^^^^N^^^^^^^N^-ight who denied that
tideland interests at all. He said they
4l"have not contributed one dime to our fight." It seems 
that while there was some validity to this statement, a 
modification of it would have been closer to the truth.
^^Ibid.
3 9 Letter, Charles Hamilton to author, March 4, 1970.
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Strom Thurmond, Governor of South Carolina, explained 
that he knew nothing whatsoever about oil interests con­
tributing to the states' rights fund. Thurmond echoed 
Wright in maintaining that not a single dime had been 
contributed and added that representatives of the oil 
interests had made no suggestions at all concerning party 
policies. On tidelands, Thurmond said, the party consid­
ered their ownership to be a matter for the states to de­
cide upon, just as civil rights legislation should be a 
matter for the states. Thurmond charged that anybody who 
accused the States' Rights movement of having intentions 
other than those of protecting the Constitution "must
4:2undoubtedly be attempting to smear our movement." Ac­
cusations and rebuttals over the role of tidelands in 
the Dixiecrat party were exchanged continually throughout 
the campaign period and afterwards, without ever reaching 
a consensus.
The tidelands issue alone, controversial and vul­
nerable as it was, never could have led to the formation 
of southern factions within the Democratic party. While 
it is true that Wright opposed the Truman Administration 
prior to the public release of the civil rights report, 
most of Wright's opposition centered around the antici­
pated suggestions concerning civil rights. There was a
42Telegram, J. Strom Thurmond to John Temple Graves, 
July 2 6 , 1948, Thurmond Papers, Correspondence Out File.
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considerable time lapse between the date the Civil Rights 
Commission Report was completed, October, 19^7, and the 
date of Truman's civil rights message to Congress in Feb­
ruary, 1948. The report was available for those who cared 
to read it and Wright was one who did. A few others read 
the report but the southern reaction to it as a whole was 
subdued. Possibly Truman was using this interim period 
to test the southern response. Finding it reasonably calm, 
he proceeded with his recommendations to Congress on the 
subject.
From all the speeches and private utterances of 
Wright on the subject of civil rights, there is no doubt 
but that this was his major objection to the Democratic 
party. He and his supporters received contributions from 
the oil men but there is no evidence to substantiate the 
existence of a conspiracy of any type. Both Wright and 
Thurmond continually denied the charges that they had 
knowingly received money from the oil people; however, 
their categorical denials of any contributions from these 
sources are hardly credible. The Dixiecrats did receive 
the support of many oil men; one need only to consult 
their list of party workers to verify this. But if oil 
men contributed heavily to the Dixiecrat movement, they 
did not contribute heavily enough. With such vast quan­
tities of money on hand, as the advocates of the conspir­
acy thesis would draw the picture, it seems that they would
89
have provided a greater opportunity for success than that
experienced by the debt-ridden Dixiecrats.
It was the lack of funds for organizational and
promotional activities that continually plagued the Dixie- 
k 3crat movement. Large numbers of southern sympathizers 
received letters stating that the party still owed a con­
siderable amount of money, and as Laney wrote in letter 
after letter, "1 thought maybe you would like to help us 
by a reasonable donation to pay off the debt we still
, „44have."
The tidelands question was not discussed by the 
Dixiecrat leaders, nor was it mentioned in the Dixiecrat 
literature or at party rallies nearly as much as was civil 
rights. Speeches by the leaders and minutes of their meet­
ings disprove beyond doubt this contention. Numerous meet­
ings occurred without the tidelands' question being men­
tioned at all and even if it were touched upon in campaign 
speeches, the tidelands issue never appeared as the central 
point of the messages. The ordinary southern citizen, es­
pecially in states not on the Gulf coast, in all likelihood 
did not understand the tidelands issue nor feel that it 
would affect him. On the other hand, the ideas and
43Merritt Gibson, private interview, April, 1970, 
Longview, Texas and Ben Laney, private interview, April, 
1 9 7 0 , Magnolia, Arkansas.
44Letter, Ben Laney to Allen Patterson, December 14, 
1948, Laney Papers, Dixon File.
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implementation of the civil rights program, so many be­
lieved, would have an immediate and personal effect.
The significance of the tidelands issue, then, 
in leading to the southern bolt in 1 9^ 8 is questionable. 
Interpreters of the issue range from those who felt it 
the only real issue to those who would discount its sig­
nificance altogether. The middle of the road approach, 
that is, admitting that it was an issue, but certainly 
not the chief issue, seems most plausible.
Of the other issues that were involved in the
bolt, the growing concept of the welfare state must be
considered. Although many businessmen of the South were
antagonistic toward this trend, numerous other southerners
enjoyed the benefits of liberal economic programs too much
to launch a vigorous attack against the administration on
these grounds alone. According to G. T. McCorvey, Alabama
Dixiecrat leader, the states' rights movement was a result
of the "wasteful expenditure of public funds . . .  a result
of the creation of countless Federal jobs for the "Faithful"
45. . . a result of the almost unbearable tax burden." The
sheer number of the New Deal and Fair Deal programs fright­
ened conservatives. Yet these programs did evoke different 
responses from southern economic and social interests, and 
thus helped to break down the regional homogeneity that had 
been so significant in maintaining the Solid South.
45McCorvey, "A States' Rights Democrat."
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With the disappearance of the old agricultural 
system the South no longer had unique regional economic
46interests that separated it from the rest of the nation. 
While economic changes brought increasing industrializa­
tion and greater diversification of agricultural produc­
tion to the South, they simultaneously began an erosion 
of the unity of the historically Solid South. Along with 
industrialization, labor unions began making inroads into 
the South, creating a new basis for political cohesiveness. 
Growing urbanization in the South and the corresponding 
decline in the rural areas led to the creation of new so-
4?cial classes not unlike those of the North. The way was 
clearly open now for new economic interests to express 
themselves through some type of political action.
The continuous and seemingly unending growth of the 
federal government paved the way for tradition-bound south­
erners to raise their old battle cry of states' rights.
Some protesters, such as Ben Laney, pictured themselves as 
being genuinely interested in preserving certain powers for 
the states. However, it appears that behind this interest 
lay a desire to use such powers for the purpose of main­
taining the status quo in the South. While there were 
probably some Dixiecrats who supported the ideal of states'
46Heard, A Two Party South? p. 154; and H. C. Nixon, 
"Southern Regionalism Limited," Virginia Quarterly Review, 
XXVI (Spring, 1940), 1 6I-7O.
^~Heard, A Two Party South? pp. 154-56.
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rights apart from the civil rights question, it is diffi­
cult if not impossible to make such a distinction. For 
the most part, Dixiecrats used states' rights as a cover 
up for the real issue: civil rights.
Although the Dixiecrat leaders capitalized on the 
South's fear of the Negro, as politicians from decades 
before had done, some of the Dixiecrats attempted to 
avoid outright insults to blacks. As one editorial ex­
plained of Thurmond, he always "tiptoes around the issue, 
like an old-fashioned father trying to explain sex to his
48son without saying the words." Staff writer John Ed
Pearce characterized Thurmond in this manner: "he creeps
up close to the issue, sidles in with an innuendo, and
then eases past the danger point with a side-step and a
49show of studious piety." Thurmond never had to utter 
a gross word, but his audience knew exactly what he meant. 
Although Thurmond was not the classic race-hater, without 
his appeal to white supremacists, his program would never 
have gotten off the ground. Thurmond knew segregation to 
be wrong morally but neither could he accept integration 
as a way of life. As one reporter wrote, "he is torn,
. . . between a desire to be a decent Christian man, and
an inner insistence on a racial system that is, in itself, 
un-Christian.
48Louisville Courier-Journal, October l6 , 1948. 
^^Ibid. ^°Ibid.
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The Dixiecrats were interested in preserving the 
status quo, that is, to "keep the Negro in his place" and 
in order to do that it was necessary to adhere to the one- 
party system. Yet the Dixiecrats attacked this very party 
hoping to mold it to their own ideology, which they claimed 
was the traditional philosophy of the Democratic party.
They labeled the Democratic party the "nigger" party in an 
attempt to discredit its venerable position in the South.
While some of the objectives of the Dixiecrats were 
obvious, other less apparent should also be noted. Accord­
ing to political scientist Helen Fuller, the major objec­
tives of the Dixiecrats were to bring about a re-alignment 
of political parties and to bring the two-party system to
the South, while the defeat of Truman was actually of minor 
5 2significance, With the establishment of the two-party 
system in the South, the Democratic party would be forced 
by the competition to be more responsive to southern needs. 
Then if the South became too disenchanted with the Demo­
crats, the switch to the Republican party might be less 
painful. This thesis is debatable at best. Most Dixiecrat 
supporters would have been satisfied with directing the 
Democratic party into more conservative channels. While
^^Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 
(3d rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 19^5)i pl 120.
S2Helen Fuller, "The New Confederacy," New Republic, 
CXIX (November 1, 1948), 10; and Carter, "Civil Rights 
Issue," p. 53.
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the demise of the one-party South may have been hastened 
by the Dixiecrats, there is no evidence that this was 
their conscious objective.
The Dixiecrats employed various tactics in order 
to accomplish their aims. First they sent a committee to 
protest to the national chairman of the Democratic party, 
and secondly they filibustered in Congress against "anti- 
Southern legislation." When all minor means of protest 
failed, the Dixiecrats turned towards the idea of forming 
a separate party with their own candidates. By 1948, de­
feat for the Democrats seemed to be a certainty; conse­
quently, the South had nothing to lose in the way of pa-
5 3tronage by bolting. To dissatisfied southern leaders 
this appeared to be a propitious time to voice their pro­
test. Perhaps, after the election, southern Democrats 
could help rebuild a Democratic party with a more con­
servative flavor. If the South were given a larger role 
in the Democratic party, it would be able to delay, if
not end, "anti-Southern" legislation, that is, more spe-
54cifically, the civil rights programs.
Few southerners, if any, seriously considered the 
possibility of the Dixiecrat party winning the election
Richard Hofstadter, "From Calhoun to the Dixie­
crats ," Social Research; An International Quarterly of 
Political and Social Science, XVI (June, 1949), 143.
54"New South: A Political Phenomenon Grips Dixie's
Voter," Newsweek, October 25, 1948, p. 32. Hereinafter 
referred to as "New South: A Political Phenomenon."
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in ig48. It has been suggested, however, by Merritt
Gibson, National Campaign Chairman of the SRD, that at
times Thurmond acted as if he actually believed he might
win the presidency. During one of Thurmond's campaign
speeches, a worker in the Dixiecrat party remarked to
Gibson about Thurmond's attitude, "That damned fool
55really thinks he's going to be elected!"
If a party defeat was necessary for the South to 
be able to assert itself again, then Truman and the Demo­
cratic party would have to suffer. Henry Wallace, the 
Progressive candidate, and the Dixiecrats in a sense 
worked for the same result--the defeat of the Democrats. 
Wallace withdrew from the Democratic party early in the 
year and established the Progressive party, independent 
of the Democratic party. The Dixiecrats, on the other 
hand, remained within the party and worked to reform the 
composition of the Democrats. They finally established 
a separate party, but only as a last resort. The states' 
righters hoped that Thurmond would receive enough elec­
toral votes to throw the election into the House, then 
the South could bargain with both pirties and give her 
votes to the one willing to make the most concessions to 
her region. To win the presidency, a candidate had to 




In the Dixiecrat strategy it was thought that the 
Republicans would carry California with its twenty-five 
votes since that state's governor, Earl Warren, was on 
the ticket. Ohio with twenty-five votes would go Repub­
lican due to the prestige of Senator Taft, and Illinois 
would give its twenty-eight votes to the Republicans.
With any two of these states going Republican the elec­
tion would be thrown into the House. If just one of 
those states went Republican and if the SRD carried 
Texas with its twenty-three votes, the election would 
be decided in the House. Or, if Illinois were to go 
Republican and one of these four southern states, Vir­
ginia with eleven votes, Georgia with twelve, North 
Carolina with fourteen, or Tennessee with ten were to 
vote Dixiecrat, the House would decide.
Dixiecrats reasoned that if the election were 
thrown to the House and if the majority of the state 
delegations were Democratic, it would be a question of 
Truman or Thurmond. Republican Congressmen would never 
have voted for Truman, so their conservative votes would 
have to be cast for Thurmond, assuming they operated by 
the same logic as the Dixiecrats. The behind-the-scenes 
strategy that the Dixiecrats hoped to execute was that of 
taking over the name and machinery of the Democratic party 
in the southern states. This strategy and the fact that
^^McCorvey, "A States Rights Democrat."
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it was sometimes successful makes it difficult to classify 
the Dixiecrats as a third party movement. In the states 
of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, 
the Dixiecrats managed to have the regular Democratic 
electors pledged to Thurmond. So in these states those 
who cast their votes for the Democrats were not really 
voting for the Democrats at all, but for the Dixiecrats. 
The Dixiecrats explained that the Confederate character 
of the Democratic party enabled any state organization 
to secede, if it so desired. Then it could vote for 
whomever it chose.
Therefore, in a sense the real struggle in 1948 
occurred within the states on the battle of deciding 
which electors would be representative of which party 
label. As Alexander Heard, political scientist, explains, 
"the significant competition engendered by the Dixiecrats 
thus occurred within the Democratic party rather than 
with it.
Although the aims, objectives and strategy of the 
Dixiecrat party gave insight into the character of the 
party, the ideology of the movement truly reflected this 
character. The ideology and origins of the States' Rights 
movement had its roots in the Reconstruction period. Both 
supporters and critics of the movement have compared with 
varying degrees of likeness the l8 6 0 's and the 1940's.
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 23.
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The new secession movement found its John C. Calhoun in 
the person of Charles Wallace Collins, a member of the 
Alabama bar. His book Whither Solid South was a prolonged 
discussion of white supremacy, Negro inferiority, and a 
moral and religious defense for continued segregation. 
According to Fuller, this " . . .  second-rate book by an 
unknown author became the 'Mein Kampf of a new movement
g. Q
because it appeared at the strategic moment."
Senator James Eastland, the first Dixiecrat leader 
to discover the book, immediately sent a copy of it to 
Fielding Wright, the newly elected Governor of Mississippi. 
Wright was apparently quite taken by Collins' ideas; and 
in his inaugural address "the voice was that of the Gover­
nor of Mississippi but the thought came from Whither Solid 
South? E a s t l a n d  and Wright, convinced of the value of 
the book to their cause, proceeded to distribute copies of 
it first to the key Dixiecrat leaders and later to the 
p u b l i c . C o l l i n s '  ideas are easily identifiable in the 
movement and in the speeches of the leaders.
Charles Wallace Collins was very much a product of 
his background. He was born in 1879 and grew up on a 
cotton plantation in the black belt of Alabama. After
^^Fuller, "The New Confederacy," p. 11.
59lbid.
^^Letter, Frank M. Dixon to Charles Collins, 
August l8 , 1948, Dixon Papers, States Rights Correspond­
ence File.
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graduating from the University of Chicago, he served as 
law librarian of Congress and as an attorney for some of 
the largest financial institutions in the nation. It was 
in hopes of arousing southerners to unite and to fight 
off this New Deal-Fair Deal attack on southern civiliza­
tion that he wrote his book delineating the political 
position of the South as he saw it in 19^7- Collins 
stressed three main points throughout his book: his in­
terpretation of the Reconstruction era in American history, 
the events of 193 6 which served to reduce further the in­
fluence of the South in the political life of the nation, 
and his explanation of the forthcoming civil rights report. 
Central to all of these points was his interpretation that 
blacks, little better than animals, should be driven from 
the country. He also suggested a means by which the South 
could enhance its political position.
His interpretation of Reconstruction, like that of 
historian Walter Fleming, emphasized the harshness of the 
radical Republican rule that was imposed upon the South.
He focused attention on the "fact" that the fourteenth 
amendment was illegal and unconstitutional in that it was 
never formally ratified by the southern states but rather 
was forced upon them.^^ Practically all that Collins said 
about the Reconstruction period can be found in the various
^^Charles Wallace Collins, Whither Solid South? 
(New Orleans: Pelican Press, 1947T1 p% 94.
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speeches of the party leaders. Rarely was a SRD speech 
given without reference to the historic wrongs to which 
the South had been subjected since Civil War days.
The next critical period which Collins saw as of 
major importance to the South was the upsetting year,
1 9 3 6 , the year in which the two-thirds rule was abrogated. 
Just as annoying in the same year the Negro vote in the 
North went over to support the Democratic party. The 
third adverse development was the rise of "left-wing or­
ganized labor as an important influence in the Democratic 
p a r t y . W h i l e  all these forces were working to destroy 
"constitutional government" in America, there was also 
the FEPC, which Collins characterized as a gestapo de­
signed to interfere with the private lives of the people. 
This was another of his ideas which was capitalized upon 
by the leaders of the SRD.
Writing before the Civil Rights Committee issued 
its report, he anticipated and denounced its suggestions, 
calling the report a political campaign document for 1 9^8 . 
Collins, bitterly opposed to any ideas that would benefit 
the Negro, denounced Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma as
6kworthless propaganda. At the same time Collins defended
white supremacy completely:
. . . the Negro south of the Sahara today [is] in
the same condition as he was thousands of years ago 
--a savage, living in the most primitive condition
^^Ibid., p. 252. ^^Ibid., p. 233. ^^Ibid., p. 57-
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under his ancient tribal organization. As a race, 
he learned nothing from the long years of the so­
journ of the civilized white in?n on his shores.
He created no written language and no literature.
He built no cities. Out from his great rivers no 
ships ladened with treasure sailed in commerce to 
other lands. On his seacoast he built no harbors. 
Underneath the ground he trod, with spear in hand, 
were the world's most priceless minerals and pre­
cious stones. It remained for the white man to 
exploit them, and he used the Negro as his laborer 
to accomplish it.^5
He saw nothing contradictory about labeling the slave 
owner as Christian and the black as subhuman, totally ir­
responsible and unfit to be a citizen. White supremacy 
to Collins was a "practical doctrine to enable the white 
people of the South to live in contact with large numbers 
of Negroes without the loss of the identity of their an­
cient culture and their racial purity.
Nor was Collins lacking in proposals to solve the 
problems that plagued the South. As for the race problem 
he made a vague proposal that the United States buy from 
Africa a large area of land, which the United States would 
annex for the purpose of creating a forty-ninth state, a 
totally black state. Movement to this state would be com­
pletely voluntary--that is, if a black man wished to par­
ticipate in the privileges of citizenship and human dig­
nity he could move to this state or otherwise not be ac­
corded these rights. Since only blacks would live there, 
Collins reasoned that they would have a better chance to
^^Ibid. , p. 22. ^^Ibid., p. 40.
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take part in governmental and civic operations, a process 
which would somehow guarantee the growth of democracy.
In his request of a minimum area of 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 square miles 
of non-desert land he said that "such a movement would be 
comparable to the opening of virgin territory like that 
of California and Texas in the l840's."^^
To solve the political dilemma of the South, Col­
lins suggested the creation of a southern party, which 
would not have a "regional but a national connotation."
He suggested a name consisting of not more than three 
words, "States' Rights" being two of the three. For or­
ganization, he noted the necessity of creating a regional 
committee to become the national committee with a repre­
sentative from each state. Within the individual state 
another such committee should exist, along with a States' 
Rights club in each county seat. There should be frequent 
meetings and discussions along with regional and state 
annual conventions to inform the public of the ideas or 
goals of the party. Collins recognized the necessity of 
having a headquarters established in Washington, D.C., 
the nerve center of the nation, a paid professional staff, 
and an official publication of the party, later established 
as "The States' Righter."^^ These suggestions made by
^?Ibid., p. 3 1 5.
^^"Outline of a Plan for a States' Rights Organiza­
tion," Laney Papers, Southern Governors Conference File.
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Collins in 19^7 eventually were incorporated into the 
SRD mov ement.
In a later essay Collins explained the immediate 
cause of the revolt as Truman's civil rights program and 
the strong civil rights plank. He saw the two national 
parties as attempting to establish a system of national 
planning for everything and everybody, a move that would
69totally destroy states' rights. Certain groups were
also working to destroy the "American way." Among these
groups were the NAACP, or in Collins' words, "unorganized
professional Negroes," Jewish Communists who were the
"most potent force behind the Negro movement," other
Jewish societies, the CIO and to some extent the AF of L,
the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, the National
Negro Congress, and various Protestant and Catholic groups.
Collins saw in this fight that the "stake for the South is
no less than the whole fabric of the Southern civiliza- 
7 0tion." The ideology of States' Rights Democrats as out­
lined by Collins was primarily an elaboration of white 
supremacy. Although he briefly mentioned New Deal eco­
nomics, this was not the thrust of his work nor was this 
an aspect adopted by the Dixiecrat leaders.
The informal ideology of the movement can best be 
seen in the speeches and writings of the key people in the
69Letter, Charles Collins to Merritt Gibson, Octo­
ber 1 9 , 1 9 4 8 , Gibson Papers.
7°Ibid.
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SRD party. McCorvey and Thurmond frequently referred to 
their beliefs in states' rights, home rule, and local 
self-government as being provided for in the tenth amend­
ment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by-it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Opposition to a strong centralized bureaucratic govern-
72ment was repeatedly emphasized. Laney expressed the 
same idea by saying that the old Democratic party stood 
for the "preservation of individual freedom and liberty 
and also for the retention of certain rights to and for 
the states.
One supporter termed the southern action a "funda­
mental" revolt, with a "cause that disturbs the deepest
emotions of the human fabric--racial pride, respect for
74white womanhood, and superiority of Caucasian blood."
An abundance of racist literature was distributed before, 
during and after the campaign. John U. Barr, a lawyer 
from New Orleans, issued a circular entitled "For White 
Men and Women Everywhere." This piece of propaganda and 
others similar to it did more damage than good to the
^^McCorvey, "A States' Rights Democrat."
72Letter, Ben Laney to Horace Wilkinson, April 12, 
1948, Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
f^ibid.
74Letter, Sam Johnston to John Sparkman, July 3, 
1948, Dixon Papers, States Rights Correspondence File.
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75cause they were attempting to defend. Support of this
type was responsible for driving the bolt forward.
75 "For White Men and Women Everywhere," Truman 
Library, Howard McGrath Papers, Civil Rights File.
CHAPTER IV 
THE GROWING REVOLT
Even before President Truman delivered his message 
on civil rights to Congress, some southern leaders pre­
dicted that his statements and proposals, based on the 
"radical" report of his Committee on Civil Rights, would 
antagonize the South. In Mississippi, the state in which 
the largest number of blacks in the Union resided, the 
newly elected governor sounded the first note of alarm.
In his inaugural address of January 20, Governor Fielding L. 
Wright warned the South of the President's intentions with 
regard to civil rights. He alerted Mississippians to the 
likely prospects of a program, soon to be thrust upon them, 
that would endanger the American way of life. The federal 
government, Wright said, as suggested in the civil rights 
report was already beginning a "campaign of abuse and mis­
representation" aimed at the South. Designs for forcing 
such schemes as the FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, anti­
poll tax bills, and now the anti-segregation proposals were 
under consideration.^
^National States' Rights Democrats Campaign Commit­
tee, "States' Rights Information and Speakers Handbook"
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The governor, blind to the need for such drastic 
programs, described Mississippi and the South as outstand­
ing examples of a place where two races live harmoniously 
together in a mutually beneficial way. If, by some small 
chance, problems did exist, each individual state was ca­
pable of handling it without the services of the federal 
2government. Hinting that a party break was imminent, 
Wright asserted that "vital principles and eternal truths 
transcend party lines, and the day is now at hand when
3determined action must be taken." Thus Governor Wright, 
an unknown in national politics until he delivered this 
speech, initiated the States' Rights bolt from the Demo-
 ̂ 4cratic party.
Following Wright's address to the Mississippi legis­
lature, Senator Eastland spoke to the same body, urging 
southern Democrats to consider withholding their electoral 
votes and, perhaps, even filling the White House with a 
southerner. The South, he urged, should at least be able 
to throw the election into the House.^ Simultaneously, 
South Carolina legislators called upon southerners to re­
examine closely their position in the party. While the
(Jackson, Mississippi: National States' Rights Democrats
Campaign Committee, 1948), p. 22. Hereinafter referred 
to as "Speakers Handbook."
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
^Commercial Appeal, February 8, 1948.
^New York Times, January 30, 1948.
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idea of a revolt was not stated or even implied, South 
Carolina was informing the national party that it was un­
happy with the FEPC, anti-poll tax, and the total civil
• 1-4. 6 rights program.
Then in February, just as some southerners had
feared, Harry Truman delivered his infamous message on
civil rights. Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana said
bluntly, ''If legislation of this character is passed, I
7know well that the South will bolt the Democratic party." 
Other reactions to Truman's message have been covered in 
the previous chapter. It was hinted and hoped by many 
that Truman would not choose to run for the presidency in 
1948. But on February 5, Truman confirmed what Howard 
McGrath, the Democratic National Chairman, had implied 
earlier: Truman would indeed run. Truman's conservative
advisers, who feared the financial loss to the campaign 
should the South bolt, pleaded in vain with Truman to
gmodify his civil rights proposals. Newsmen, thinking 
that Truman would have a strategy to placate the South 
questioned him at a news conference on the possibility of 
selecting a southerner as his vice-president. Truman, how­
ever, replied bluntly that he had not given the matter much 
9thought.
^Ibid.
^Fort Worth Press, February 4, 1948.
8 9Truman, Papers, p. 12?. Ibid.
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Meanwhile preparations for the annual Southern Gov­
ernors Conference at Wakulla Springs, Florida, scheduled 
for February 7, were underway. Although the major purpose 
of the meeting was to draw up plans for regional schools 
in the South, some irate southerners took advantage of 
this opportunity to expose what they perceived to be the 
dangers of the civil rights program. Governor Wright pro­
posed that the conference notify leaders of the national 
party that southerners would reject all efforts to enact 
any civil rights legislation. To publicize southern pro­
test to Truman's program he urged a Southwide mass meeting 
for March 1 in Jackson. As Wright spoke, his suggestions 
became increasingly radical culminating in a fiery appeal 
to secede from the party. Under such leadership, the South 
could proceed to nominate a pro-southern presidential slate.
To Wright's chagrin no one would second his proposal. 
Choosing to remain calm the governors, with Wright as the 
only dissenter, adopted instead a resolution of Thurmond's, 
part of which suggested the appointment of a committee to 
investigate the matter further. And, further, to consider 
the findings of the southern investigative committee and 
to determine an appropriate course of action, Thurmond pro­
posed that another conference be held within sixty days.
He lamented that Truman was obviously indulging "in compet­
itive bidding for the votes of small pressure groups" at 
the expense of the traditions and institutions of the
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S o u t h . A s  an example of the racial and economic prog­
ress in the South, Thurmond contended that the crime of 
lynching had practically disappeared and that southern 
Negroes were more prosperous than ever before. Further­
more, Thurmond deprecated Truman's program calling it a 
divisive force at a time when the unstable international 
situation made national unity vital.
At the conclusion of the conference the governors 
agreed to appoint such a committee for the purpose of 
gathering information and conferring with the Democratic 
national chairman. In forty days the southern governors 
were to convene again to hear the results of the report. 
Thurmond as chairman of the committee to study the Truman 
program, requested that southern congressmen form a com­
mittee similar to his to study the effects of civil rights 
in the various states. Subsequently, these representatives 
agreed to work in conjunction with the Southern Governor's 
Committee and meanwhile to oppose the Truman legislation.^^
Thurmond and Wright agreed on many points but Wright 
consistently called for more radical policies than did 
Thurmond. The Jackson Daily News, mouthpiece for Wright, 
said there was no need for a committee but there was defi­
nite need for action. According to Wright, the governors.
^^Motion, February 7, 19^8, Thurmond Papers, States 
Rights File.
^^Telegram, W. M. Colmer to J. Strom Thurmond, Feb­
ruary 20, 1948, Thurmond Papers, States Rights File.
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already aware of the issues but fearful of political re­
prisals, appointed a committee out of "political coward­
ice." Wright described the southern governors as "having
12no more backbone than skinned bananas."
By the end of the second week in February, all kinds 
of apocryphal tales concerning the civil rights program 
spread across the nation with surprising speed. Wishful 
thinking southerners told of Truman's intent to pacify the 
South by modifying his stand on civil rights. According 
to rumor he would omit the anti-segregation proposal but 
retain those proposals concerning anti-lynching and the 
anti-poll tax. When confronted with this rumor, Truman 
categorically denied it.
But the South, particularly sensitive at this time, 
provided a fertile ground for the origin and propagation 
of myths. The popularity of rumors was given impetus by 
the scheduling and later cancellation of a speaking engage­
ment by J. Howard McGrath, National Chairman of the Demo­
cratic party, in Atlanta, Georgia, at the Jefferson-Jackson 
Day dinner. Southerners were warned that he might take 
advantage of the opportunity to try to sell the South on 
the civil rights program. As the date of the speech ap­
proached, southerners became increasingly nervous over the 
prospect of a lecture on the benefits of a nation-wide civil 
rights program. To avoid further misunderstanding, McGrath
12Baltimore Sun, February 13, 1948.
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explained that, while not recanting on any of his personal 
beliefs, he would refrain from speaking on any topic of­
fensive to the S o u t h . A f t e r  much ado over an ordinarily 
trivial matter, McGrath, on February l6 , cancelled his 
speaking engagement.
Apparently both parties had wished to be relieved
of the commitment, and when Governor M. E. Thompson changed
the date of the Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner from March
fifth to March ninth, McGrath bowed out, claiming that he
had a previous commitment for that date. This fact was
later confirmed by the Washington bureau of the Providence 
l4Journal. Ostensibly, the date had been changed because 
of an education convention scheduled for the fifth that 
would overload the hotels; actually, however, Thompson was 
giving McGrath a chance to step out gracefully and thus to 
avoid a possible intra-party conflict over civil rights. 
This incident, though unimportant in itself, was signifi­
cant in that it revealed the explosive disposition of the 
South at this time.
By mid-February some visible moves within the Demo­
cratic party were being made to discourage the threatened 
southern bolt. The Democratic National Committee, after 
allowing the southerners to cool down somewhat, initiated
^^New York Times, February 10, 1948; and Washington 
Post, February 10, 1948.
^^Providence Journal, February 17, 1948.
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talks with the dissenters, but no agreement could be 
15reached. Because the South had long been a chief fi­
nancial supported of the Democrats, one of the most seri­
ous results of the threatened southern bolt would be a 
decline in party f u n d s . H o w e v e r ,  Truman, when asked if 
he planned on having a conference with southerners, re­
plied that he did not.^^
From the South there were continued sporadic indi­
cations of rebellion. In Mississippi, Governor Wright, 
not disheartened in his efforts to galvanize the southern 
governors to action, called a mass meeting of Mississip­
pians. On February 12, four thousand people gathered at 
Jackson where they sang Dixie, waved Confederate flags 
and adopted resolution after resolution. They resolved 
that the Mississippi state Democratic executive committee 
should issue a call for a meeting of "all true white Jef­
fersonian Democrats" for a future meeting again to be held 
at Jackson. Among the adopted resolutions regarding the 
necessity of preserving states' rights, there was one 
which specifically condemned the administration's efforts 
to control the tidelands. Perhaps this is one of the rea­
sons for the accusation that the oil industry and not the 
Negro was the heart of the southern bolt. This body also
^^Washington Post, February 11, 1948,
^^Ibid., February 13, 1948.
17Truman, Papers, p. I38.
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articulated the threat of withholding the state's elec­
toral votes if that were required to protect the states 
from federal encroachment. Even Hodding Carter, liberal 
editor from Mississippi, said that party leaders were re­
lying too much on the federal government as a cure-all.
In less sophisticated terms. Governor Wright said of the 
Democrats, "one certain way to get rid of rats is to let 
the ship sink, and those rats will desert.
On March 1, the Mississippi Democratic executive 
committee met to continue planning for the southern revolt 
and to complete preparations for their nation-wide confer­
ence. The immediate state level task for the committee 
was to persuade all of Mississippi's delegates to the 
National Convention, as well as the presidential electors, 
to pledge themselves to a pro-states' rights and anti- 
civil rights position. In the event that a civil rights 
platform was adopted at the Democratic National Convention, 
the Mississippi delegates, according to the committee's
19proposals, were instructed to withdraw from the convention.
In yet another display of defiance many southern 
Democrats cancelled their plans to attend the Jefferson- 
Jackson Day dinner in Washington, the annual fund raising 
event for the Democratic party. The reason for their can­
cellation was their unrestrained fear and premonition that
1 oNew York Times, February I3 , 1948.
^^Key, Southern Politics, pp. 331-32.
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segregation would not be enforced. Senator Olin D. John­
ston of South Carolina, his wife, and their party did not 
attend the function for fëar of being seated next to a 
Negro. Nevertheless the $1,000 they paid for their table 
went into the Democratic campaign chest. National commit­
tee officials planned to fill all empty chairs but John­
ston thwarted them by dispatching a former heavyweight 
boxer with the ten South Carolina tickets to prevent, by 
physical force if necessary, the national committee from 
filling the vacant South Carolina section. The officials 
then announced that the seats would remain empty. John­
ston's purpose was "to create an illusion of effective
20division within the party."
When McGrath, in his speech at the dinner, said 
that Truman would not compromise in his civil rights pro-
21gram the audience responded with mild cheers and applause.
When Truman spoke at the dinner, his only reference to the
southern split came when he spoke of the "floogie bird,"
whose label read, "I fly backwards. I don't care where I'm
going. I just want to know where I've been." His speech,
22however, drew no enthusiastic applause.
In spite of the growing revolt most political ob­
servers dismissed the southern protest as nothing more than
PONew York Post, February 20, 1948.
o 1Providence Journal, February 23, 1948. 
^^"Democrats: Black Week," Time, March 1, 1948,
p. 12.
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a mere threat, and certainly not a break from the party.
Nor was there any indication that the President was par­
ticularly worried about a revolt. But this indifferent 
attitude of the administration and the press did not dis­
courage the southerners in the least. Mississippi had al­
ready begun raising funds. Some 250 people already had 
raised #6 1 , 5 0 0  toward their goal of #1 0 0 , 0 0 0 which was to 
be used to fight anti-southern legislation. Governor 
Wright explained "We want to kick out these birds who
stole the party from us. We want to see the South revive
23the conservative Democratic party."
To fulfill the assignment given to them at the 
Florida Southern Governor's Conference, the committee 
studying Truman's civil rights program interviewed Demo­
crats from various parts of the South. This committee in­
cluded Governor William Preston Lane, Jr., of Maryland, 
chairman of the Conference of Southern Governors; Governor 
J. Strom Thurmond, South Carolina, chairman of the Special 
Committee of Southern Governors; Governor R. Gregg Cherry 
of North Carolina; Governor Ben Laney of Arkansas; and 
Governor Buford H. Jester of Texas. After collecting 
the bulk of the necessary data, the committee questioned 
Senator McGrath on the real meaning of the civil rights 
program. McGrath at this meeting was barraged with ques­
tions, but the more important ones dealt with the anti-poll
^^New York Times, February 23, 19^8.
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tax, anti-lynching laws, the FEPC, segregation, the two- 
thirds rule, and the possibility of a southerner for the 
vice-presidency.
As the meeting progressed the questions the south­
erners asked McGrath degenerated into useless demands that 
should only have been directed at Congress or at the Presi­
dent. McGrath was requested to defend the constitutional 
basis of the anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and the FEPC.
He was asked if he would oppose segregation and the fed­
eral civil rights enforcement agency and if he would sup­
port restoration of the two-thirds rule and a states' 
rights program at the Democratic National Convention.
To most of these demands and requests McGrath either 
answered negatively or equivocated. The cordial parley 
proceeded but with growing disaffection. McGrath resented 
the continual repetition of questions which would force 
him to speak for what the Congress or the President might 
do in the future. At the same time, the committee, con­
sidering many of McGrath's answers to be evasive and vague,
24became increasingly incensed. In anger McGrath finally
25turned his back to the committee. The only statement 
that could be construed as a possible compromise with the 
southern committee was McGrath's acknowledging his personal
oIlIbid., February 24, 1948.
25Ben Laney, Private Interview, Magnolia, Arkansas,
April, 1970.
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acceptance of the 1^44 platform as being adequate for the 
19 4 8 c a m p a i g n . A t  the end of the interview, McGrath, 
speaking for the Democratic National Committee, said "We 
appreciate the great loyalty our party has had from the 
Southern States through the years. I don't take the atti­
tude that they are with us anyway so the 'H' with them."
He added that he hoped they could work out their differ-
27ences soon.
The Southern Governor's Committee, obviously dis­
satisfied with the results of their talk with McGrath,
'ssued a statement expressing their contempt for the 
leadership of the Democratic party and warning that "the 
Sou 1 is no longer 'in the bag.'" They announced that 
eacl southern state would utilize the most effective 
methot of resi.^ing the program of the Democratic party 
through a coordination of all the southern efforts in a
28general program. The next day Thurmond and Laney talk­
ing to several southern Senators in the office of John L. 
McClellan informed the Senators of McGrath's refusal to
29compromise or recant any part of the Truman progiam.
2 6',The Revolt Grows," Newsweek, March 8 , 1948, p. 1 8 .
2 7 Transcript of Conference of Southern Governors 
With J. Howard McGrath, February 23, 1948, McGrath Papers, 
Governors Conference of 1948 File.
28 "Statement" by the Southern Governors' Committee, 
Thurmond Papers, States Rights File.
"The Revolt Grows," p. 19.
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They discussed the possibility of a nominee other than
30Truman but at that point made no specific suggestions.
The first formally declared southern bolt by a 
Democratic organization over civil rights occurred at 
Jasper County, South Carolina, on February 23- At a 
meeting in Ridgland, H. Klugh Purdy, the head of the 
county's Democratic committee, spoke against "spineless 
party leaders seeking to destroy the South," and he sup­
ported a "declaration of independence for tne South."
His call to the South was for his fellowmen to "strike 
the match tonight that will set the South aflame." He 
then read his resolution which said there was no course 
left but to withdraw from the national party. They pro­
ceeded to do just that. At the back of the meeting hall
was a large banner which read, "You can have her, we don't
31want her, she's too black for me."
In Alabama as well as in Mississippi the campaign 
for selecting Democratic presidential electors and dele­
gates got under way with a primary held May 4. Prominent 
states' rights leaders, Gessner T. McCorvey, and Horace 
Wilkinson, Birmingham attorney, with the support of the 
Democratic Executive State Committee, wanted those on the 
ballot pledged to vote against Truman or against anyone 
else who was pro-civil rights. Furthermore this committee
^^New York Times, February 23, 1948.
"The Revolt Grows," p. l8.
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asked the delegates to promise to bolt the convention 
should the platform include civil rights. At the conclu­
sion of the primary and the run-off held on the first of 
June, the Alabama delegation was split in half: half
agreed to walk out of the convention and the other half 
declared their intention to remain within the party re­
gardless of the program adopted. Anti-bolters in Alabama 
included Senator Lister Hill, Governor J. E. Folsom,
former Governor Chauncey Sparks, and Attorney General
32Albert Carmichael.
As Democratic leaders began to explore the possi­
bilities for peace within the party, they found the south­
erners staunchly wed to the idea of Truman's withdrawal 
and the omission of civil rights as the only solution. 
Truman's formal announcement to run for the presidency 
surprised no one nor did his uncompromising stand on the 
issue of civil rights. McGrath indicated that he would 
personally support a mild civil rights plank similar to 
the one adopted by the 1^44 Democratic convention. Truman 
also, at one point, was willing to accept this. This plank 
was so vague in its reference to civil rights that it should 
not have been offensive to the South, but by this time Mr. 
Truman had become a personal issue with many southerners. 
Regardless of Democratic rhetoric to the contrary, the South
^^Key, Southern Politics, pp. 332-33*
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33knew beyond a doubt what Truman stood for. Moderate 
southerners, still hoping to avoid a break with the Demo­
cratic party, made proposals from time to time to McGrath
but nothing would satisfy the southern rebels short of
34secession from the party.
On March 13, the southern governors representing 
six states with seventy-two electoral votes held a "little 
convention" just four blocks away from the White House.
Those attending were Governors Fielding Wright, Mississippi; 
Buford Jester, Texas; James E. Folsom, Alabama; M. E. Thomp­
son, Georgia; Strom Thurmond, South Carolina; and Ben Laney, 
Arkansas. Presiding over the conference was Governor Lane 
of Maryland who did so because of his post as chairman of 
the Southern Governors' Conference and not because of any 
interest in the movement. Claiming that his state conven­
tion was the only body authorized to make such commitments,
35he did not vote and took no active part in the meeting.
At the meeting, the Southern Committee report on 
civil rights was presented. It began by stating that the 
purpose of the conference was to consider the problems of 
the southern states resulting from the civil rights program. 
Such policies as might be proposed from this program would
^^Providential Bulletin, March 5i 1948.
34Letter, Myron G. Blalock to J. Howard McGrath, 
Montgomery, Alabama, State Department of Archives and His­
tory, Marion Rushton Papers, Correspondence 1948 File.
^^Washington Post, March l4, 1948.
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mean a "major alteration in the division of governmental 
powers and sovereignty between the states and the federal 
government." The report proceeded to denounce the anti­
poll tax, anti-lynching, and the whole of Truman's pro­
gram in all-too-familiar rhetoric. Emphasis was placed, 
not on the issues themselves, but on the underlying 
states' rights principles.
The Conference of Southern Governors in Washington 
both repudiated the leadership of the Democratic party and 
recommended that southerners "fight to the last ditch to 
prevent the nomination of any candidate . . . who advocates
such invasions of state sovereignty" as those proposed by 
the P r e s i d e n t . T h e  conference suggested that southern 
delegates fight for a positive statement for states' rights 
in the party platform, and, concluding the formal recom­
mendations, they asked that southerners pledge their votes 
in the electoral college only to advocates of states' 
rights. Although these were the major recommendations, 
there were also suggestions concerning effective political 
action. Organizations at the state level were urged to 
send in resolutions expressing opposition to the civil 
rights program and to any candidates who support such a 
program, while delegates to the national convention were 
asked to work for the adoption of a states' rights plank
Repcrt, Folsom Papers, Governors of Other States
File.
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at the convention, to oppose the Truman program and to
37support the restoration of the two-thirds rule.
In this meeting southerners outlined a "pre­
convention caucus." It would begin with a meeting of the 
southern delegations to be held in Philadelphia or Wash­
ington just two days prior to the July 12 national con­
vention. At the caucus, plans for the fight in the con­
vention would take form. Those who would attend the pre­
convention caucus were delegates and alternates from Ala­
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, and
. . 38 .V i r g i n i a .
It was also suggested that, if necessary, a post­
convention conference would be held at Birmingham where 
a presidential slate could be selected by the southern 
states. The decision to hold the Birmingham conference 
would hinge upon the developing of any one of the fol­
lowing three situations: if southern delegations were
not seated; if Truman or someone who had not renounced
the civil rights program was the nominee; or if the con-
39vention did not adopt a strong states' rights platform.
As the outline of the revolt began to take shape, 
the Dixiecrats announced that the conference of the States'
37lbid.




Rights Democrats would meet on May 10, in Jackson, Missis­
sippi. The purpose of this meeting was to formulate fur­
ther the principles of states' rights and to plan future 
action necessary to the preservation of constitutional
, 40 government.
With the Democratic party split into so many seg­
ments, many southerners began to suggest compromise can­
didates such as General Dwight D. Eisenhower. To some 
southerners he represented the answer to the Russian 
problem and to others he was the solution to the Negro
4lproblem. Marion Rushton of Alabama, one of Eisenhower's 
most devoted followers, presented his case for claiming 
that because he was a Texan with southern sympathies, he 
could win the South and because of his nation-wide follow­
ing, he would re-unite the Democratic party. Rushton de­
clared, "Eisenhower is our nominee. The man and the hour
42have met. Eisenhower is the man." It was to counteract 
this Eisenhower boom that Truman made the formal announce-
43ment of his intention to run.
The draft Eisenhower movement caused opposing dis­
sident elements in the party to unite temporarily. Northern
40Telegram, Arthur L. Adams to Ben Laney, Laney 
Papers, Ben Laney File.
41Telegram, Marion Rushton to Gessner McCorvey, 
Rushton Papers, Correspondence 1948 File.
4 2Letter, Marion Rushton to Gessner McCorvey,
April 195 1948, Rushton Papers, Correspondence 1948 File.
^^Redding, Inside the Democratic Party, pp. 147-49*
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liberals sucli as James Roosevelt saw in Eisenhower what 
they thought the Democratic party needed, a man who would 
not serve as a partisan President but would answer the 
call from the people of this country expressed in a spon-
kktaneous draft. The draft Eisenhower movement was not 
easily killed. It persisted with great force down to the 
time of the Democratic convention.
Not all southerners were convinced of the desir­
ability of General Eisenhower as a candidate. E. H.
Ramsey, leader of the southern bolt in Florida, said 
that he was "the greatest threat to the South and may be
the scheme finally adopted in an effort to break the south- 
45orn bloc." Leon W. Harris, a lawyer from Anderson, South 
Carolina, warned the South that since Eisenhower's politi­
cal preference and politics were unknown he might be more 
radical than Truman. Besides, southerners felt, the South 
had its own men whose opinions were well known and were 
trustworthy, men such as Harry Byrd of Virginia.
In the meantime preparation for the May 10 meeting 
continued. Eight southern leaders met in Memphis on 
April 9) to plan procedure and policy for the All South 
meeting. Several points were agreed upon at the meeting:
Statement, July 6 , 1948, Columbia, South Carolina, 
South Carolinian Library, Olin Johnston Papers, General 
Eisenhower File.
^^Letter, E. H. Ramsey to Ben Laney, June 2, 1948, 
Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
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Fielding Wright would serve as temporary Chairman; Ben 
Laney would oe permanent Chairman; a lady from Dallas,
Mrs. F. R. Carlton would serve as Secretary; Horace Wil­
kinson was to be Chairman of the Resolutions Committee;
E. S. Lewis would be head of the Credentials Commiffeir; 
and W. W. Wright, a wealthy wholesale grocer from Missis­
sippi, was named head of Ways and Means and Floor Commit­
tees whose purpose was to see that order was preserved. 
Since no agreement could be reached on the keynote speaker,
this choice was delegated to a committee comprised of
46Wright, Thurmond, and Laney, As southern leaders con­
tinued plotting the course for rebellion, all of the 
South buzzed with excitement. Southerners from every 
corner of that region animatedly and often quite heatedly 
argued the political questions of the day.
The next phase in this budding revolt took place
in Atlanta, Georgia, where a meeting was held to discuss 
the strategy and procedure to be followed by the southern 
states in their opposition to the Truman program. Those 
attending were southern Democratic state chairmen from 
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Arkansas,
Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, and North 
47Carolina. Although nothing new of major importance
^^Letxer, Arthur Adams to Ben Laney, April 9, 1948, 
Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
4?Memorandum, William P. Baskin to Arthur Adams, 
Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
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occurred here, the chain of events leading to the southern 
break away from the Democrats was strengthened.
The Gallup Poll of April 9 showed Truman's popular­
ity in the South at an all time low. In the South, 82 per 
cent opposed Truman and his civil rights program, but most 
southerners supported his foreign policy, his anti-Russian 
attitude, and his Marshall Plan which they saw.as thwarting
48the spread of Communism. In spite of the polls Truman 
did not appear worried. He maintained that when a choice 
was made at the ballot box, southerners would vote for him 
rather than for his Republican opponent who would be run­
ning on a strong civil rights stand also. As the month of 
April passed, the White House heard less about the southern 
bolt, possibly because of the secrecy involved in some of 
the Dixiecrat planning meetings. Democrats in Congress 
reported that southern leaders recently had been making 
some overtures for peace; consequently, Truman concluded
that only Alabama and possibly one other state would fail
49to vote Democratic in November. Truman was counting on 
the South's fears of penalties and on party regularity to 
see him through the election.
48 "Poll Among Southern Voters Finds Reversal in 
Attitude Tow. rd President's Handling of His Job," Demo­
cratic National Committee Clipping File, Democratic Party- 
Dixiecrat Revolt, 1948-52, Truman Library.
49 . ̂New York Times, May 7, 1948.
^^Ibid., May 9, 1948.
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Just before the major conference of southern Demo­
crats was to convene, Governor Wright worked to set the 
tempo of the meeting by making an inflammatory anti-Negro 
speech broadcast live throughout Mississippi. In his 
diatribe he defended segregation in the South and compared 
it to the lack of kindness in the northern states. He 
concluded with a warning to Negroes :
If any of you have become so deluded as to want to 
enter our hotels and cafes, enjoy social equality 
with the whites, then kindness and true sympathy 
requires me to advise you to make your home in 
some state other than Mississippi.51
Thus Wright succeeded in setting an appropriate mood for
the proceedings of the next day.
The mejor roads into Jackson were draped with Con­
federate flags while the banners over the doors of the
city auditorium read, "Welcome, States' Rights Democrats." 
Preparations for this day had been in the making by a full 
time working staff since March 20. The States' Righter,
the periodical of the movement, had also begun publication 
5 2by this time. All that morning chartered buses arrived
from Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, Little Rock, Birmingham,
5 3and other southern cities. All of the southern states 
were represented along with a few non-southern states.
^^Ibid., May 10, 1948.
^^Louisville Courier-Journal, May 10, 1948 
^^States' Righter, May, 1948.
129
The meeting began at 10:00 A.M. with 3,^00 people 
in attendance. For some four hours "volunteer citizens," 
that is anyone who believed in states' rights and opposed 
civil rights, participated in the conference. To register
54one merely signed a card pledging himself to such beliefs. 
Key suggests that the idea of "volunteer citizens" was de­
cided upon because if only official delegates to the Demo­
cratic party were allowed to participate the turnout would
55have been embarrassingly small. The mood of those in 
attendance ranged from ebullient enthusiasm to utter bore­
dom. Only 1 5 0 spectators plus 500 of the 1,000 "delegates" 
stayed until all of the resolutions were adopted.
As the convention opened, the group from Texas sang 
"The Eyes of Texas Are Upon You," after which they received 
"thunderous applause." After the invocation, the entire 
body sang "Dixie," then appropriately enough. Fielding 
Wright delivered the welcoming speech. Following Judge 
Hart Wilson of Birmingham who delivered the speech nomi­
nating Ben Laney as permanent chairman, Laney made the 
traditional criticisms of Truman, outlining the southern 
interpretation of the civil rights program in detail. He 
reiterated the "tragic" history of the South during and
S4Key, Southern Politics, p. 333.
S^lbid.
^^New York Times, May 11, 1948.
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following Reconstruction, but pointed out that if south­
erners wanted to justify segregation, they must admit it 
had not always given the Negro an equal opportunity. Ne­
groes, he admitted, have been employed in the "least re­
warding fields of work." While physical lynchings had 
disappeared, Laney said, those of a psychological nature 
still existed for the Negro. As for education and recre­
ational facilities, here again the South had fallen down
in its job. His plea was for the South to do more in
57this area in order to prevent federal intervention.
After Laney's speech, Mrs. F. R. Carlton, of Dallas 
was nominated and voted Permanent Secretary. At that 
point the permanent committees. Resolutions, Credentials, 
and Steering, were assigned; then Strom Thurmond delivered 
the keynote address. He covered the same issues that Laney 
had just discussed, promising that at the conclusion of the 
campaign the Democratic party would not so eagerly sell the
q O
South out for minority votes.
Alluding to economic issues, he explained how the 
South had long suffered from a discriminatory freight rate, 
"a 39% rate differential on manufactured goods as compared 
with the Eastern section of the country." Also high tar­
iffs were frequently imposed on the South while the Eastern
57Minutes, Jackson Mississippi Conference, May lU, 
1948, Laney Papers, Southern Governors' Conference File. 
Hereinafter referred to as Minutes.
^^"Speakers Handbook," pp. 25-36.
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manufacturers enjoyed protection against price competition
from the rest of the world. Emphasizing that the struggle
was not one of race but one of principle, he, like Laney,
concluded by defending segregation on the grounds that it
was essential to the perpetuation of southern civilization.
According to Thurmond he personally had no interest in any
public office if he had to sacrifice principle for it. He
stated that the rights of the people should not be "sacri-
59ficed on the block of blind party loyalty." Then came 
Thurmond's challenge to the Democrats when he warned "the 
die is cast and the Rubicon crossed." He explained that 
the Democratic party had forced the hand of the South to 
take up the battle for the defense of d e m o c r a c y . F o r  
all his histrionics, Thurmond received warm resounding 
applause.
Five resolutions were adopted and a Declaration of 
Principles based on the Declaration of Independence was 
read.^^ The resolutions consisted of a Declaration of 
Faith filled with states' rights and anti-Negro senti­
ments, the selection and instruction of delegates to the 
National Democratic Convention, and the rules for the Bir­
mingham meeting if circumstances should require it. An­
other resolution requested that the chairman of this con­
ference appoint a committee consisting of two Democrats 
from each of the states represented to hold organizational
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Minutes.
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meetings. In the third resolution the national southern 
leaders were commended for their stand against the civil 
rights program, while the fourth resolution thanked the 
governors and their co-workers of Mississippi and Arkansas 
for hosting and organizing the convention. After the en­
dorsement of the fifth resolution, which commended Gover­
nor Wright's May 9, 19^8, speech to his constituents, the 
conference closed with Mr. Gene Timmerman's singing of 
"Let's Send Harry Back to the Farm."^^
After the meeting, Thurmond fielded questions from 
the press on the conference. Thurmond stated that the 
meeting was simply a phase in the action that the South 
would take to defend herself in the National Democratic 
Convention and in the electoral college. When asked about 
his choice for the southern candidates, he replied that 
there were many who were qualified, but he refused to name 
any of them. With respect to the South's willingness to 
compromise Thurmond explained in explicit terms that only 
a categorical removal of the civil rights program would 
permit such negotiations.^^
Meanwhile the national Democratic party was system­
atically planning for the national convention. The execu­
tive committee of the Democratic party named Alben Barkley,
^^Ibid.
^^"Questions submitted to J. Strom Thurmond by 
press regarding States Rights Democrats Convention in 
Jackson," May 10, 1948, Thurmond Papers, States Rights 
File.
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Senate Leader, as temporary chairman and Sam Rayburn,
House Leader, as permanent chairman. Rayburn in the posi­
tion of permanent chairman could practically run the con­
vention and, for the most part, recognize whom he pleased. 
At a press conference, McGrath, denying that this was a 
gesture aimed at appeasing the South, explained that ap­
pointments were based on past records of party loyalty
64and service. Still there were hopes that Truman would 
renounce his civil rights program and agree publicly to 
the 1944 p l a n k . S o m e  southern congressmen and adminis­
tration aides were hard at work on a viable compromise in 
civil rights that would prevent the expected bolt, and, 
on June 8 , it was reported that the administration would 
accept such a civil rights plank. Even so, most southern 
Democrats insisted on their continued opposition to Truman. 
Harry Byrd of Virginia expressed what many southerners 
thought : that it really did not matter how the platform
read, everybody knew what Truman meant and wanted.
Despite rumors of compromise, nothing of the sort 
was forthcoming. The Dixiecrats feverishly worked to 
create a political machine from nothing. On June 8 , the 
SRD campaign committee met at Jackson to discuss the pos­
sibility of selecting their own candidates should Truman
^^New York Times, May 21, 19^8. 
^^Ibid., June 8 , 1948.
^^Ibid., June 9 , 1948.
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be nominated at Philadelphia. Governor Ben Laney called 
the meeting to order and then enumerated such duties of 
the campaign committee as supporting presidential candi­
dates who were for states' rights and opposed to civil 
rights, supporting electors and delegates from the various 
states who held similar views, holding a pre-convention 
caucus at wh^ch they would advise the national convention 
that they did not intend to support Harry Truman or anyone 
else of his political views, and preparing for the States' 
Rights meeting in Birmingham on July 17- This committee 
was directed to confine its efforts to the "former Confed­
erate states" where it had the greatest chance of success. 
The campaign committee was to begin working with the dele­
gates and electors from those eleven states so they would 
be in agreement as to the party's aims and procedure. The 
committee should also be prepared to meet any and all de­
velopments that might arise at the Democratic convention.
The organization of the campaign was developed down 
to the state level allowing the states to form their own 
organization but providing liason men to work with the 
several states to give greater uniformity and direction 
to the overall campaign. The matter of determining how 
to get the SRD party on the ballot in different states was 
assigned to a "November Ballot Investigator." The Dixie­
crats planned to establish a "nerve center" in Little Rock
^^Minutes.
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from which to direct the campaign, a goal which was never 
fully realized. The coordination of fund raising and ad­
vertising, two indispensable factors, demanded a great 
amount of time from the committee. Since time was short, 
a daily schedule was drawn up detailing the work to be 
done between June 7 and election day. Radio talks were 
scheduled, southern dailies and weeklies were lined up 
to report on the party. States' Rights buttons were to be 
distributed as would be copies of the "States' Righter."
The projected budget for two months was set at $90,000,
and Jackson, Mississippi, was designated the temporary
6 8headquarters for the SRD. At the close of the conven­
tion delegates were reminded not to let enthusiasm for 
the revolt diminish. Vigorous advertising and rousing 
publicity were stressed as essential to the success of 
the movement.
With an agreement to galvanize and not lose the 
faith, one of the most important organizational confer­
ences that the Dixiecrats would hold came to a close.
Their success or failure would in large measure be deter­
mined by how well they were able to implement instructions 
received at the Jackson meeting. The Dixiecrats, with an 
impossible task before them, began the summer optimistically.
Ĝ Ibid. ^̂ Ibid.
CHAPTER V
THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
With much foreboding the Democrats anticipated the 
coming of the national nominating conventions in the sum­
mer of 1 9 4 8. Nearly everyone believed that the Democrats, 
who would probably nominate Truman for the Presidency, 
faced inevitable defeat. The country seemed just as cer­
tain that Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican choice for the 
Presidency, would chalk up a victory. For many months 
the major national polling concerns, Roper and Gallup, 
argued not over the likelihood of the Democratic defeat, 
but over the extent of the defeat.
Truman had always labored under numerous handicaps. 
In appearance Truman's pedestrian, often rather crude man­
nerisms did not distinguish him in the eyes of his country­
men. Nor did the remarks that he frequently made to the 
press concerning the tremendous and almost overwhelming 
responsibility of the Presidency instill confidence in the 
public. When compared with the imposing figure of Franklin 
Roosevelt, he never quite seemed to measure up to the re­
quirements of the position. His speeches, delivered with a
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midwestern twang and sprinkled with homey aphorisms, 
lacked the refinement and sophistication of Roosevelt's.
Furthermore, the public failed to appreciate the 
almost insurmountable obstacles that Harry Truman faced. 
Many who had sympathized with Roosevelt and the wartime 
pressures thoughtlessly believed the conclusion of the 
Second World War would automatically solve American do­
mestic problems. Actually, of course, the postwar period 
brought inflation, a shortage of goods, labor unrest, vio­
lent political conflicts between the Congress and the Pres­
ident and a renewed sense of pressing social issues.
Nor did friction in the international sphere abate 
with the war's end. The wartime coalition foundered on 
Soviet expansion and mutual suspicion. Unrest and revolt 
in the colonial empires of our European allies contributed 
to an uneasy peace and intruding in this already tense and 
unstable international atmosphere was the atomic bomb which 
portended ill for the fate of man. The leadership neces­
sary to cope with such awesome developments seemed to many 
to be lacking in the United States.
One week after Japan surrendered, Truman sent to 
Congress his domestic program, which was an extension of 
the New Deal welfare reforms. In spite of the similarities 
between the programs, Truman failed to get the cooperation 
of many of the Republican New Dealers who accused Truman 
of conservatism. As the Republican aides began leaving
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the Truman Administration, public confidence in the new 
President waned. Trouble within the.administration over 
foreign policy matters caused further problems within the 
cabinet as well as within the party. In 1946, Henry Wal­
lace's well-publicized speech, criticizing Secretary of 
State James Byrne's "get-tough-with-Russia" policy, ended 
in Wallace's resignation. And Wallace made good his 
threat to remind the administration continually of its 
misdirected foreign policy.
Meanwhile office-hungry Republicans were rejoicing 
over and attempting to capitalize on what seemed to be a 
disintegration of the New Deal coalition. The liberal- 
labor bloc became increasingly alarmed at Truman's han­
dling of high prices and labor unrest. To cope with in­
flation Truman urged Congress to extend wartime price con­
trols, but at the same time he denounced such controls to 
the press by calling them "police state methods." When 
Congress passed a watered down anti-inflation bill, Truman 
vetoed it. Yet as inflation grew more severe. Congress 
wrote another slightly stronger price control bill which 
Truman signed. In short, Truman's vacillation on infla­
tion angered those who wanted high prices as well as those 
who wanted strict controls. Labor problems during this 
period were particularly acute and for Truman they posed 
added political problems. It appeared that Truman's re­
quest for the power to draft railroad workers into the
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armed services would permanently alienate the labor vote 
from the Democratic party, but he later righted this af­
front to labor.
No President since Hoover had been so unpopular 
just prior to congressional elections. Republicans, taking 
full advantage of Truman's unpopularity with their slogan 
"Had Enough? Vote Republican" won a sweeping victory in 
1 9 4 6 , their first victory since I9 2 8 . The GOP sent 246 
of its party to the House as opposed to I88 Democrats. 
Fifty-one Republicans surfaced in the Senate while only 
forty-five Democrats returned. The Republicans also re­
joiced over the twenty-five Governors they had elected.
Some of the credit for the Republican victory must un­
doubtedly be attributed to the fissures in the Democratic 
party.
To rebuild the strength and prestige of the Demo­
cratic party was one of the enormous tasks facing Truman 
and his fellow party men in 194? and 1948. Ironically, 
in view of the Wallace defection, Truman's foreign policy, 
as he dealt with Soviet Russia's aggression and with the 
countries of Eastern Europe through the Marshall Plan, 
helped advance the position of the party. In the domestic 
area, moreover, Truman began to pursue policies designed 
to appeal to labor and minority groups. This move was 
occasioned by the fact that the Democrats in 1946 lost 
their greatest number of votes in the cities. In his
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request to Congress in May, 19^7, for a public health 
program, he included a division calling for worker dis­
ability insurance. At the beginning of 1948 he urged an 
end to segregation and discrimination in the armed forces 
and in federal government jobs. By his immediate recogni­
tion of Israel as an independent nation in May, 1948, he 
hoped to enhance his appeal to a significant urban minor­
ity group.
Truman attracted farmers by his opposition to flex­
ible price supports and support of subsidies. In June, 
1 9 4 1 , he vetoed the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act. Although 
overridden by Congress, Truman's veto won the affection of 
labor, an affection that was to have a towering influence 
in the 1948 election.
The old Democratic coalition, however, was actually 
being torn apart by a triangular struggle within the party. 
In 1 9 4 7 , when Henry Wallace officially declared himself an 
independent presidential candidate, he enunciated a program 
of domestic reform, "progressive capitalism," and an inter­
nationalist foreign policy. Wallace attracted Negroes, 
Communists, and some others from the far left in the Demo­
cratic party. Another left wing, but anti-Communist and 
anti-Wallace, element in the Democratic party was formed 
in 1947 by intellectuals, labor leaders, and urban leaders. 
This group, known as the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), worked steadily at a "Dump-Truman" movement. Then
I k l
there were the Dixiecrats who threatened to run their own 
candidates.
Faced with diverse dissension from within, the Demo­
crats in one of their few concerted actions met in July in 
Philadelphia for their convention. When the Republicans 
met in this same city three weeks earlier the occasion was 
filled with optimistic crowds certain of victory. The 
Democrats did not convene with the same enthusiasm; room 
cancellations occurred during the week of the convention. 
There were attempts to cheer up the delegates by making 
signs such as "Keep America Human with Truman," and "Truman 
Victory Kits" for the delegates, complete with notebook, 
pencil, lighter fluid, and whistle. Some quipped that this 
was to be used in the Democratic graveyard.^ One newspaper 
reported that the liveliest Democrat was the paper-mache
2donkey which had flashing electric eyes and a wagging tail.
This contrast of convention moods was, unfortunately 
for the Democrats, not confined to the walls of the conven­
tion, for, televised for the first time in 1948, the na­
tional conventions were witnessed by thousands of select 
viewers. Pessimism pervaded the ranks of the Democratic 
delegates. They were positive that Harry Truman, the cer­
tain nominee, was incapable of winning the election. In a 
futile attempt to cheer up the delegates, the city of
^"The Only Fight," Time, July l8, 1948, pp. 23-24, 
^New York Times, July 13, 1948.
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Philadelphia opened its bars on Sunday, but as the New 
York Times reported, "the delegates drank bourbon, scotch 
and rye as if it were so much embalming fluid--and with
3about the same effect." As the Democratic delegates 
wandered aimlessly around the streets cab drivers com­
plained at the lack of business. One quipped that they 
should have been driving hearses instead of cabs to match
the mood of the representatives. Even delegates them-
4selves spoke of "going to the wake."
There were, however, some life-giving possibilities 
within the convention. Those who pushed the "Draft Ike" 
movement hoped for a struggle between Eisenhower and 
Truman for the nomination. Secondly, there was some un­
certainty as to whom the vice-presidency would go, and 
then there was the pending southern walk-out.
A "Draft-Ike" movement in the talking stage as 
early as February of the year had been actively supported 
by the liberal ADA. Although the platform adopted by the 
ADA at their first annual convention in February, 1948, 
could have been taken from Truman's message to Congress, 
the ADA opposed Truman. Both Truman and the ADA supported 
the Marshall Plan, the National Health Insurance program, 
federal aid to education, and a civil rights policy. But 
Truman, the /DA exclaimed, as they pointed to the gap be­
tween what he said and what he did, was not liberal enough
^Ibid., July 12, 1948. ^Ibid.
1^3
for them. Primarily the ADA disliked Truman personally 
and sought to brand him as an incompetent political leader. 
Furthermore, these liberals were angered by Truman's ap­
pointment of conservative Democrats to posts vacated by 
New Dealers and many thought he had failed to support the 
Jewish cause in Palestine vigorously enough.
The main concern of the ADA was victory not prin­
ciple. Looking for a charismatic leader to replace their 
revered Roosevelt, they turned to Eisenhower. Because of 
his extraordinary achievements abroad, they expected him 
to be every bit as spectacular on the home front. Richard 
Kirkendall, a leading historian of the Truman era, wrote 
that the ADA looked to Eisenhower to "stir the popular 
enthusiasm which would sweep progressive candidates across 
the country into Congress" and produce the type of leader­
ship that would "defeat both the forces of vested reaction 
and the Communist-dominated third p a r t y . O t h e r  explana­
tions for the ADA support for Eisenhower, a conservative 
whose specific political views were unknown, are lacking.
Two weeks after the ADA convention, its members 
launched an attack against Truman, and by late March, James 
Roosevelt, an ADA vice-chairman, publicly expressed support
Richard Kirkendall, "The Presidential Election of 
19^8," in The American Scene, Varieties of American His­
tory , ed. by Robert 51 Marcus and David Burner (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), P- 403» Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Kirkendall, "The Presidential Election."
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for General Eisenhower.^ The ADA revolt against Truman 
originally consisted of a liberal-labor coalition. By 
April it picked up another element with ideologies com­
pletely foreign to those of the ADA. Dissident southern 
Democrats alienated from Truman by his civil rights pro­
gram, the very core of the ADA movement itself, joined 
the ADA in support of Eisenhower. Why southern Democrats 
rallied to Eisenhower is no more logical than why the ADA 
supported him. Southerners knew as little of Eisenhower's 
principles as did the liberals but they seemed willing to 
trade anyone for Truman. Had such a movement gotten off 
the ground, its divergent groups no doubt would soon have 
split apart. But it was thought that if Eisenhower could 
join two such ideologically polarized groups as these, he
7could doubtless unite the country.
The state convention of Georgia endorsed Eisenhower 
by means of a resolution on July 2, which in part read 
that Eisenhower was "the one man, the only proper man to 
lead the people of this nation in their fight against com­
munism, tyranny and slavery" and he could "maintain the
gpeoples of the world at peace." The administration forces
Clifton Brock, Americans for Democratic Action: 
Its Role in National Politics (Washington, D.C.: Public
Affairs Press, 19^2), pp. 08-91•
^Ibid., p. 92; and New York Times, July 6, 1948.
o New York Times, July 3» 1948.
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were fearful that the Eisenhower boom would hurt Truman 
at the convention. It was alleged that George Allen, 
former chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
now an insurance executive, was sent to ask Eisenhower to 
remove his name officially from the race. When the press 
in early July reported this, the White House denied it, 
explaining that Allen had gone to visit Eisenhower for
9the weekend, but it was entirely on his own prerogative.
Cabell Phillips, popular biographer of Truman, re­
lates a somewhat different story. In the autumn of 194?, 
Truman, believing himself already defeated in the election, 
offered to give the Democratic nomination to Eisenhower, 
while Truman would relegate himself to the vice-presidential 
candidacy. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, sup­
posedly first made the suggestion to Truman, who thought it 
was a fine idea. Truman then sent Royall to Eisenhower 
with the proposal, but Eisenhower refused it. Phillips 
checked the validity of the story with the men involved, 
and of the three involved, only Royall confirmed it. 
Eisenhower refused to comment on it and Truman denied it 
completely. That Truman who fought so valiantly to main­
tain his position would resort to such action seems a little 
far-fetched.
^Ibid.
^^Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency; The His­
tory of a Triumphant Succession (New Y o r k : T h e  MacMillan 
Company, I9 6 6 ), pp. 196-97•
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By the fourth of July, Alabama was stating her 
willingness to yield to any state that would nominate 
Eisenhower because he had so far only declined to take 
the Republican nomination. Texas, Arkansas, and South 
Carolina announced they would go for Eisenhower. Nine­
teen different party leaders under the leadership of 
James Roosevelt, California state chairman, sent tele­
grams to the 1 , 5 9 2 delegates to the Democratic Conven­
tion inviting them to a caucus in Philadelphia on July 10 
to select the best man for the presidency. The root of 
this scheme was an effort to block T r u m a n . S p o n s o r s  of 
this strange coalition included Mayor William O'Dwyer of 
New York, Mayor Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr., of Minneapolis, 
James Roosevelt of California, Governor J. Strom Thurmond 
of South Carolina, Governor Ben Laney of Arkansas, Sena­
tor Lister Hill of Alabama, and Governor William J. Tuck 
of Virginia.
This curious collection of conservative southerners 
and liberal New Dealers worked feverishly for Eisenhower's 
nomination. Plans for the caucus at Philadelphia continued 
up to July 9i the day before the scheduled meeting, in 
spite of Eisenhower's July 5th announcement spurning the 
proposed draft.
^^New York Times, July 4, 1948; and Statement, 
Laney Papers, Letters Regarding Civil Rights File.
^^New York Times, July 5, 1948.
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Eisenhower had clearly stated his position: "I
will not, at this time, identify myself with any political 
party and could not accept nomination for any public of-
13fice or participate in partisan political contest." He 
could hardly have issued a more forthright refusal, but 
his supporters refused to give up. James Roosevelt wanted 
the convention to go ahead and nominate Eisenhower because 
after the nomination the General surely would not refuse 
it. Active ADA supporters picketed Eisenhower's New York 
home with signs saying, "Ike, You Favor the Draft, We 
Favor it For You," and "Ike, You're A-I With Us, Be I-A 
in the Draft." All manner of means to persuade Eisenhower
l4to accept the nomination were utilized.
The Democratic leader of New York's borough of 
Queens, James A. Roe, declared his intention to introduce 
a resolution at the beginning session of the convention 
requesting that Truman step down in favor of Eisenhower. 
John M. Bailey, Democratic leader of Connecticut, thought 
that the convention should nominate Eisenhower without his 
consent and 3ven run a campaign without his participation, 
if necessary. Bailey reasoned that Eisenhower had never 
stated his refusal to serve if elected President and he 
would not let his country down at such a time.^^
13Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman
Victory of 1948 (New York: The New American Library,




One of the most ludicrous incidents surrounding 
the efforts to nominate Eisenhower centered around the 
antics of Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, one of the 
most liberal of southerners in Congress. He suggested 
that the Democratic party become a "national" party and 
then draft Eisenhower as a "nonpartisan" candidate. 
Eisenhower would select his own vice-president, presum­
ably Pepper, and even be allowed to write his own plat­
form. Pepper's efforts resulted in yet another tele­
gram from Eisenhower of July 9, saying "no matter under 
what terms, conditions or premises a proposal might be
17couched, I would refuse to accept the nomination."
Pepper then relinquished his efforts and agreed to Eisen-
18hower's plea not to place his name in nomination.
At this point most ADA men decided to support 
Truman. A few however, among them Leon Henderson, chair­
man of ADA, tried to muster support for Supreme Court 
Justice William 0. Douglas, a vigorous reformer and a 
liberal New Dealer. To get southerners to back Douglas, 
Henderson even promised to support restoration of the 
two-thirds ri’le. Southerners, though, knowing of Doug­
las' liberal pro-civil rights beliefs, refused to agree. 
Aware of Douglas' lack of northern support and slim
^^New York Times, July 7i 1948.
^^Brock, Americans for a Democratic America, p. 
l^Ibid.
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chances of victory, the rest of the ADA members capitu­
lated and unenthusiastically accepted the nomination of
19Truman on the first ballot.
During early July, rumors spread that Truman might
compromise on at least two of the issues that concerned
the South and perhaps accept the 1944 plank along with a
20states' rights plank. But southern leaders were uncon­
vinced. Laney said he saw no chance to heal the break 
with the Truman supporters if they continued to place
states' rights second to civil rights. Unless there were
21great concessions, no reconciliation would occur.
The southern pre-convention caucus was called at 
Philadelphia on July 10, 1948, to outline a plan of action 
that the southern delegations would follow during the 
course of the National Democratic Convention. The dele­
gations were instructed not to vote for Truman or anyone 
with similar beliefs, not to vote for any nominee who did 
not denounce civil rights, to keep the civil rights plank 
out of the platform, to insert a states' rights plank, and 
to try to defeat any proposal contrary to the SRD's beliefs 
Finally, the caucus called for a post-convention meeting to 
be held in Birmingham if certain situations arose or if
^^Ibid., pp. 94-95.
Of)New York Times, July 3» 1948.
21Telegram, Ben Laney to Charles Scripps, July 8 , 
1948, Laney Papers, States' Rights Committee File.
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specified conditions were not met at the Democratic con­
vention. If the southern delegations were not seated, if 
Harry Truman should be nominated for the Presidency, or 
if the convention failed to adopt a states' rights plank, 
then the delegates were invited to meet on July 17, in 
Birmingham, to select an acceptable Presidential and Vice- 
Presidential candidate. It was the contention of those in 
control of the caucus that their action could be described 
neither as bolting the party, forming a new party, nor 
holding a rump convention,. Instead, they maintained they
were trying to return to the old Democratic party to the
22principles upon which it was founded.
The day before the convention was to open a south­
erner with different views from the Dixiecrats, Senator 
Pepper, announced his desire to seek the Presidency of 
the United States. Promising to continue in the tradi­
tion of the New Deal, he pictured himself as a liberal 
practical southerner, but one who denounced Truman's 
civil rights program as being unenforceable and useless 
in the South. Claiming support from twenty-two states, 
he finally admitted that his only definite pledges, six- 
and-a-half votes, came from his home state of Florida.
His brief campaign was made notable though when a twenty- 
two-year-old girl attempted to ride a horse onto the floor 
of convention hall. When stopped and questioned about her
22Black Folder, Gibson Papers.
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activities, she explained that she was campaigning for
Pepper for President: "Everybody likes horses, every-
23body likes Pepper." A policeman suggested that a 
donkey might have been more appropriate. The Pepper for 
President idea was abortive from the very beginning, and 
Pepper withdrew from the race shortly after the conven­
tion began.
As the convention opened Monday afternoon, July 12, 
unenthusiastic and restless delegates almost filled the 
floor. The routine chores of the convention such as 
greetings from the city fathers and speeches condemning 
the Eightieth Congress comprised the afternoon session.
The first sign of any life in the convention occurred at 
the first night's session when Senator Alben Barkley de­
livered the keynote address. In his sixty-eight minute 
speech he praised the New Deal and the Democrats and de­
nounced the Republican Congress. Except for his failure 
to predict victory in November, Barkley delivered the 
usual keynote address. But at the close of his address
the convention finally came alive with a twenty-eight
24minute demonstration. The somber proceedings began 
to sound like a convention. And perhaps it was this 
favorable reception of his speech that won for Barkley 
the vice-presidential nomination.
^^New York Times, July l8, 1948; New York Post,
July 12, I9 4Ô ; and New~York Herald Tribune, July 12, 1948.
24New York Times, July I8, 1948.
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Apparently the choice of a vice-president had re­
ceived little attention prior to the convention. Although 
Leslie Biffle, the Secretary of the Senate and a friend of 
Barkley, had been promoting Barkley for the position, Tru­
man's first choice was William 0. Douglas. An associate
of the Supreme Court and a well known liberali Truman
25thought Douglas could cut into the Wallace appeal. When 
Clifford, at Truman's request, contacted Douglas concern­
ing the offer, the Justice was anything but enthusiastic. 
Douglas politely informed Clifford that he would consider 
the matter. The Friday prior to the opening of the con­
vention, Truman, anticipating a favorable reply, tele­
phoned Douglas who was vacationing in Oregon. Douglas 
again declined to answer but promised Truman he would 
make a decision by the opening day of the convention.
He subsequently rejected the offer, explaining that he 
was not inte-ested in becoming a politician.
Douglas' final refusal then opened the way for 
Barkley, a poor choice politically speaking. He not only 
represented the older style politics of the New Deal, but 
also with his home of Kentucky neighboring Truman's home 
state of Missouri, he would not give any geographical 
balance to the ticket. Nevertheless, Barkley had much 
political experience as a long-time Democratic leader in
^^New York Times, July 12, 1948.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 190.
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the Senate, and as keynoter of the 1932 and 1936 conven­
tions, he was a familiar figure. Perhaps Truman thought 
that Barkley could ease the friction between the northern 
and the southern factions of the party. The New York 
Times noted that he should be a good "caretaker of the 
possible minority party awaiting its chance to get back 
into the White House in 1952."^^ The details of how 
Barkley got the nomination are controversial. Truman's 
version stated that Barkley called him asking if the 
President cared if he tried to secure the nomination, 
to which Truman replied: "Why didn't you tell me you
28wanted to be Vice-President; it's all right with me."
Barkley, however, related the conversation dif­
ferently, alleging that Truman had asked him to run for 
Vice-President. Barkley claimed that when Truman called 
to congratulate him on his keynote address Truman asked 
Barkley why he did not tell him earlier that he wanted 
the vice-presidency. According to Barkley, Truman said,
"I didn't know you wanted the nomination," to which Bark-
29ley responded, "Mr. President, you do not know it yet." 
The New York Times reported that Barkley, upon hearing 
that Douglas had been the first choice for the vice­
presidency retorted, "I'm not interested in any biscuits
^^New York Times, July l4, 1948.
28Truman, Memoirs, II, I9O-9I.
29Alben Barkley, That Reminds Me (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 202.
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that have bean passed around to other people and then
30passed on to me cold." Nonetheless, Barkley did accept
the nomination. According to his memoirs, he accepted
because he thought the convention favored him above all
31other possible candidates. With the matter settled.
Senator McGrath, on Tuesday, July 12, announced that the
32President had chosen Barkley as his running mate. Dele­
gates now directed their attention to the most explosive 
and crucial issue of the convention: civil rights.
By the second night of the convention, the confron­
tation that would split the convention wide open was taking 
shape. Three different proposals relating to civil rights 
were being projected. The left wing of the party repre­
sented by the ADA advocated the adoption of a strong civil 
rights platform with specific recommendations and well- 
defined measures for implementation. The Truman plank was 
simply a moderate and general statement of civil rights 
designed to appease the blacks and not to offend the South. 
Administration representatives would have been satisfied 
with the simple tokenism of the 1944 civil rights plank.
The South on the other hand insisted that civil rights be 
totally excluded from the platform and in its place a 
strong statement of states' rights be drafted. This
^^New York Times, July 12, 1948. 
^^Barkley, That Reminds Me, p. 202. 
^^New York Times, July 13, 1948.
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tri-lateral struggle over civil rights not only divided 
the delegates, but it was responsible for a defeat on the 
convention floor for the administration. At the conclu­
sion of this battle, Truman inadvertently found himself
saddled with a program which he opposed but which nonethe-
33less helped bring him victory.
The fight for a strong civil rights plank started 
several months prior to the convention. Hubert Humphrey 
and James Roosevelt sent letters to the party leaders in 
the different states asking their support in adopting a
34strong civil rights plank at the July convention. Tru­
man had hoped all along that these civil ri ts enthusi­
asts would lose some of their determination before the 
convention because he saw no need to widen the breach be­
tween the administration and the South. Various attempts
or suggestions were made with Truman's approval in hopes
35of unifying the party. For example, Francis J. Myers 
of Pennsylvania, a pro-civil rights Democrat and chairman 
of the platform committee, attempted to unify the party
o ̂by supporting the 1944 civil rights plank. Myers and 
Truman's staff, deciding on this compromise before the
3 3Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. 120.
34 rBrock, Americans for a Democratic America, p. 9o
^^Ibid.
"Plot and Counterplot," Newsweek, June l4, 1948,
p. 25.
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convention, ordered Clifford to write the draft for the
37platform ahead of time. This moderate civil rights 
bill was presented at the initial platform committee 
meeting. The bill stated a belief in civil rights for 
all people regardless of racial or religious background, 
but it was filled with meaningless platitudes and pro­
vided for no specific measures or means of enforcement.
Thoroughly displeased with this weak platform 
Humphrey and former Congressman Andrew J. Biemiller of 
Wisconsin presented a much stronger civil rights plank 
which specifically called for personal safety from the 
crime of lynching and mob violence, equal opportunity in 
employment, full and free political participation and
o Qequal treatment in the armed forces. A vigorous debate 
between the moderate liberal sponsors of civil rights 
legislation ensued with the ADA accusing the administra­
tion of giving in to the states' rights faction. One 
administration representative. Senator Scott Lucas, be­
came so enraged at the ADA men and Humphrey in particular,
39that he repeatedly referred to Humphrey as a "pip squeak."
Finally by Tuesday night the platform committee ap­
proved the mild civil rights plank while simultaneously
37Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, p. 120.
O o Brock, Americans for a Democratic America, p. 97<
39 Winthrop Griffith, Humphrey: A Candid Biography
(New York: Morrow Press, 19^5) i PP• 151-52.
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rejecting the ADA plank. Humphrey then announced the 
intention of the ADA to take their contest to the conven­
tion floor in the form of a minority report. Officials 
scheduled the presentation of the platform for Wednesday 
afternoon.
While the liberal and moderate wings of the Demo­
cratic party tried to reach a compromise civil rights
plank, southerners met to determine their course of ac­
tion. Stubbornly insisting that the convention incorpor­
ate into the platform a strong statement affirming states'
rights and rejecting civil rights, they refused to support
40the administration's mild plank on civil rights.
Under Truman's direction, Senator Myers worked for
days in hopes of drawing up a plank acceptable to the South,
Myers finally agreed to a combination of the 1944 civil
rights plank along with a strong states' rights plank sup-
41portive of the South's right to handle racial matters. 
According to Charles Hamilton, a Mississippi delegate, ad­
ministration leaders agreed to the inclusion of states' 
rights in the platform, if Mississippi would promise at 
that early point during the week not to bolt the conven­
tion. The Mississippi delegation refused, reaffirming 
their bolting pledge if Truman or a similar candidate were 
the convention's final choice. These delegates, according
40Redding, Inside the Democratic Party, p. 192.
41 "Plot and Counterplot," p. 25.
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to Hamilton, were the ones responsible for the eventual 
defeat of the South's program in the convention. Many 
southern delegates resented their promise to bolt because 
their desertion would decrease the southern vote making 
it impossible for the South to get any concessions. Sen­
ator George of Georgia supported Hamilton's charge when 
after the convention he explained to the press that the
"Mississippi bolters were responsible for the Southern
42failure in the convention." " When Mississippi declared
its unbending intentions to bolt regardless, Pennsylvania,
which held the deciding vote, cast its vote for the
43stronger civil rights plank.
Seldom in complete agreement on any action, the 
southerners could not even agree on the presentation of 
a single minority plank concerning states' rights. They 
finally submitted three reports to the platform committee. 
Next they tackled the problem of selecting a protest can­
didate should Truman win the nomination. While the key 
men in the protest movement urged Ben Laney to be the 
candidate, the Texas delegation was talking both against 
the proposed bolt and against Laney's nomination. In a 
late night session Laney talked to the Texas delegation, 
reminding Governor Buford Jester of his strategic role in
42 r>Statement, "1948 Democratic Convention Scrapbook,"
Jacksonville, Florida, Charles Hamilton Papers.
^^Ibid.
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kkthe movement and of his earlier commitments. Jester 
made no reply to these overtures but his delegation fi­
nally promised to give at least token support to Governor
Laney on the first ballot, but only if Laney remained in
45the Democratic party. But when Laney discovered that 
other southerners including the delegates from Georgia 
did not support his nomination, he withdrew his name 
from the race. Dixon, upset by Laney's withdrawal pled 
with Laney not to leave the movement. Dixon feared that 
if Laney left it would "wreck the movement of which you 
are so valuable a part. People all over the South are
46looking to you for leadership," Dixon said.
Laney's explanation for his behavior at Philadel­
phia was that there had not been a split with other Dixie- 
crat leaders nor had he cha.iged his mind about opposing 
the civil rights program of Truman. He vowed himself to 
continue the fight against civil rights indefinitely. 
Laney said that there were differences of opinion on how 
to proceed with party organization and methods, but due 
to the gravity of the situation, they would all become 
united sooner or later. He explained that he had no 
major differences of opinion with any of the southern
44Ben Laney, Private Interview, April, 1970. 
^^New York Times, July 13, 1948.
46Telegram, Frank Dixon to Ben Laney, July 15t 
1948, Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
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klGovernors. After Laney withdrew his name from the can­
didacy, the South decided to use Richard Russell, the 
favorite son of Georgia, as a protest candidate.
Although the actual civil rights debate was not 
schedules until Wednesday, a related incident concerning 
the credentials committee--and perhaps influencing the 
voting of the next day on the issue--inflamed the tempers 
of the delegates. When the official Mississippi delega­
tion was challenged by a second Mississippi delegation, 
called the Mississippi Loyalists led by Charles Hamilton, 
president of the Young Democrats of Mississippi, the cre­
dentials committee upheld the right of the regular Missis­
sippi delegation to be seated. The Mississippi Loyalists 
along with other supporters challenged this decision on 
the grounds that the official delegation did not really 
represent Mississippi and they had already promised to 
refuse to support any candidate who was pro-civil rights. 
Upon hearing the credentials committee's decision, a 
black member of the committee, George L. Vaughn, delivered 
a minority report which opposed the decision and again 
called for the exclusion of the official Mississippi dele­
gation. His comments evoked boos and ungentlemanly re­
marks from the southern delegations.
Barkley, the temporary chairman, called for a voice 
vote on Vaughn's minority report ignoring northern delegates
^^Ibid.
l6l
who wanted a roll call. Mysteriously, the floor micro­
phones had been cut off giving Barkley a good excuse for 
not hearing their objections. Ba^^ley declared that by 
virtue of the voice vote the report was defeated. A 
great deal of commotion occurred on the floor as some 
delegates stormed up to the platform demanding recogni­
tion, but in vain. The convention quickly adjourned for
,, . , . 48the night.
This incident undoubtedly intensified the deter­
mination of civil rights supporters to secure adoption 
of a strong plank on the matter. The ADA met at a night­
long caucus to plan their strategy for the civil rights 
battle, and they agreed that the Biemiller Amendment would 
be delivered by Hubert Humphrey. To make sure that Sam 
Rayburn, permanent chairman, did not repeat Barkley's mis­
take, Biemiller informed Rayburn of their desire for a
49roll call on the vote. On Wednesday, four minority re­
ports were presented to the convention: the Biemiller and
three states' rights reports from Texas, Tennessee, and 
Mississippi. The last three amendments concerned with a 
states' rights plank said basically the same things. Dan 
Moody, former Governor of Texas, however, presented the 
major speech for the South. In it he requested that a 
short declaration of states' rights be included in the
48New York Times, July l4 and 26, 1948.
49 ,Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. 124.
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Democratic platform and reiterated the southern argument 
against the federal government's encroachment upon states' 
r i g h t s . M o o d y ' s  speech, moderate in tone, stated that 
his purpose was to restore harmony in the Democratic party 
and he explained that not only had he never bolted a con­
vention before but that he had no plans of bolting the
51Democratic convention at that time.
Speaking in behalf of the strong civil rights plat­
form was Hubert Humphrey who was also running for a seat 
in the Senate. Having been warned against bucking the 
party, his decision to deliver such a speech was no small 
act of courage. He began by commending President Harry 
Truman for his stand on civil rights. Then he called upon 
Congress to guarantee to all people the right of full and 
equal political participation, the right to equal oppor­
tunity of employment, the right of security of person, and
the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of 
52our nation. With a sincere belief in the principles of 
the report, Humphrey emphatically asserted his own ideas: 
"There are those who say to you--we are rushing this issue
C. Edgar Brown, comp, and ed., Democracy at Work 
Being the Official Report of the Democratic National Con­
vention (Philadelphia: The Local Democratic Political
Committee of Pennsylvania, n.d.), pp. I7 8-8I. Hereinafter 
referred to as Official Report.




of civil rights. I say we are a hundred and seventy-two 
5 3years late." In conclusion he announced "The time has
arrived for the Democratic party to get out of the shadow
of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright
54sunshine of human rights." At the conclusion of his 
speech delegates, showing their approval, paraded enthu­
siastically for several minutes.
The debate over the civil rights programs was rep­
resentative of the traditional division in American his­
tory between strict constructionism and loose construc-
5 5tionism. Southerners threatened that "failure to re­
affirm the constitutional rights of the states was essen­
tial to Southern confidence in and support of the party.
At the close of the debate the Texas amendment was voted 
down 925 to 3 0 9 * Two other proposals by the South were 
rejected by voice vote, while the Biemiller amendment
carried 6 3 I-I/ 2  to $8 2-1 / 2  amidst an uproar of boos and 
57cheers. In the midst of all this. Handy Ellis, chairman 
of the Alabama delegation, eager to make his dramatic an­
nouncement of Alabama's withdrawal from the convention,
^^New York Times, July 1$, 19^8; and Official Record, 
pp. 1 8 9-9 2 .
5 4.Ibid.
^^New York Times, July 1$, 1948.
^^Ibid.
^^Official Report, pp. 196-202.
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tried unsuccessfully to gain recognition from chairman 
Sam Rayburn. Rayburn heard a voice vote on the adoption 
of the whole platform then quickly recessed the convention 
until the night session. Thus ended the historic civil
C- o
rights debate in the Democratic convention of 1948.
On Wednesday, July l4, the convention met to nomi­
nate its Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.
As soon as the night session began, Handy Ellis secured 
recognition and made his announcement. Alabama's electors 
were under instructions "never to cast their vote for 
Harry Truman, and never to cast their vote for any candi­
date with a civil rights program such as adopted by the
59convention. We bid you goodbye!" As the thirteen mem­
bers of his delegation walked out, they were joined by 
the entire Mississippi delegation of twenty-three men.
Some southerners cheered; others sat dejectedly.
As the dissenters left the convention hall, a dele­
gate from Wisconsin piped out that it was a good riddance 
and that the Democrats could win the election without them. 
Ellis' comment was "The Hell you will. Harry Truman won't 
get $5*50 from the white people in Georgia to help his
^^Ross, Loneliest Campaign, pp. 125-26.
^^"Democrats: The Live Squall," Time, June 26,
1948, p. 13.
^^New York Times, July 15, 1948; and Commercial 
Appeal, July 15, 1948.
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c a m p a i g n . T h e  bolters walked out into a rainstorm, 
stopping briefly to pose for newspaper photographers.
But the southerners who remained withheld their 
votes from Truman. After order was restored, the proceed­
ings continued. Alternate delegates filled in the places 
deserted by the bolters. When the roll call began with 
Alabama first, it yielded to Georgia who nominated Senator 
Russell for the Presidency, a nomination seconded by George 
Wallace, later Governor of A l a b a m a . T h e  southern dele­
gates demonstrated to the tune of "Dixie," after which 
Charles J. Block of Georgia, who nominated Senator Russell, 
warned the convention that "the South is no longer going 
to be the whipping boy of the Democratic party." Further­
more he maintained that the Democratic party could not win
6 ̂elections without southern support.
The remaining southerners voted for Senator Richard 
Russell for the Presidency denying Truman the unanimous 
endorsement of the convention. When Truman was nominated, 
a demonstration, apparently the only thing well-organized 
at the whole convention, ensued lasting for thirty-nine 
m i n u t e s . T r u m a n  won on the first ballot by 947-1/2 to 
263 for Russell.
^^Gladys King Burns, "The Dixiecrat Revolt of 1948," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis. Auburn University, 1 9 6 5 )1 p . 165.
^^Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 1948.
^^New York Times, July 15, 1948.
^^Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. 128.
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At 1:45 Truman and Barkley came out to make their 
acceptance speeches. Just prior to this, a committee- 
woman presented the President with a floral Liberty Bell 
which held a group of white pigeons as "doves of peace." 
Pigeons flew everywhere and some guests "suffered inad­
vertent damage to their clothes." But as pigeons landed 
on the rostrum, this nonsensical antic gave the convention 
some of the vitality that it had been lacking.
In spite of the administration's opposition to it, 
the minority plank had won in the convention. Altho. jh 
McGrath, Myers, Rayburn, and Barkley, Truman's key men 
at the convention, as well as the states they represented, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Kentucky, and Missouri, voted against 
this minority plank, Truman did not miss the opportunity 
for getting credit for its passage. In his memoirs, omit­
ting the story of the struggle over civil rights, he wrote 
that he was "perfectly willing to risk defeat in 1948 by 
sticking to the civil rights plank in my platform.
At the conclusion of the convention, the South was 
outraged at the treatment it had received. Laney saw the 
South as having been "outnumbered and over-run" as had 
been the case many times before. The action at the 1948 
convention, Laney said, constituted "the greatest insult
G^ibid., p. 1 2 9 .
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, I8 2 .
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that was ever made against the South by the Democratic 
6 7Party." It was now beyond doubt that these outraged 
southerners would reconvene in Birmingham. From there 
they would demonstrate their protest to the nation.
^^Letter, Ben Laney to Jim Snoddy, June 20, 1948, 
Laney Papers, Governor Ben Laney File.
CHAPTER VI
THE BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE
The long-feared southern revolt became a reality 
on Saturday, July I?, when the insurgents met in Birming­
ham, Alabama, for a rump convention. As he walked out of 
the convention at Philadelphia, Governor Wright had an­
nounced that the meeting at Birmingham was on. He said, 
"The chips are down. The Die has been cast. We must 
make Birmingham the beginning of our electoral college 
fight to save the South.
The SRD argued that this was not a convention but 
rather another conference, a continuation of the May 10 
Jackson meeting. There it had been decided that if Truman 
or someone else with similar views won the Democratic nom­
ination, "true Democrats" would be forced to meet and se­
lect a more acceptable slate to run for the Presidency.
In spite of the Jackson decision and statement of purpose,
conflicting reports, issued at the time by the leaders and
2the press, clouded the purpose of the Birmingham meeting.
^Statement, Dixon Papers, States Rights Correspond­
ence File. 
2New York Times, July 17, 1948.
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The lack of organization and the absence of recog­
nized authority contributed to the confusion, the outstand­
ing characteristic of the conference. Alabama and Missis­
sippi Dixiecrats, Horace Wilkinson, Frank Dixon, Wallace W. 
Wright, and Sydney Smyer, appeared to be in charge of the 
convention although no one could be sure. Of those present 
at Birmingham some wanted to select candidates for the 
Presidency and Vice-Presidency while others preferred a 
campaign to free the presidential electors from their 
pledges to vote for the Democratic ticket.
In addition to the arguments over purpose and pro­
cedure there was disagreement over the terminology to be 
used at the Birmingham meeting. As already mentioned, 
there was disagreement over the type of meeting. Was it 
a conference or was it a convention? Who were the official 
delegates to this convention, if, of course, it were a con­
vention? Laney himself, in his call for the meeting em­
phasized there were no official delegates; all were volun­
teer interested citizens who professed a belief in states'
3rights while opposing civil rights.
These volunteer citizens were responding to Laney's 
call for a conference: "This is a 'grass roots' meeting
and I urge every man and woman who believes in States’ 
Rights and who opposes Harry S. Truman and the things he 
openly stands for to attend." The selection of Truman and
3Statement, Laney Papers, Unfiled.
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the inclusion of a civil rights program, Laney explained, 
have dictated the need for States' Righters to take "mili­
tant and positive action if they are to protect those
principles that should be dearer to true Americans than 
4life itself."
Just before the opening of the conference, scheduled 
to begin at 10:00 A.M. in the Municipal Auditorium, Wallace 
supporters paraded across the front of the auditorium with 
picket signs reading "Win with Wallace" and "Down with 
Lynching." But incessant booing and heckling caused the
Wallace picketers to leave about fifteen minutes after
• ■ 5arriving.
The convention itself began thirty minutes late in 
a hall decorated with red, white, and blue bunting. Dele­
gate seating was marked by the various state flags and 
standards. State banners represented were Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Tennessee, Texas, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, and 
Arkansas. Four students from the University of Virginia 
and one lady composed the Virginia delegates. None were 
identified as belonging to Kentucky or North Carolina, 
while Louisiana, Florida, and Texas each had approximately 
fifteen to twenty-five representatives.^ South Carolina
4Ibid.
^St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 17, 19^8. 
^New York Times, July l8 , 1948.
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was well represented by people from the Governor's office. 
Representing Tennessee were ten university students and 
five interested citizens. Georgia counted eight, and
7Arkansas twelve. There were twenty people not from the
southern states: Indiana (one), Pennsylvania (five), 
Illinois (two), California (two), Maryland (four), Wash-
gington, D.C. (one), Colorado (one), and Oklahoma (four).
"Alfalfa Bill" Murray, former Governor of Oklahoma, 
at seventy-nine was one of the oldest "delegates" present. 
Though nearly blind and half deaf, he was a loyal sup­
porter. After his two-day bus trip, during which he lost 
his baggage, he appeared listless and wrinkled "with a 
piece of gauze around his neck." Under his arm he carried 
copies of his book The Place of the Negro proudly boasting
9that he was "the man who introduced Jim Crow in Oklahoma." 
Other extremists such as Gerald L. K. Smith, a noted racist 
who went by the pseudonym of S. Goodyear, were also present 
but had no active role in the conference itself.
Considering the heavy southern composition, at the 
outset of the meeting, the display of Confederate flags 
and pictures of Confederate leaders was discouraged to
?Ibid.
gBirmingham Age Herald, July l8 , 19^8; and Montgom­
ery Advertiser, July 19, 19^8.
^Birmingham News, July 17» 19^8.
10"Tumuit in 'Dixie,'" Time, July 26, 1948, pp. 15-16
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avoid giving any more of a sectional tone to the confer­
ence. But as the conference got under way large portraits 
of Robert E. Lee bobbed up and down from time to time, 
while delegates insisted on waving Confederate flags and 
singing "Dixie." The hall with a capacity of six thousand 
people was packed and the aisles bulged with people. Since 
all present could not get into the hall, loudspeakers con­
veyed the proceedings to the "responsive, excited, some­
times hysterical" crowd of several hundred outside.
One description of the convention depicted it as 
having "all «he pent-up fever of a giant, boisterous re­
vival m e e t i n g . T h e  Birmingham News reported the Tut- 
wiler lobby filled with "scowling, cigar-waving men," many
in white or seersucker suits looking "like a Yankee thinks
12Southerners ought to look." Numerous college students
including over fifty black-hatted University of Mississippi
students were present. Their continual chanting of "to
hell with Truman" won for them the dubious distinction of
13being the noisiest of the demonstrators.
Not all of the "delegates" were so optimistic and 
enthusiastic. Some appeared to be bored, amused or even 
fatalistic. The enthusiastic supporters, however, domi­
nated and as the day wore on, they became progressively 
more boisterous. In fact, they became so rowdy that ABC
^^Birmingham News, July 17» 19^8.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., July l8 , 1948.
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stopped coverage of the affair in mid-afternoon, saying
l4that the meeting was "too inflammatory." It was a
"slam bang affair" that "gained momentum as it moved
toward its close late in the afternoon.
At one point the crowd verged on mob hysteria when
a man, unknown at that time to the general audience, dared
protest the proceedings. Cries of "throw that Communist
out" were heard throughout the auditorium before it was
discovered that the objector was retired Army officer and
aspirant for the Presidency, Herbert C. Holdridge. A
police escort quickly provided for his safe exit from the
m e e t i n g . A s  the band struck up "Deep in the Heart of
Texas," "Carry Me Back to Old Virginny," and "Dixie," the
17crowd quickly forgot the Holdridge incident.
Few big name politicians were seen at the Dixie 
gathering--"the meeting had more lung power than political
18strength." The governors from Arkansas, Mississippi, 
Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia were in Birmingham, 
but the only active ones were Thurmond and Wright. Other 
political figures of some significance were Frank Dixon 
of Alabama; Hugh White, former Governor of Mississippi;
Sam Jones, fermer Governor of Louisiana; Senator Eastland
^^Montgomery Advertiser, July 20, 1^48.
^^Birmingham News, July I8 , 1948.
l^Ibid. l^Ibid.
18Montgomery Advertiser, July 291 1948.
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and Senator John Stehnis of Mississippi; Handy Ellis,
Alabama chairman of national convention delegates; Repre­
sentatives John Bell Williams and William Colmer of Missis- 
19sippi. As one writer said, there was an "utter lack of
20any aristocracy of Democracy amongst the new Dixocracy.’’ 
Noticeable by their absence were such important southern 
leaders as Lister Hill and John Sparkman of Alabama, Ben 
Laney, Senator Russell of Georgia, Senator Byrd of Vir­
ginia, Governor Talmadge of Georgia, and Governor Earl
21Long of Louisiana.
Gessner T. McCorvey called the meeting to order. 
Following the invocation by the pastor of Southside Bap­
tist Church in Birmingham who asked God to "purge from 
[their] hearts, all prejudice Ruby Mercer of the Metro-
22politan Opera sang the "Star-Spangled Banner" and "Dixie." 
Walter Sillers, speaker of the Mississippi House of Repre­
sentatives, was elected permanent chairman, and after sev­
eral preliminary speeches, former Governor of Alabama,
Frank M. Dixon, delivered the keynote address. It was 
similar to all the other statements made concerning the 
reasons for the southern bolt. Many Dixiecrat supporters 
were especially moved by his words when he explained that
^^New York Times, July 19, 1948.
20Montgomery Examiner, July 19, 1948. 
2^Ibid.
Q OBirmingham News, July 1?, 1948.
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Truman's civil rights program of integration "means to
reduce us to the status of a mongrel, inferior race," and
23to make a mockery of the Anglo-Saxon heritage. Heavy
applause and cheers often interrupted Dixon. When he
warned that "the South will fight the attempt to mongrel-
izs our people," the entire auditorium vibrated with wild
ovations of approval. And his allusions to the absence
of high southern officials brought shouts of "where is
24Lister Hill" and "drive the quislings out."
The mammoth Alabama-led demonstration following 
his speech was joined by others waving their state and 
Confederate flags and chanting "To Hell with the Yankees. 
Shouts of "We want Dixon" and "To Hell with Truman" were 
heard amidst an uproar which lasted for twenty minutes 
despite the absence of any music from the band which had 
been dismissed during Dixon's speech. While the crowd in 
the gallaries cheered tirelessly, the floor, as one re­
porter described it, was "a surging sea of frenzy." Con­
federate flags waved wildly as a college student paraded 
down the aisles carrying aloft a huge portrait of Robert E. 
Lee.^^ And all Dixon, described by the Montgomery Examiner
„25
^^"Speakers Handbook," pp. 43-44.
24Washington Post, July l8 , 1948.
2^Ibid.
^^Birmingham Post, July 1?, 19^8; and "The South:
War Between the Democrats," Newsweek, July 26, 1948, pp. 21- 
22. Hereinafter referred to as "War Between the Democrats."
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as the "silver-tongued orator with his a-la-Bryan keynote 
speech," need do to stir the crowd was just to mention
27"Truman, Damn-Yankee, Dixie or sandwich and Coca Colas."
By the afternoon session, the crowd had swelled to 
seventy-five hundred. The session began at 2:30 with a 
brief speech by Governor Jim Folsom of Alabama setting 
the tone for the session by denouncing Truman's disregard 
for states' rights. The report of the Resolutions Commit­
tee presented next by Horace Wilkinson proposed that they 
"rededicate" themselves to the principles and traditions 
of the Democratic Party" and "repudiate the blasphemy of
28those who would charge us with bolting." The resolu­
tions included one releasing all delegates from any sup­
posed obligation to the proceedings of the Philadelphia 
convention. Each state in a very significant but ill- 
defined resolution was beseeched to cast its electoral 
votes for Thurmond for President and Wright as Vice- 
President. The audience did not realize that this reso­
lution was a nomination until Wilkinson explained that 
"This is considered a nomination for President and 
Vice-President."
Then with the mention of Thurmond and Wright as 
nominees of the SRD's the crowd became hysterical.
^^Washington Post, July I8 , 1948.
28 Letter, Horace Wilkinson to Editor of Atlanta 
Constitution, July 26, 1948, Black Folder, Gibson Papers
^^Ibid.
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Demonstrations broke out immediately. According to the 
Birmingham News if the candidates appeared to be "a little
30less than enthusiastic, it did not dim the crowd's ardor."
A seventy-seven year old Georgia delegate, Mrs. Beulah
Waller, known as the "Wool Hat Woman of Georgia," did a
jig on the stage during the demonstration that followed
the nominations. She proclaimed that she would "walk all
31night for Southern Democracy." The demonstration was of 
such intensity that Chairman Sillers was able to restore 
order only by having the band play the "Star-Spangled 
Banner." Then Senators Eastland and Palmer Bradley,
3 2Dixiecrat leader from Texas, seconded the nominations.
Governor Wright spoke first in praise of the his­
tory of the southern Democrats. He urged that people not 
consider the conference a bolt from the Democrats. "I say
to you that we are the true Democrats of the Southland and
3 3these United States." His introduction of Thurmond pro­
claimed that "our people are going to vote for J. Strom
Thurmond, a man of integrity--a man in whom you'll be
34proud to place your trust."
^^Birmingham News, July l8 , 1948.
^^Ibid.
3 2 Dolores Ann Hobbes, "The States Rights Movement 
of 1948" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Samford University,
1 9 6 8 ), p. 5 1 .
3 3 "War Between the Democrats," pp. 21-22.
3^Ibid.
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Thurmond's speech was a condemnation of Truman's
programs. Thurmond argued, "For our loyalty to the party
we have been stabbed in the back by a President who has
betrayed every principle of the Democratic party in his
35desire to win at any cost."
So it was that Thurmond and Wright finally repre­
sented the Dixiecrat ticket, though apparently the choice 
of candidates had been uncertain up to the last minute. 
Reports claimed ,that Laney was the first choice, but when 
he refused the honor, a committee of three was given the 
duty of selecting the candidates. By a majority decision 
of this committee they agreed upon Wright for President 
and Thurmond for Vice-President. Thurmond, however, re­
fused to go along with this agreement saying that he would 
run only if he were given first place on the ticket.
The biographer of Thurmond presents a different 
version of the story. She claims that Thurmond, unenthu- 
siastic about Birmingham, had not even planned to attend 
the meeting. He was scheduled for a visit with a South 
Carolina National Unit at Camp Stewart, Georgia, on the 
same day. But when notified that it was urgent for him 
to be at the Birmingham meeting, he arranged to attend. 
Upon entering the hall at the conference in the afternoon.
^^New York Times, July iB, 1^48.
Ben Laney, Private Interview, Magnolia, Arkansas, 
April, 1 9 7 0 .
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he was offered the SRD nomination for President of the 
United States.
The conflicting accounts concerning the SRD's 
choice for President make it difficult to know what ac­
tually happened. Judging from newspaper articles, the 
Thurmond story seems to be the least likely one. Prior 
to the Birmingham conference, numerous stories were cir­
culated to the effect that Laney would be the man favored 
for President by the majority of the States' Righters.
The only other name that was suggested as a possibility 
for the Presidency was Fielding Wright of Mississippi. 
According to these press stories, Thurmond would be the 
second man on the ticket.
The information provided on the committee of three, 
whose purpose was to select a Presidential candidate, is 
not extensive. According to Merritt Gibson, the national 
campaign chairman, the committee did actually exist but 
he was unable to remember the names of those serving on
o O
it or the exact time that it met. There is no evidence 
which casts doubt upon the existence of such a committee. 
If Thurmond knew the choice of the committee ahead of 
time, that may well have been his reason for not planning
3 7 Alberta Morel Lachicotte, Rebel Senator: Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina (New York: Devin-Adair Com- 
pany, I9 6 6 ) , pp. 42-43.
38Merritt Gibson, Private Interview, Longview, 
Texas, April, 1970.
180
to go to Birmingham. However, there is no concrete evi­
dence to support this observation.
Laney's refusal to run for President on the SRD 
ticket caused concern to many in the SRD ranks. This led 
to further speculation that the Dixiecrat leaders were at 
odds. When Laney remained in his hotel room in Birmingham 
during the entire meeting, many feared he was abandoning 
the movement. And ax the conclusion of the meeting, Laney 
issued a statement that confirmed his differences with the 
leaders. Laney appeared to be chiding the other Dixiecrat
leaders contending that "the spirit of obstinacy and re-
39venge is not the spirit of the Southland." But he re­
affirmed his belief in opposition to civil rights by saying 
the spirit of the South may have been damaged but not bro­
ken. Emphasizing that the immediate objective of the SRD 
should be to defeat the proposed civil rights measures he 
added that it should "be done through and by the official
koDemocratic organization in each state."
Laney served as the permanent chairman at the 
states' rights campaign committee meeting in Jackson in 
May and also presided at the pre-convention caucus in Phil­
adelphia. But he feared that there was not enough time, 
money, or organizational know-how to give any hope of
39Laney Interview.
^^Montgomery Advertiser, July 19, 1948,
I8l 
4lsuccess to a third party. In explaining his action at 
Birmingham, Laney stated that he withdrew his name at 
Birmingham for the same reason that he withdrew it at 
Philadelphia: he feared that the South would not support
him solidly. He proposed that more popular candidates be 
selected since they would have a greater chance for suc­
cess. Laney claimed that he had never changed his mind 
about opposing civil rights and Truman, but he favored
k2fighting within the party rather than from the outside.
On several other occasions, Laney reiterated his
fear that his leadership might serve as a divisive force
in the southern ranks. He explained furthermore that
since the people from Arkansas had not agreed on a course
of action he actually had no authority to commit his state 
43to the cause. It has been suggested by critics that
Laney refused the nomination because he was an oil man,
and his name on the ticket would lend credence to the
44charge that big business was backing the revolt. Re­
gardless of the reasons for his vacillating stand, he
4iBen Laney, Private Interview, Magnolia, Arkansas, 
April, 1 9 7 0.
L pLetter, Ben Laney to Ruth Byrne, July 20, 1948, 
and Ben Laney to George Armstrong, July 291 1948, Laney 
Papers, Letters Regarding Civil Rights File.
43 . »Letter, Ben Laney to T. C. King, July 231 1948,
Laney Papers, Letters Regarding Civil Rights File.
44Raleigh-News-Observer, August 2, 1948.
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held a key position in the movement throughout its dura­
tion. Governor Laney disapproved of the radicals in his 
group and longed for a more sophisticated movement. Al­
though he periodically became disgusted with the movement 
itself, he never altered his sincere belief in states' 
rights.
Following the acceptance speeches of the Dixiecrat
leaders ':he statement of principles was adopted with no
dissenting votes. The Birmingham Principles affirmed the
belief in racial and religious minority rights but said
that the protection of the "Constitutional rights of a
minority does not justify or require the destruction of
45Constitutional rights of the majority." The statement 
confirmed the South's belief in guarding "the American 
people against the onward march of totalitarian govern­
ment" and the "faithful observance of Article X of the
46American Bill of Rights." The statement alluded to 
the tidelands issue as an example of the threat to our 
form of government. As for the Democratic convention 
the Birmingham statement noted that it was "rigged to 
embarrass and humiliate the South." It continued by de­
claring that segregation and the special reorganization 
of the civil rights section of the Department of Justice 
was an anathema to the South.
45Newsletter, Black Folder, Gibson Papers 
^^Ibid.
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Loudly proclaiming its loyalty, the South indicated 
that if a foreign power attempted to force a program upon 
the entire nation in the same way in which the civil rights 
program was being forced upon the South, war would be in­
evitable. The Dixiecrats outlined their beliefs as rever­
ence for the Constitution as the greatest charter of human 
liberty ever devised; opposition to efforts to destroy the 
rights of all citizens; support of social and economic 
justice; opposition to a totalitarian, centralized govern­
ment and a police state; support of segregation; opposition 
to the enforcement of the Truman program that would "de­
stroy the Southern--W€ky of life" ; support of the checks and
—  2 ^ -  
balances system of government run by the people.
Following such a statement of beliefs they presented 
their states' rights platform. It argued, first of all, 
that the chief problem in the United States was the preser­
vation of Constitutional government and that to preserve 
this it would be necessary to eliminate Communists from 
governmental jobs and from all positions that would have 
access to important information. The second major argument 
within the platform was that the states, and not the fed­
eral government, should have power over matters such as 




After the presentation of the platform the Dixie­
crats then voted to put forth their own slate of electors 
and they appointed a general chairman of the SRD campaign 
committee, who was to appoint a finance committee and 
chairman. In order to give the organization a name and 
to analyze methods by which the party could get on the 
ballot, the Dixiecrat leaders decided to meet in Atlanta, 
July 24, and every state was encouraged to send represent­
atives to the next meeting in Birmingham to be on October 1, 
After all of the resolutions had been adopted unanimously 
and the meeting was ending, Wilkinson yelled, "Harry Tru-
48man won't be able to carry Independence, Missouri."
At a press conference following the conference Thur­
mond told the reporters, "I came over here to say a few
49words and found myself recommended for President." When 
questioned about the issue of white supremacy, he said he 
was "not interested one whit in the question of 'white 
supremacy'" and added that he was anxious that "the rest 
of the country realize we have some pretty good guys down 
here,
But there had been white supremacy speakers at 
Birmingham. Eastland, Dixon, and Alfalfa Bill Murray were
51among them. Strom Thurmond on the other hand scolded
48Washington Post, July l8 , 1948.
49New York Times, July 19, 1948.
5°Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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the white supremacy people, saying that he himself was,
"a progressive Southerner" interested in improving the lot
of the Negro, but he would "campaign on the states' rights"
ticket solely in support of his beliefs in "the sovereignty
5 2of the states as against Federal Government interference."
His actions, however, were not always consistent with his
rhetoric and Thurmond repeatedly exploited the racial
issue under the guise of states' rights. Another of the
Dixiecrat leaders, Ben Laney, also objected to speakers
who used race appeal as a calling card for the movement.
To Laney, Birmingham was a flagrant display of uncontrolled
racism. He repeatedly urged the party to be more moderate
53and orthodox in its practices.
Reaction, on the whole, to the Birmingham conference 
was unfavorable. Most of the leading newspapers denounced 
the movement. Even in the South, few influential papers 
supported the Dixiecrats. For example, the Montgomery Ad­
vertiser decried the fact that the Birmingham convention 
had re-enforced to the North and to the world the stereo­
type image of the bigoted southerner. The South needed 
the support of the rest of the nation but was not likely 
to get it "by shouting 'nigger.' We cannot win friends 
by hoarse blasphemies and the appearance of unreasoning
^^Ibid.
5 3Letter, Wallace Malone to Ben Laney, August 3» 
1948, Laney Papers, States Rights Committee File.
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obstinacy." The editorial observed that Dixon's address 
sounded as if it was tailored for a Ku Klux Klan rally.
"It was racism and sectionalism at its worst and will cer­
tainly do more harm than good to the cause he purported to 
5 5represent."
The editor of the Anniston Star, Colonel Harry M. 
Ayers, wrote disapprovingly of the Birmingham convention 
saying that "their get together was more like a Roman holi­
day than a c o n v e n t i o n . W h i l e  it did not represent all 
of the South, it did give the militants an opportunity "to 
blow off steam and afforded the college boys and girls an
opportunity to get out of summer school and join in the
57high jinks that characterized the parade." Ayers con­
cluded that he saw "no good excuse whatsoever for the Bir
mingham rump convention. Its principal effect will be o
58elect the Dewey-Warren Republican ticket. . . . "
With the Birmingham festivities behind them the 
first days of August were busy ones for the Dixiecrats.
They were hard at work in an effort to get their candi­
dates on the ballots in the various states as well as 
making plans for their formal convention scheduled for 
August 11 in Houston, Texas. Although more subdued than 
Birmingham, the Houston convention was merely a re-enactment
^^Montgomery Advertiser, July 20, 1948. 
^^Raleigh-News-Observer, August 2, 1948. 
5^ibid. ^^Ibid. ^®Ibid.
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59of Birmingham. Houston was the chosen cite because the 
Dixiecrat leaders knew it was necessary to make a double 
effort to swing Texas and its twenty-three electoral votes 
into their column. It was hoped that this official opening 
of the SRD campaign would give the SRD additional and des­
perately needed publicity.
Heading the Dixiecrat movement in Texas was wealthy 
Texas oil man E. E. Townes, former chief counsel for Humble 
Oil and chairman of the state steering committee. Oil at­
torney and former governor, Dan Moody, Jr., organized 
Young Dixiecrat Clubs while Houston oil millionaire, Hugh
Roy Cullen, hosted at the reception for Thurmond after the
, . 60  convention.
At the Same Houston Coliseum on August 11, in Hous­
ton, a milling, sometimes boisterous, crowd of 1 0 , 0 0 0 as­
sembled. Their object, as reported by Pat Flaraty of the 
NBC affiliate KPRC Houston, was to win the 12? electoral 
votes from the eleven southern states. As the convention 
was about to open, four pickets from the Harris County Pro­
gressive party were virtually ignored as they marched in 
front of a crowd.
Frank Dixon, former governor of Alabama, introduced 
Fielding Wright, the SRD choice for Vice-President. As
59Merritt Gibson, Private Interview, Longview, Texas, 
April, 1 9 7 0 ; and "Third Parties: The Only Hope," Time, 
August 231 1 9^8 , pp. 1 6-1 7 .
T. McCorvey, "High Cotton," New Republic, CXIX 
(August 3 0 , 1948), 10.
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the band played "Dixie," the crowd came to its feet making 
rebel yells and honoring Wright with a standing ovation.
The focus of Wright's speech was on individual rights 
which would be made secure only by the acceptance of states' 
rights. He said that government should allow the states to 
protect the right of choosing one's own employment, one's 
own church, and one's own fellow workers. The government, 
he stressed, should protect the right of a community to 
govern itself. He not only warned that these rights would 
be lost in a Truman victory, but also that a dictatorship 
might possibly emerge from the enactment of the Truman 
program.
His comments on the loyalty of the South to the 
Democratic party drew loud applause and cheers from the 
audience as did his condemnation of the big city. Through­
out his speech he alluded to the unfair treatment the South 
had received at the hands of the Democrats, especially at 
Philadelphia. The Democrats, he cried, had deserted their 
traditional patterns and had gone to following the bosses 
and the liberal elements in the Democratic party. In clos­
ing he accused the present Democratic and Republican par­
ties of being "philosophically bankrupt. They are mere 
vehicles for getting into and holding onto o f f i c e . A s
^^Tape of Houston Convention, Located with Gibson 
Papers. Hereinafter referred to as Tape.
^^Ibid.
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Wright saw it "Only a return to American principles, to 
local self-government, can halt the unseemly spectacle we 
are now witnessing." For his speech Wright received a 
standing ovation.
Next Dixon introduced Strom Thurmond as the man
from Edgefield, South Carolina, the home of William B.
Travis and James Bonham, both heroes of the Alamo. The
crowd broke out once again into loud cheers while the
band played "The Eyes of Texas" and "Dixie." In his
speech he made reference to "a blue-print prepared by
the nominee of the communistic Progressive Party for
lifting the face of America and giving us the "new Rus- 
64sian look." Thurmond stressed that if the country loses 
states' rights, "then may we ask: 'For what is a man pro­
fited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul?'"^5
Thurmond compared dictatorships in Italy and Germany 
during the Second World War period to what Truman was then 
establishing in Washington. Attacking the anti-lynching 
proposal, he said, "the Red, the Pinks and the subversives 
are making use of the horror which American people hold 
for this form of murder to try to change our system of 
government. He stated that the FEPC "was patterned 




referred to in Russia as Stalin's 'All-Races Law.'" The 
FEPC, he claimed, being used by the Communist infiltra­
tors into our government, should be entitled "a law to 
sabotage America." Thurmond told the crowd that in order 
to enforce the FEPC a federal Gestapo would be created 
just as the one formerly existent in Germany and Italy.
In conclusion he stated his acceptance of the challenge 
to lead a great cause of saving the United States republic 
and the American way of life.^^
The crowd was immediately on its feet cheering 
Thurmond. The NBC commentator noted various signs that 
were being carried on the floor but said that one in par­
ticular had been an eye catcher for the crowd. It read 
that the South was proud of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina and that "Texas is in this fight with you 
until the end. We were not yellow in I8 6I and we are not 
yellow now. Excuse our G o v e r n o r . T h e -  sign was being 
carried by four teenagers who v. >.re sponsored by a man who 
dubbed himself an unreconstructed rebel who had only ten 
dollars, the cost of the sign. The only high Texas offi­
cial present at this convocation was Houston's Mayor Oscar 
Holcomb. There were no state or national senators or con-
69gressmen from Texas in attendance.
As the demonstration progressed, Ray Miller, news­
man on the scene, interviewed Merritt Gibson down on the
^^Ibid. ^®Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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convention floor. He asked Gibson if it would be legal
for Democratic electors to be pledged to candidates other
than those selected by the Democratic national convention.
Gibson replied that the Supreme Court of Alabama had ruled
that electors were not bound by any law. He explained that
if electors were free agents in Alabama then they would be
70anywhere since the principle was the same.
With che conclusion of the Birmingham convention it 
was clear that the Dixiecrats had grown from a few irate 
southern leaders into a mass movement. Despite numerous 
obstacles such as shortage of time, lack of money, and 
poor organization, the newly formed party prepared now to 




The Presidential election of 1948 was unique in 
that practically no one forecast the upset victory of the 
Democratic party. With the party split into tliree fac­
tions, the chances of a Democratic victory seemed nil.
When pollsters and politicians alike predicted defeat for 
the Truman Administration, only Truman himself, as the 
traditional interpretation goes, believed victory possible.
Kirkendall disputes this view and maintains that 
the victory was not personal but rather a party victory 
and that Truman did not singlehandedly achieve victory. 
Calling the idea of the "lonely campaign" a romantic myth, 
Kirkendall points out that Truman's success was due to the 
tireless efforts of his advisers and the whole party.^
Nor can the picture of the Democratic campaign in 
1948, as a hastily improvised effort be substantiated.
Hours of tedious planning, heated discussions and argu­
ments by Truman's advisers continued relentlessly from 
1946 to 1948. Every action and move was carefully
^Kirkendall, "The Presidential Election," pp. 400-1,
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calculated as to its effect on the electorate. The man 
most responsible for the basic strategy of the Truman 
campaign was Clark Clifford, a lawyer from St. Louis, 
Missouri. Within the Truman Cabinet as within the Demo­
cratic party, ideological differences led to the forma­
tion of the conservative wing led by John W. Snyder, 
Secretary of the Treasury, while Clifford headed the 
opposing liberal faction. Truman was influenced first 
by one faction then by the other. But by the middle of 
1947 Clifford was Truman's most trusted adviser.
The blueprint for the Truman campaign was con­
tained in a lengthy memorandum on "The politics of 1948" 
written by Clifford and given to Truman in November, 1947» 
As early as the summer of 1947, Clifford started gathering 
information on what Truman should do in order to be pre­
pared for the election of 1948. Although there was no 
hint of a southern revolt, Wallace already was giving lec­
tures around the country denouncing the Truman program.
To some of the labor groups Wallace hinted on several dif­
ferent occasions that he might run for the Presidency. 
Clifford took note of this left wing disaffection in writ­
ing his analysis of present conditions and future political 
trends in the nation. He predicted that Thomas E. Dewey 
would be the Republican candidate, that Henry Wallace would 
run on a third party ticket and that even if Truman lost
2Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. 21.
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the East, he could still win the election with the support 
of the South, the West and labor. Although most of the 
memo was surprisingly accurate, Clifford did make one 
gross error: he saw the South as being so solidly Demo­
cratic that it could be ignored in the making of national 
policy.
The memo contained a prophetic breakdown of impor­
tant special interest groups such as the farmers, laborers, 
Negroes, and Catholics. The farmer, Clifford wrote, was 
pro-administration at the present and as long as he made 
good crops and was protected by parity he should vote 
Democratic. Beyond what the administration had already 
done for the farmer there was little else to do except to 
pay special attention to him in campaign speeches and in 
this Truman excelled.
Clifford saw the labor vote as instrumental to 
Truman's success. He feared that if no major party was 
pro-labor, laborers could refuse to vote at all or would 
vote for Wallace. Clifford advised Truman to court the 
labor vote whenever possible and he also emphasized the 
necessity of Truman's winning other liberal groups in 
addition to labor.
The Negro vote was also of great importance and 
might hold the balance of power in New York, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. Clifford feared that 
Republicans would make a play for the black vote by
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supporting anti-poll tax and FEPC laws. So in order to 
win this vote the Democrats needed a clever maneuver that 
would undercut the Republicans and the Progressives. Thus, 
Truman delivered his civil rights message.
The Catholic vote, Clifford reasoned, governed by 
their fear of Communism, could therefore be kept in hand 
by Truman's foreign policy toward Communist countries.
Even the deterioration of United States-Russian relations 
would not be detrimental but rather would broaden Truman's 
appeal to all types of voters. If the Republicans tried 
tc play up Communist infiltration in government, the Demo­
crats could point to the federal employee loyalty measures 
already established to combat this menace.
Clifford deemed inflation and the housing shortages 
as issues that the average citizen would be most sensitive 
to. He suggested that Truman request a maximum anti­
inflation program, public housing plan, and tax revisions 
to help the lower income groups. Knowing that the Republi­
can Congress would reject these proposals, Clifford con­
cluded that it would then make it impossible for the Repub­
licans to run on a similar platform. Truman did not really 
have to worry so much about the implementation of these 
proposals, Clifford assured him, they would merely serve 
as political pawns. But he emphasized that in order for 
this strategy to work there must be no compromises.
This strategy would hurt not only the Republicans 
but Wallace as well. To make a direct attack on Wallace,
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Clifford urged that at a strategic moment, liberals 
should denounce the Communism inherent in the Wallace 
program. Truman would have to move further to the left 
with economic and civil rights reforms if he hoped to 
steal Wallace's platform. He suggested further that 
Truman should appoint prominent progressives whenever 
possible; whether or not the Senate confirmed them was 
immat erial.
Another section of the memorandum urged the Pres­
ident to appoint a new chairman of the party and begin 
rebuilding the whole organization. According to Clif­
ford the Democratic party had grown stale and needed 
new men with new ideas to restore its vitality. The 
President should work to improve his own image too. 
Leading labor officials should be invited to the White 
House for conferences as should businessmen such as 
Henry Ford II or intellectuals such as Albert Einstein. 
This Clifford thought would help erase the picture of an 
"irresponsible" man whose only diversion was playing 
poker.
Clifford further thought it advisable for Truman 
to make non-political tours similar to ose made by 
Roosevelt in 1940. This would enable him, while not yet 
being the official candidate of the Democrats, to start 
the badly needed campaigning prior to the Democratic con­
vention. If the public saw Truman on a non-political
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coast-to-coast tour, they would not analyze it closely,
but rather simply see the President carrying out the
3functions of his office.
Truman, after carefully reading the memo and dis­
cussing it at length with Clifford, agreed to follow the 
general strategy outlined. He refused, however, to com­
ply with such publicity tricks as inviting labor leaders, 
Henry Ford, or Einstein to the White House. But the major 
points, Truman agreed to start implementing with his Jan­
uary 7 State of the Union Message.
In accordance with the Clifford memo, Truman's 
State of the Union Message requested federal action to 
end discrimination, federal aid to education, higher unem­
ployment compensation, a federal system of medical insur­
ance, a continuation of rent control, more TVA schemes, 
price supports and cooperatives and expansion of REA, and 
an anti-inflation program. In foreign affairs he stated 
the goal of world peace through the United Nations. From 
February to June, Truman steadily barraged Congress with 
requests for the enaction of the legislation proposed in 
his January, 1947, message.
By June, he was ready for his "non-political" cam­
paign by rail. Major speeches were planned for Chicago, 
Omaha, Seattle, Berkley, and Los Angeles. Truman spoke 
from planned texts at first and later with more success.
^Clifford Memo, Truman Library, Clifford Papers.
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extemporaneously from the back platform of the train at 
hundreds of small spots along the way, thus publicizing 
himself and his program to the people. At first the 
turnouts were sparse and various mishaps occurred, in­
cluding some bobbles made by Truman in his speeches, but 
by the end of the trip, the whistle stop campaign had 
turned into the successful political maneuver envisioned 
by Clifford.
One of the implications included in the memo was 
used by Truman in his acceptance address made before the 
Democratic national convention. He announced that he 
would call a special session of Congress to pass the 
legislation which Republicans had recently promised in 
their platform. He planned to request legislation de­
signed to halt inflation, laws to meet the housing short­
age, federal aid to education, a national health program, 
civil rights legislation, and an increase in the minimum 
wage. Truman set the date for the session on July 26,
called "Turnip Day" in Missouri, hence the name of the
special session. The President knew that the Republican 
Congress was too conservative to pass these measures but 
by not passing them the American people might question 
the sincerity of the Republican platform. Thomas E. 
Dewey, the Republican nominee for President advised the 
Congress to pass some bills that the Republican party 
advocated but it refused. Instead they passed a weakened
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version of a housing bill and one calling for consumer and 
bank credit controls. Thus, Truman succeeded in exposing 
the hollowness of the Republican campaign platform.
Following Truman's June "non-political" tour and 
the Democratic convention, Truman began a vigorous and 
effective coast-to-coast campaign running from Labor Day 
to Election Day. His trip included traveling over 20,000 
miles and delivering over 250 speeches. These speeches 
contained a sense of conservatism--Truman emphasized con­
solidating the New Deal gains.
As Kirkendall points out, Truman did not work alone 
in his campaign. Democratic politicians and party members 
accompanied him on his tour as did three of his cabinet 
members who campaigned vigorously for him: Attorney Gen­
eral Tom C. Clark, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. 
Brannan, and Secretary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin. Clark 
emphasized the Communist threat and the administration's 
solution to it, the loyalty program; Brannan spoke to farm 
groups, and Tobin attacked the Taft-Hartley Act. State 
and local Democratic organizations worked as tirelessly 
for Truman as did the Democratic National Committee.
In general Truman followed the advice of Clifford 
and other liberals to the extent that the Truman candidacy 
could be categorized as a little left of center. Liberal 
advisers spearheaded Truman's campaign. Clifford and
^Kirkendall, "The Presidential Election," p. 4l4.
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William Batt, head of the Research Division, were the 
most important advisers--they emphasized the necessity 
of concentrating on the former Roosevelt supporters, es­
pecially the workers, the veterans, and the Negroes. To 
do this they advised Truman to emphasize the shortcomings 
of the Eightieth Congress thereby alerting the people of 
the necessity of preserving the social gains of the Roo­
sevelt era.^ While not heavily emphasizing foreign policy, 
his advisers urged Truman to show that his policies would 
insure peace while the election of another might lead to 
war.
In becoming increasingly liberal Truman did not 
appear especially concerned with the South. While the 
southern problem received little attention from adminis­
tration advisers, they did encourage Truman’s tour of the 
South, suggesting that he discuss the economic gains of 
the South under Roosevelt. As Kirkendall says, the ad­
visers hoped that "the South’s interest in economic lib­
eralism, in addition to its attachment to the Democratic 
party, would offset its hostility to racial liberalism."^
Kenneth M. Birkhead, Associate Director of Public 
Relations for the Research Division of the Democratic Na­
tional Committee, said Truman’s advisers did not worry too 
much about Thurmond. Truman decided that he could gain 
nothing, not even the South, by being anti-civil rights so
5%bid., p. 415. ^Ibid.
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he gave token support for civil rights. According to
Birkhead, . .we just didn't worry too much about
Strom Thurmond. Like the Wallace thing, we kept track
of it and we'd watch what they were saying, this kind
7of thing, but we didn't do too much with it."
In a memo of October 2?, Jack Beal and Frank 
McNaughton, other presidential campaign advisers, re­
ported that the Democratic party need not worry about 
the splintering of the party by the Dixiecrats. They 
did not see the Dixiecrats as such a severe threat for 
several reasons. In the first place, the southern Demo­
crats could never control the country alone, and they 
could not expect help from the Republicans. The civil 
rights legislation would be enacted eventually anyway 
and probably by a Republican Congress. With the passage 
of civil rights, other issues would cease to be a source 
of contention within the Democratic party; instead, it 
would make the South angry at the GOP and lead Democrats 
to unify. Moreover, liberals in the South could be 
counted on to minimize the chances of a real split in 
the party. Despite the economic progress of the South 
these advisers predicted no substantial change in south­
ern politics. Finally, they noted that the Democrats 
would either "get together, or they would all get sacked
7Transcript of Interview, Kenneth M. Birkhead, 
July 7, 1 9 6 6 , Truman Library.
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together." This election would teach the Democrats that 
they must stay together in order to win.^
It was true that southern Democrats could not 
numerically control Congress but the memo underestimated 
the possibility of a conservative Democratic-Republican 
coalition. Such a conservative coalition later emerged 
to delay civil rights legislation and other liberal meas­
ures. That southern politics would not be affected by 
economic changes was also later disproven. Lacking the 
accuracy of the Clifford Memo, this memo still doubtlessly 
influenced the Democratic campaign.
In planning his campaign schedule Truman faced the 
question of whether to tour the South. Because Wallace 
had encountered many unpleasant incidents on his southern 
tour, most of Truman’s advisers felt it would be better 
for him to avoid campaigning in the southern states leav­
ing this chore to the native loyal Democrats, particularly
gin the Deep South. In addition to the problem of speak­
ing to segregated audiences, there would also be the per­
sistent question of speaking on civil rights.
Howard McGrath, nevertheless, announced in mid- 
August that the President would undertake a "barnstorming
^Memorandum, Frank McNaughton to Paul Fitzpatrick, 
October 27, 19^8, Truman Library, Frank McNaughton Papers.
gMemorandum, Clark Clifford to the President,
June l4, 1948, Clifford Papers, Speech File.
^°lbid.
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tour through the Deep South to challenge the states' rights 
advocates in their home territory." The presidential ad­
visers were aware of the deep loyalty of the South to the 
party, and Truman kept insisting that not all southerners 
were as opposed to his program as the southern leaders 
would have him t h i n k . B y  mid-September McGrath and 
others, figuring that it was too much of a risk for Truman 
to campaign in the South, announced he would go to Texas
and Oklahoma and possibly Arkansas but not further south 
12than that. Truman arrived in El Paso on September 25 
where he was greeted by Governor Jester, Sam Rayburn, and 
Tom Clark. His breakfast with John Nance Garner at his
13Uvalde home, was played up widely by the press. Tru­
man's visit with Garner was a stroke of political ingen­
uity for if Garner, a conservative and highly respected 
southerner supported Truman, then other Texans might safely 
do l i k e w i s e . T r u m a n  found large friendly crowds in Texas. 
Even Governor Jester, who so bitterly disliked Truman's 
stand on civil rights and tidelands, played a major role 
in entertaining Truman in Fort Worth where Jester publicly 
promised Truman the support of Texas in the election.
^^New York Times, August 19» 19^8.
^^"Campaign Strategy," New Republic, CXIX (Septem­
ber 20, 1948), 6.
^^New York Times, Septe.;.’:er 2?» 1948.
l^Ibid.
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The day Truman arrived in El Paso, he received a
wire from Thurmond asking him to discuss issues such as
civil rights and tidelands with Texans. Apparently Truman
never bothered to answer this one nor a similar request
made later by Thurmond. Rayburn said of Thurmond's tele-
15gram: "It is the damndest effrontery I ever heard of."
Merritt Gibson telegraphed McGrath, requesting that he
persuade Truman to discuss the issues, but he received
no reply. Never once in his four-day tour of Texas did
Truman mention either of the issues.
On October l6, Truman spoke at Raleigh, North
Carolina, where he was greeted by Governor Greg Cherry.
Pleading for unity he predicted that the Dixiecrats would
get nowhere in November, and that true southerners who
wore individualistic should not be ruled by prejudice and 
18emotion. Barkley, campaigning in Asheville, North
Carolina, warned southern Democrats that if they voted 
for anyone other than Truman, they would be casting a vote 
for the Republicans. According to the Vice-Presidential 
candidate, it would "be a tragic thing if the partnership 
between the Democratic party and the states of the South
"Smoke 'Em Out Harry," October 1, 1948, Laney 
Papers, Unfiled.
l^Ibid.
^^New York Times, October 19, 1948.
^^Ibid., October 20, 1948.
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19were to be destroyed." If the South placed itself out­
side the Democratic party, it would have no means at all 
of advancing its goals; he advocated that southerners 
work out their differences within the party. Some frag­
mentary groups, he said, "have been attracted by sincere
interests, some by distortion of issues and some by mis-
20understanding of these issues." In New Orleans on 
October l6, when Barkley asked Democrats to return to 
the party, hi received his coolest reception since he 
started campaigning October 1. iîe then avoided mention­
ing civil rights and efforts to keep Truman off the ballot
, . . 21 in Louisiana.
In the South, loyal Democrats campaigned for Truman. 
Congressman Sam Rayburn, Senator Barkley, Brannan, and a 
host of prominent southerners like Senators George of 
Georgia and Pepper of Florida, and Governors Folsom of 
Alabama and Kefauver of Tennessee publicly worked in be­
half of the President. Numerous other loyal Democrats were
responsible for keeping Truman on the ballot in some of the
22southern states.
The only speech in the whole campaign on civil rights 
was delivered, appropriately enough, in Harlem. While civil
^^New York Herald Tribune, September 28, 1948.
2°Itid.
 ̂New York Times, October 17» 1948.
^^Kirlcendall , "The Presidential Election," pp. 4l7-l8.
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rights was one of the most significant issues of the cam­
paign and one which was instrumental to Truman's success, 
the irony is that it received so little attention during 
the campaign.
In his speech, the first ever delivered by an Ameri­
can President in Harlem, he praised his committee's work on 
civil rights and reaffirmed the ideas of his February 2 
civil rights message. Some black leaders thought it expedi­
ent to openly support Truman since he had done more for 
blacks than had any previous President. If blacks failed
to support a man who espoused their cause, future candidates
23might simply write off blacks and do nothing for them.
Such was the strategy, campaigning, and planning of 
Harry Truman and the Democrats. Meanwhile other political 
parties busily campaigned for the programs and policies 
that they thought would be necessary and beneficial to the 
nation. In addition to the parties carved out of the Demo­
cratic party but expounding different programs, other groups 
represented in this contest included the Socialists, National 
Prohibitionists, the Christian Nationalists, Socialist Work­
ers and Socialist Laborites, and the Communists, who had a
24platform but no candidate for the Presidency. These minor
23Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. 238.
2kKirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, comps.. 
National Party Platforms, l840-1960 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1961 ) , p"̂ 4l9. Hereinafter referred to as 
Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms.
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but seemingly perpetual parties posed no threat to the 
Democrats,
Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York, was Truman's 
chief worry. The resounding Republican victory of 1946 
and the pro-Dewey public opinion polls led Truman to con­
centrate his campaign against the Republicans. Dewey had 
made a rapid ascent in political circles. As district at­
torney at the age of thirty-five in New York County, his 
success as a "racket buster" gave him the confidence to 
run for governor. Although he was defeated, it was by 
such a small margin that by 1940 he attempted to win the 
Republican Presidential nomination, only to lose to Wen­
dell Wilkie. In 1942, he again ran and won election as 
Governor of New York, a springboard for his Presidential 
candidacy in 1944. This race left him as titular head of 
the party and the best known of the possible Republican 
choices for 1948.
In spite of the comment by Alice Roosevelt Long- 
worth, Theodore Roosevelt's daughter and a critical ob­
server of Washington figures, "you can't make a souffle 
rise twice," most of the Republicans believed otherwise. 
Dewey was often chided by the press and the public for 
his appearance which they said was analogous to the groom 
on top of a wedding cake. He was an experienced politi­
cian despite his stiff public manner and bad press. His 
Vice-Presidential running mate. Governor Earl Warren of
208
California, who at first pursued the Presidency but was no 
match for the popular Dewey, was a wise choice. He was im­
mensely popular in his home state which had a coveted number 
of electoral votes; he was a liberal and he would provide a 
good geographical balance for the Republican ticket.
The Republican party, like the Democratic party, was 
split into liberal and conservative wings. At the outset 
of the Republican convention Senator Robert A. Taft, actual 
leader of the conservative Republicans appeared to be Dew­
ey's strongest opponent. This faction of the party, how­
ever, was not in control of the convention, thus, by the 
third ballot Dewey was nominated unanimously.
An analysis of the Republican platform indicates that 
the international point of view determined the foreign pol­
icy while the liberals directed domestic policy. In the 
area of foreign policy, the platform advocated support of 
the United Nations and the containment policy, issues upon 
which both factions of the party agreed. But on domestic 
issues there was little agreement. The platform included 
even though the Eightieth Congress had rejected, civil 
rights legislation, control of inflation, public housing, 
and a higher minimum wage. The presidential wing of the 
party tried to appease conservative as well as southern 
Democrats by omitting issues such as federal aid to educa­
tion and the FEPC.^^
^^Ibid., pp. 450-54.
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In spite of these intra-party disagreements Repub­
licans looked forward to victory and Dewey, so confident 
of success, did comparatively little campaigning. Refusing 
to criticize Truman on vulnerable points, he campaigned 
like a gentleman; he was reluctant to make promises to peo­
ple in order to win votes, and to keep his own party in 
tact, he frequently resorted to generalizations rather than 
making specific points.
While the Republicans were obviously the most formi­
dable opponents of the Democrats, the most feared minor 
party participating in the election of 19^8 was the Pro­
gressive party. Unique in its origin and program, and 
strongly influenced by the Communists, this political group 
made a distinct imprint on the campaign tactics and the 
policies of the Democratic party.
Henry Wallace, a former Vice-President and Secretary 
of Agriculture, though not a Communist allowed himself to 
be their pawn. Wallace was a^jpuzzling figure to those who 
knew him. He was aloof and mysterious in his habits and 
beliefs which included an interest in Eastern mysticism.
His involvement in a third party effort began in 
1946 when he disagreed with Truman over the administration's 
foreign policy. On September 12, as Secretary of Agricul­
ture he made a speech in Madison Square Garden highly crit­
ical of American policy toward the Soviet Union, whereupon
^^Ross, Loneliest Campaign, p. l44.
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Truman asked him to resign from the Cabinet. He then be­
came an editor of the New Republic, a liberal journal, but 
his interest in this quickly faded as he grew increasingly 
active in politics.
In December, 1^46, a group of liberals and Commu­
nists joined together to found the Progressive Citizens of 
America, an organization which championed traditional lib­
eral causes. Although Wallace was not a member of the Pro­
gressive Citizens of America, he agreed to run on their 
ticket as their Presidential candidate, publicly announcing 
his intentions on December 29» 1947- His Vice-Presidential 
running mate, Glen Taylor, presented another unlikely choice 
as an American leader. A western singer and cowboy, Glen 
Taylor won the Idaho senate race in 1944. He had been an 
ardent admirer of Roosevelt and the Democrats, until he 
broke with Truman over foreign policy matters concerning 
Russia.
As expected the Communist party, consisting of over 
60,000 members in 1947, developed an interest in the Wal­
lace candidacy. Although this party made no direct state­
ment claiming Wallace as a candidate of their party, they 
supported him in every other way. Communist leaders and 
newspapers actively backed Wallace whose ideas in foreign 
policy agreed with those of the party. For example, Wal­
lace vociferously denounced the Marshall Plan while blam­
ing Harry Truman and American imperialism for the origins
2^1
and continuation of the cold war. Envisioning a world
based on the United Nations, Wallace opposed further
American military buildup while proposing the destruc-
27tion of atomic weapons. Containment, according to 
Wallace, was just another name for imperialism--a course, 
which if continued would ultimately lead to nuclear war­
fare. As the Wallace campaign continued, Soviet policy 
seemed determined to undermine his efforts. Following 
the Czechoslavakia coup and the Berlin blockade, Wal­
lace's rhetoric became even more suspect to the American 
public.
On domestic issues the Progressive party condemned 
the peace time draft, all forms of segregation and dis­
crimination, along with the loyalty programs and oaths.
It called for price controls, more TVA projects, repeal 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, price supports for agriculture, 
an extension of social security, public housing, national 
health programs, the eighteen-year-old vote, and federal
28aid to education. Wallace made it clear that his pro­
gram had no intention of abandoning capitalism but that 
he was concerned with patching the system up.
The intensity of the Wallace effort in 1^48 was 
easily the equivalent of two or three ordinary campaigns.
^^New York Times, July 28, 1948.
28 Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms,
pp. 4 3 6-4 7 .
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But Wallace was no ordinary candidate nor was his campaign 
an orthodox one. Unlike the traditional party rallies, 
people willingly paid to hear him speak and to hear the 
musical entertainment that opened and closed each meeting. 
He campaigned vigorously in the South but with little suc­
cess. Unlike Tr_;man, he emphasized civil rights while on 
his eight-day tour of the South and by refusing to speak 
to segregated audiences he caused an uproar wherever he 
went. In Durham, North Carolina, he was greeted with a 
flood of eggs, firecrackers, and hecklers which succeeded 
in drowning out his speech. He met further resistance as 
he moved across Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Ten­
nessee. As Time magazine noted, if he had done little
29else he had at least exposed racism at its worst.
The press gave wide publicity to the unusual manner 
of the Wallace campaign and to Wallace's numerous idiosyn­
crasies. Wallace frequently made intemperate comments 
which the press enjoyed exploiting. For example, in Salem, 
Oregon, Wallace suggested that the government buy up sub­
marginal lands to discourage settlement there and if peo­
ple still insisted on living there, they should be pre-
30vented by the government from having children. When the 
press learned of the so-called "Guru letters," a series of 
mystically inclined letters written to a cult leader and
29Ross, Loneliest Campaign, pp. 226-27. 
^^New York Post, May 25, 19^8.
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signed by Wallace, they continually badgered the Progres­
sive candidate about them. Instead of explaining his con­
nection with the letters or admitting to authorship, Wal­
lace chose to remain silent thereby allowing the press to 
31speculate. These and numerous other similar actions by 
Wallace alienated many of his potential followers and la­
beled Wallace as a crackpot.
Although the Progressive campaign was the longest 
of the four major campaigns waged in 1948, the momentum 
of the movement declined rapidly after the Progressive 
convention. While Soviet aggressive actions undercut his 
appeal in foreign policy, the public may well have tired 
of Wallace. The critical attitude of the press also ac­
counted for the decline of his appeal. By election time 
the Progressives pulled their candidates out of all state 
and local races in order to avoid splitting the liberal 
vote.
While the Progressives declined in strength, the 
Dixiecrats made their move. Unlike the other parties, 
the Dixiecrats, because of their late start had to work 
out organizational details during their campaign. The 
wonder is not that the party was frequently uncoordinated 
and non-functional but that it worked at all. On July 2 8 , 
Thurmond and Wright issued to the press the party's plans, 
organizations, and personnel. The Executive Committee
^^New York Times, July 24, 1948.
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consisted of: Ben Laney, Chairman; members were Frank
Dixon and R. T. Goodwyn of Alabama; J. 0. Emmerich and 
Everett Truly of Mississippi; Frank Upchurch and C. E. 
Shepard of Florida; Arch Rowan and Palmer Bradley of 
Texas; John Daggett and C. E. Parker of Arkansas; W, P. 
Baskin and George Warren of South Carolina; Judge Leander 
Perez and Frank J. Looney of Louisiana. These men would 
conduct the actual campaign along with a steering commit­
tee composed of Governor Laney, Chairman Frank Dixon of 
Alabama, W. W. Wright of Mississippi, Judge Perez of 
Louisiana, Arch Rowan from Texas, and R. M. Figg of South 
Carolina. Judge Merritt Gibson of Longview, Texas, was 
the national campaign director, and George C. Wallace 
from the Capital National Bank of Jackson, Mississippi, 
was the national campaign treasurer.
The national headquarters of the party was sched­
uled to open August 9i in the Heidelberg Hotel, Jackson,
Mississippi. Liaison offices would open also in Columbia,
32South Carolina and in Washington, B.C. The first men­
tion of establishing a Washington Bureau was made by 
Horace Wilkinson, who suggested hiring someone for $$0,000 
a year whose duty it would be to defend the South against 
the attacks to which it was being subjected. Wilkinson 
contended that if the southerners would put an economic
32Letter, Horace Wi .kinson to Ben Laney, May 17, 
1 9 4 8 , Laney Papers, Employ the Physically Handicapped Week 
File.
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boycott on northern goods, it would cause the North to 
think twice about supporting Truman's program. The bu­
reau, he felt, should be controlled by the southern gov­
ernors , and it should be run by a man who was "cold blooded" 
and who had only one objective: "The economic and politi­
cal destruction of all forces opposed to the South." Wil­
kinson believed that "South baiting" could be made politi­
cally unprofitable. Fortunately for the Dixiecrats they
33did not always follow all of Wilkinson's advice. How­
ever, they did pass a resolution providing tor the crea­
tion of the States' Rights Foundation with its headquar­
ters in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the Foundation
and its bureau was to disseminate information concerning
34states' rights and the meaning of the Constitution.
Immediately after the opening of the national head­
quarters on August 9, the Dixiecrats sought to get the 
party on the ballot in all of the forty-eight states. But 
it was late and the time limit required for getting on the 
ballot was expiring in several states; the Dixiecrats 
sought to discover legal avenues of meeting this important 
objective. Party workers proceeded to file numerous suits 
and countersuits in v ious states in an effort to get the 
party on the ballot.
33%bid.
34Resolution, Laney Papers, Southern Governor's
Conference File.
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By August 25) the states of Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina had chosen electors who 
were pledged to the Dixiecrats and who would be listed 
under the Democratic label. Petitions were being circu­
lated in Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Minne­
sota, North Carolina, and Virginia--all these states had 
different requirements as to the number of names needed
for the party to be listed. Write-in campaigns were
35underway in Maryland and Oklahoma.
Some of the difficulties involved in the struggle 
for getting on the ballots can be clearly seen in the 
case of Indiana. Although the SRD obtained the eleven 
thousand required signatures before the deadline, the 
legality of the petition was challenged by the Truman and 
Wallace supporters there. The Dixiecrat representative 
sent to Indiana had arranged that payment would be made 
to the men circulating the petition according to the 
number of names they obtained, and since filing deadlines 
were close at hand, the Dixiecrats did not have time to 
check the validity of the petitions. Consequently, they 
created so many fake names that the petition in Indiana
g Ç"
eventually was declared illegal.
The most persistent problem faced by the Dixiecrats 
was the lack of funds necessary for waging a Presidential
"Newsletter,” Black Folder, Gibson Papers.
3^ibid.
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campaign. In August, following the discussion of their 
financial situation at a campaign committee meeting in 
Birmingham, the party leaders agreed to urge all state 
chairmen to organize local groups to collect funds.
Each state was asked to raise ten thousand dollars per 
electoral vote and the States' Rights Newsletter sug­
gested that buttons be distributed to those who contrib­
uted one dollar or more. Since most of the money that 
the SRD collected consisted of small personal donations
by people with small incomes, they never had enough
37money to carry out a really efficient campaign.
Failure to file an account of the party's contribu­
tions and expenses in accordance with the Hatch Act caused 
much adverse publicity for the SRD's. Their explanation 
for this oversight was that the firm of certified public 
accountants misinterpreted the deadline for filing, and 
thinking it was October 20, not September 10, as the law 
stipulated. When they finally submitted the report the 
Dixiecrats claimed to have collected $13,449.78 and spent 
$1 4 ,8 9 0 .5 3 , which left them with a deficit of $1,440.75*
o o
The largest individual contribution had been $540.00.
The lack of funds jeopardized the publicity efforts 
of the party. An inadequate amount of literature and 
radio time hampered the campaign effort severely but the 
Dixiecrats did have some eff Ive means of propaganda.
3?Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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For example, in Mississippi, the theaters ran a three- 
minute movie trailer made by Governor Wright that ex­
plained the movement. The tight budget, however, limited
39considerably the distribution of this film. Another 
idea which might have aided their cause was a special 
campaign train to tour the South but this too was im­
possible because of the expense. The 3RD tried also to 
publicize the cause at the numerous fairs held during the 
months of September and October. In Mississippi small 
booths were located in the center of the Commercial Build-
40ing where literature and buttons were distributed.
The national organization branched out through the 
veterans, the college, and the women's divisions which 
operated in each state. For the women's division the SRD 
called for a woman chairman in each state to direct the 
activities of the women in her state, to organize women's 
clubs, and to hold statewide mass meetings. From each 
county there was a chairman whose purpose was to see to 
it that all voters, but women in particular, voted in 
November for the 3RD.
At election time booths were set up at central 
locations so that buttons and literature could be dis­
tributed and funds could be collected. Telephone commit­
tees were established with instructions for calls to be 
made between 9*00 and 11:30 A.M. and between 2:00 and
39ibid. ^°Ibid.
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5:00 P.M. The message suggested was: "I am calling to
ask you to help preserve our constitutional right of local
self-government by voting on November 2, for the States'
klRights Democrats electors." All women who could write
or speak were asked to do so at every opportunity and
women who were free on November 2, were asked to take
42voters to the polls.
The college division of the SRD opened its activi­
ties on August 7> with its headquarters at the Heidelberg 
Hotel in Jackson, Mississippi. Ken Doshotel, Chairman of 
the College Division reported that clubs had been formed 
on the campuses of several schools in the states of the 
Deep South with varying degrees of success. The fee for 
membership to these clubs helped the sagging SRD campaign 
chest, and college students distributed literature in 
their states. According to Doshotel, who personally 
visited most of these campuses, college students were 
poorly informed of the principles of constitutional gov­
ernment. He subsequently suggested that more history and
government courses be taught, presumably with an idea of
43stressing the virtues of states' rights.
"Handbook for Women's Organization" (Jackson, 
Mississippi: National States' Rights Democrats Campaign
Committee, 1948).
^^Ibid.
4 3"Report of College and University Division," by 
Ken Doshotel, November 4, 1948, Gibson Papers.
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Campaign newsletters were distributed to all state 
chairmen, field representatives, and a select group of 
other leaders who were connected with the national head­
quarters. The Newsletter invited all who were interested 
in "preserving the principles of American government as 
expounded by Thomas Jefferson," to join their movement.
The leader of this fourth party movement was Strom 
Thurmond of South Carolina. Thurmond, who characterizes 
himself as a liberal southerner, was born and spent his 
childhood in Edgefield, South Carolina, a town famous for 
producing governors and other politicians. After graduat­
ing from Clemson College with a major in Agricultural 
Science and English, he taught agriculture at several 
small schools in and near Edgefield for the next five 
years before becoming the superintendent of Education in 
Edgefield County. By 1930 he gained admittance to the 
South Carolina bar after completing a home study course 
in law but law was just a springboard to politics for 
Thurmond. His political career began in 1933 when he was 
elected state senator from Edgefield County, a position 
he retained until 193 8 when he was selected as circuit 
judge. The coming of the war interrupted Thurmond's 
political career only briefly, for in 1946 he success­
fully ran for governor.
Alberta Lachicotte, echoing Thurmond's self­
characterization emphasizes that as governor he was a
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44liberal, "by southern standards." She points to his 
accomplishments in race relations in the state emphasizing 
his establishment of industrial training schools for Negro 
girls, his improvement of existing parks and health cen­
ters for blacks, his revamping of the whole school system, 
and his appeals for higher salaries for black and white 
teachers alike. He set a precedent in the South Carolina 
legal annals when he ordered the arrest and trial of white 
men who lynched a black. When he advocated the repeal of 
the poll tax in South Carolina, he incurred the charge of 
being too progressive.
A devout believer in states' rights and an outspoken
opponent of civil rights, Thurmond was the ideal man to
lead the Dixiecrat crusade. As a candidate he received a
great deal of well-deserved criticism but was the victim
of slander as well. One of the most widespread rumors of
that election year was that Thurmond had an illegitimate
daughter whose educational and living expenses he covered.
The story, especially tailored for Thurmond, explained that
45the daughter was black. Apparently without foundation, 
the rumor plagued Thurmond throughout the campaign while 
his supporters, denouncing the rumor, diligently worked 
for his election.
44 ILachicotte, Rebel Senator, p. 4?.
^^Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep 
South: Stars of the New Confederacy (New York:Grossman
Publishers, 19^0) , p"I 284. Hereinafter referred to as 
Sherrill, Gothic Politics.
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Robert Sherrill, southern journalist, writes that 
Thurmond perfectly represented the "god-fearing, salt-of- 
the earth folks who swim in the same rivers they dump 
their raw sewage into" and who "set up auto junkyards 
next to college campuses, and feel that poached eggs are 
only for sick p e o p l e . B y  and large his greatest appeal 
was to those least secure in their economic and social 
status. Admittedly Thurmond also represented people of a 
somewhat higher level of sophistication than that outlined 
by Sherrill. His support was solid enough that at the 
conclusion of the SRD campaign, Thurmond managed to stay 
alive politically.
When Thurmond left the Governor's office in 1951 
he practiced law until 1954 when he was elected to the 
United States Senate in a write-in campaign against state 
senator Edgar Brown. The first person ever elected to a 
major office in the United States by this method, he was 
later re-elected twice as a Democrat and once as a Repub­
lican. From his senatorial position he has consistently 
been the mouthpiece of southern reactionaries. For exam­
ple, he commandeered a twenty-four hour and eighteen 
minute filibuster against the 1957 civil rights legisla­
tion. Speaking with disdain of President Lyndon Johnson's 
"disgraceful We Shall Overcome message" in April, I9 6 5 , 
Thurmond claimed that he did not clap even once during
^^Ibid., p. 258.
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the whole speech in spite of the piercing stare of Mrs.
T T, 47Johnson.
His reputation as an ultra-conservative and a 
maverick have been proven by his consistent support of 
the traditional Republican-southern Democratic coalition. 
At every juncture throughout the fifties and sixties he 
fought civil rights legislation and the "radically lib­
eral, socialistic" programs of Kennedy and Johnson.
Thurmond's real political dilemma, however, came 
when ultra-conservative Barry Goldwater was nominated 
for the Presidency by the Republicans in 1964. Thurmond, 
finding Goldwater's philosophy closer to his own than that 
of any other Congressman, felt it necessary to make an 
announcement of support. As early as I9 6I Thurmond had 
expressed a desire to see the American political party 
abandon the old less descriptive titles of Democrat and 
Republican for the more accurate labels of liberal and 
conservative. With President Lyndon Johnson's selection 
of Hubert Humphrey as his running mate, Thurmond began 
openly campaigning for Goldwater in the South at large 
and then in a more concentrated manner in his home state.
For Thurmond to campaign in behalf of Goldwater 
simply involved updating his earlier campaign speeches 
and including other issues in addition to that of states' 
rights. Much of the rhetoric was the same:
4?Ibid., pp. 271-72.
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The Democratic Party has abandoned the people, . . .
has invaded the private lives of the people by using 
the powers of government for coercion and intimida­
tion of : :idividuals . . . has rammed through Congress
unconstitutional, impractical, unworkable, and oppres­
sive legislation . . . has encouraged lawlessness,
civil unrest, and mob actions.^8
The "Thurmond blitz" in South Carolina was successful, for
this election of 1964 marked the first time that South
Carolina had voted Republican since 1 8 7 6.
Lachicotte, never finding fault with Thurmond,
praised him for his tremendous courage in changing parties
and supporting Goldwater. "To jump from a winning team to
a losing one . . . required mettle and an undauntable
spirit," reports Lachicotte who failed to mention Thur-
49mond's loss of his ten years of seniority as a Democrat. 
Changing parties did nothing to alter the reactionary views 
of Thurmond who continues to be vocal in his opposition to 
civil rights legislation.^^
As the Dixiecrat Presidential hopeful Thurmond 
waged a strenuous campaign. According to Merritt Gibson, 
Thurmond wanted to speak at every "little pigtraiJ" and 
was only reluctantly persuaded to speak at places where 
a sizeable gathering could be mustered.
Thurmond's speeches were always based upon one 
issue, that of states' rights, or, more correctly, the
48Lachicotte, Rebel Senator, p. 2 3 8 .
^^Ibid., p. 2 4 3 . ^^Ibid.
^^Merritt Gibson, Private Interview, Longview,
Texas, April, 1970.
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civil rights program of President Truman. The States' 
Rights candidate analyzed the four parts of the civil 
rights program which were most inimical to the South: 
the anti-poll tax law, the anti-lynching law, the FEPC 
with its federal police force and the abolition of seg­
regation. Economic issues were rarely mentioned in the 
course of Thurmond's speeches unless they were placed 
in a historic context, nor did the tidelands issue re­
ceive any notable attention.
Thurmond contended that the civil rights committee 
report lay unnoticed until a congressional election in 
the Bronx in New York occurred. The defeat of Boss Ed 
Flynn by a Wallace man was seen by the Democratic leaders 
as a threat, thus indicating that Wallace was capable of 
winning votes of "small pressure blocs." At this junc­
ture, Truman decided to deliver his civil rights message 
5 2to Congress. Thurmond saw the civil rights program, 
not only as politically motivated but as unconstitutional 
and as a program that would ruin states' rights. He con­
sistently quoted or referred to the tenth amendment to 
point out how the Truman Administration was ignoring 
states' rights. The major parties were overlooking this
law because they were "engaged in a cheap political scram-
5 3ble to gain the votes of the minorities." Accusing the
^^Speech, J. Jtrom Thurmond, March 1?, 1948, Thur­
mond Papers, States Rights File.
^^Ibid., July 31, 1948.
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Democrats of having an insatiable thirst for power, he
added that people know their madness," and "will not
stand for it." Thurmond saw the civil rights program
as a product of those who were "working like beavers to
55turn this into a socialistic state." He emphasized 
the necessity of returning the running of the American 
government to the people or to the states. "We must rid 
ourselves," he railed, "of the regimentation that is 
slowly making us slaves of Washington." "And," he con­
tinued, the people must "learn to look every Washington 
gift horse in the mouth, and examine it for Communistic 
slanders." Thurmond emphasized the necessity of pro­
tecting the Constitution from all kinds of attacks in­
cluding telling the disgruntled minorities "that the 
Presidency of the United States is not for sale."^^ He 
warned that civil rights legislation would end all the 
constitutional precedents on the division of power be­
tween the state and federal government
The whole program of civil rights, Thurmond 
claimed, was in essence a renewal of Reconstruction meas­
ures. Reconstruction, he explained, was a black period 
in American history for the South, a period from which 
it had taken the South seventy-five years to recover. 
After the war the South was burdened with an unfair
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., September 30, 1948,
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freight rate system which prevented the South from com­
peting with northern manufacturers. "This kept the South 
a 'crown colony' status, producing raw materials for the 
industrial East, and buying back their finished goods at 
high p r i c e s . T h e  South was still working to correct 
this inequity, said Thurmond, along with the unfair tariff. 
The tariff caused the South to purchase eastern products 
that had protection against world competition, while at
the same time the raw materials of the South had no equiv-
59aient protection.
The anti-poll tax law in itself was not offensive, 
Thurmond explained, as he personally had been a leading 
advocate of its repeal in the state of South Carolina.
He saw the tax as a measure of revenue only and not a 
burden on the right to vote; besides to many the issue 
seemed insignificant since only seven states out of the 
forty-eight still retained this tax. But the Dixiecrats, 
viewing this action by Congress as a violation of the 
constitutional provision that gave the states the power 
to determine suffrage requirements, envisioned a form of 
federal suffrage leading ultimately to a centralized gov­
ernment free from the requirements of state or of local 
self-government
^^Ibid., September 23, 1948. ^^Ibid.
^°Ibid., March 1?, 1948.
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Similarly, the anti-lynching law in itself was not 
objectionable, but was unconstitutional according to the 
Dixiecrat interpretation. The federal government had no 
right to handle crimes that occurred within a given state; 
legally and constitutionally it could deal only with fed­
eral crimes. The states had laws against murder and some 
specific laws and penalties to deal with lynchings, a 
crime that was practically non-existent. Thurmond's 
figures showed that in one year 75 per cent of those 
lynched were white, but he gave no date and was not very 
specific in his s t a t e m e n t . A t  one point Thurmond called 
the anti-lynching bill a federal police bill in disguise 
that would give the federal government unlimited power in 
the area of crime control. Pointing out that some 325 
murders were committed in New York City in the year 1946, 
Thurmond said the federal government had said nothing 
about a federal police force for that area. There was 
only one lynching in 19^7 in the whole country, yet, this 
was significant enough to substantiate the need for fed­
eral crime control. "Regardless of what good causes a 
Federal police system is alleged to serve, we are opposed 
to this step toward dictatorship."^^ He compared Lidice, 
the village that the Germans totally destroyed in World 
War II, in order to punish a few individuals, with the
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., August 26, 1948.
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kind of punishment that would be inflicted as a result of 
the Truman program. The Democrats had proposed levying a 
fine of $10,000 against a whole town or county where a 
lynching occurred, but the Dixiecrats felt that the idea 
of penalizing a whole community for the action of one of
63its members was wrong.
On the issue of segregation, Thurmond thought civil
strife would abound if it was abolished:
Lawlessness will be rampant. Chaos will prevail.
Our streets will be unsafe. And there will be the 
greatest breakdown of law enforcement in the his­
tory of the nation.
Let us also tell them, that in the South, the 
intermingling of the races in our homes, in our 
schools, and in our theatres is impractical and
I I I ■  ■ ■  ■  I I ■ ■ ■  I I . . . . . . . . . 11 ■ ■  ■  1 n  —  — ■  ■ ■  ■ ■ ■  1 A  —  1 ' ' 'impossible.b4
This attempt to stir up racial and religious hatred for 
political advantage, Thurmond expounded, was the lowest 
of all political tricks. "If corrupt machine politicians 
feel that they must play politics with the race issue, 
let them play at it in their own dirty back yards !" 
Thurmond asserted.
Thurmond, continually pointing to the dangers of 
integration, appealed to many parents when he brought up 
the subject of raising and educating children. Mothers 
should have the right to send their children to a public 
or private school where their children would be taught by
G^Ibid. ^^Ibid., October 6, 1948.
G^ibid., July 31, 1948.
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"proper" teachers and associate with "proper" people.
Thurmond contended that no authority, including the fed­
eral government, should have the right to tell you that 
"your child must sit beside, play with, or share his 
lunch with children that you don't want your boy or girl 
to associate with."^^ This, Thurmond said, would be the 
situation if Truman's program were enforced. American 
mothers, who have never needed advice or permission by a 
governmental agency on raising children, soon would be 
given such directions. Thurmond compared this to the 
Hitler Youth Movement where children were indoctrinated
to oppose religion, scorn adult discipline, and act as
f i  7spies for the state against their own parents.
In several speeches Thurmond denounced integration 
in the army saying that it was an unforgivable move, es­
pecially since "our military leaders tell us that it will 
be at the sacrifice of the morale of our soldiers and 
threaten the safety of the country i t s e l f . A c c o r d i n g  
to Thurmond, the people of the United States "do not want 
their sons sv.b j ected to an unnecessary hazard, simply to
69allow politicians of this country to appeal to bloc votes."
Thurmond, characterizing the Fair Employment Commis­
sion as legislation that would control the hiring and firing 
of people within private businesses and industries, saw this
^^Ibid., August 26, 1948. ^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., September 231 1948 ^^Ibid.
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also as an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the 
people by the federal government. The FEPC, as Thurmond 
viewed it, would enable Communists to infiltrate the gov­
ernment more efficiently by forcing saboteurs into various 
industrial plants. This law, Thurmond explained, was an 
emulation of Stalin's "all Races Law" written in 1920 
which helped Stalin achieve his position as "supreme dic­
tator of Soviet Russia.
To enforce the civil rights program a federal
police agency operating within the Department of Justice
was the "most alarming" part of the President's program.
The concept of a Federal police force working within 
the Stat ÎS is utterly foreign to the Constitution of 
the United States. Gestapo-like agents would rove 
throughout the nation; policing elections; meddling 
with private businesses; intervening in private law­
suits; breeding litigation; keeping the people in a 
state of duress and intimidation; and bringing to 
our people all of the potential evils of a so-called 
police state. 71
Earlier when Truman had explained that the federal police
force was necessary to enforce the anti-lynching bill and
the FEPT because the FBI was not trained in handling civil
rights matters, Thurmond agreed, saying "our FBI has never
72been trained in Russian methods."
Thurmond frequently alluded to the loyalty of the 
South to the Democratic party as the prime reason for the
^^Ibid., September 6 , 1948.
f^Ibid., March 17, 1948.
^^Ibid., September 25, 1948.
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continuing strength of the party. Because of this un­
swerving loyalty, Thurmond said, "never did we dream that
a Democratic President would stab us in the back" by en-
73forcing such vicious anti-southern laws. He raised the 
question of defining party loyalty by contending that the 
States' Rights Democrats were still loyal to the party, 
and the disloyal were those who were presently in control. 
They were responsible for subverting the revered princi­
ples for which the Democratic party had long stood. Thur­
mond' s favorite analogy on loyalty was to raise the ques­
tion of what would people do if the preacher of their 
church was suddenly no longer practicing his religion but 
instead was preaching contrary doctrines. His answer was 
that they would withdraw, taking the church with them.
They would be loyal not to the church building nor to the 
faithless preacher, but to their traditional beliefs. To
Thurmond, the loyal Democrat was the man willing to stand
74up for the traditional party beliefs. Thurmond said the
SRD did not desert the party but rather it was stolen from
them by the crooked big city bosses who undermined the
75ideals of the Democratic party. ^
The Dixiecrat candidate stated that at Philadelphia 
the South was abused and humiliated by the "collectivist
^^Ibid., March 17, 1948.
^^Ibid., August 26, 1948.
^^Ibid., August 28, 1948.
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crew" in charge there. When the Democratic convention
abandoned the ideals of Jefferson, "Democracy caught the
train for Birmingham. We left in Philadelphia only the
7 6shell of the Democratic Party." According to Thurmond
"the radicals, the subversives, and the reds [were] in
complete control of Party machinery." Constitutional
government was "like a voice in the wilderness. Once
77again, we were ridiculed, reviled, and scorned."
On August 21, 19^8, Thurmond charged that the 
administration was trying to cover up the extent to which 
pro-Communists and Communist members have infiltrated 
government. When Truman called the investigation a "red 
herring" he was, according to Thurmond, trying to modify 
the outrage of the public over the disclosure of such 
facts. He charged that Truman had held back the FBI and 
covered up some subversives because of partisan politics. 
The position of the SRD was that every effort should be 
made to purge the Communists from governmental positions, 
regardless of political consequences.
At tines, Thurmond criticized southern leaders who 
refused to join the Dixiecrat movement. Charging that 
they pretended to oppose the President's program, then 
thinking of the loss of patronage, they did an about face 
and supported Truman. They betrayed the South and were
^^Ibid., September 10, 1948.
^^Ibid., September 25, 1948.
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"willing to barter away the rights of the South for a mess
7 fiof political pottage."
Occasionally Thurmond attacked all of the other
Presidential aspirants. He accused Truman, Dewey, and
Wallace of wanting to introduce in America a totalitarian
state like that of Germany, Italy, and Russia. All three
wished to destroy the American way of life and to nullify
79the Bill of Rights. Thurmond predicted that historians
would say of the election that three men supported the
totalitarian state--while "only one stood for the kind of
government that has made the United States the greatest
80nation on earth." To the charge that the Dixiecrats 
were helping the Republicans, Thurmond answered that 
without the SRD, Dewey would carry nearly all of the 
South; thus this was merely a measure used by the admin­
istration to discredit the southern party.
In his speeches, Thurmond, who considered himself 
a devout Christian, often made statements in Biblical 
language :
We of the South have bourne all things, believed 
all things, endured all things, suffered long and 
envied not: we have sought not our own; we have not
been easily provoked; but our service, our faith, our 
belief, and our sufferings have been to no avail.
7^Ibid., July 31, 1948. 
I
So
^^Ibid., September 20, 1948.
Ibid., October 4, 1948.
^^Ibid.
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On another occasion he said: "Today we must sail by
the star of the Constitution, second in glory only to 
the Star of Bethlehem itself in protecting the rights
82of oppressed mankind." This undoubtedly had appeal 
to many of a religious bent in the South, who like the 
slaveholders of an earlier period, failed to see any 
inconsistency between his racial and religious beliefs.
Thurmond outlined three specific objectives of 
the SRD: to oppose centralized government with power
concentrated in Washington; to alert the citizens of 
the United States that the American way of life was 
being endangered by the politicians of both major par­
ties in hopes of attracting minority bloc votes; and 
to restore the South to her former position of influ-
O oence and power within national politics.
Thurmond and the SRD virtually ignored the for­
eign policy as an issue. From the few comments made 
by the Dixiecrat chiefs it appears that they supported 
Truman's get-tough-with-Russia policy. Thurmond be­
lieved that continued American ownership of the atomic 
bomb was the instrumental factor in maintaining world
84peace.
OpIbic., September 23, 1948. 
^^Ibid., August 2 6 , 1 9 4 8 . 
^^Ibid., October I9 , 1948.
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While Thurmond was busily campaigning, his Vice- 
President made speeches in several sites in the South 
emphasizing the same topics and adding little new to the 
SRD rhetoric.
CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS OF THE DIXIECRAT EFFORT
The results of the 1948 Presidential election as­
tounded the nation. Truman, in the face of what seemed 
to be certain defeat received 24,179«345 popular votes or 
49 per cent of the total, thus capturing 303 electoral 
votes; the Republicans received 21,991i291 popular votes, 
approximately 43.1 per cent and I89 electoral votes; the 
Progressives won 1,137,326 popular votes, 2.4 per cent 
but did not win any electoral votes; and the Dixiecrats 
won 1 ,1 7 6 , 1 2 3 popular votes or 2.4 per cent of all votes 
cast and 39 electoral votes.^
The Dixiecrats, while winning over one-fifth of 
the popular votes in the South, and receiving over 9 8 . 8  
per cent of their total vote from the southern states, 
still insisted that they were not a regional but a na­
tional movement. They won one or more votes in nine non­
southern states with their greatest degree of success out 
of these nine states in Kentucky where they received 1.3 
per cent of the total. In general the Dixiecrats had
^Heard, A Two Party South? pp. 23-26, II3-I8 .
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limited their campaign to the southern states although
former Louisiana Governor Sam Jones conducted a vigorous
campaign on behalf of the Dixiecrats in North Dakota, a
2state which cast 37^ votes for Thurmond.
The Dixiecrats carried Alabama, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, and Louisiana, the states where Thurmond was 
listed under the Democratic label. In each state where
he was listed on a separate ticket, he trailed both the
Democrats and the Republicans. The election results 
pointed out that the Dixiecrat appeal was primarily to 
those who feared altering the status of the blacks.
Whites who lived near large numbers of blacks, in black
belt areas, were the sections which voted most heavily
for the Dixiecrats. Alexander Heard, political scientist 
and co-worker of Vladimir Key on the topic of recent 
southern politics, found a positive correlation between 
the percentage of the Thurmond vote and the percentage 
of the black population. According to their analyses, 
"the intensity of southern feeling on the position of 
the Negro varies proportionately with the concentration
3of Negroes." Where large black populations exrsted, 
race became the foremost issue. William Keefee, a po­
litical analyst, who views statistically the voting
^Ibid.
^Key, Southern Politics, pp. 329-44; and Heard,
A Two Party South? pp. 251-52.
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behavior in the four Dixiecrat states in relation to the 
black-white ratio, confirmed Key's thesis that the Dixie- 
crats received their heaviest votes in the black belt 
areas of the South. Assuming that some blacks in the 
rural southern black belt did vote, analysts safely at­
tributed the majority of the votes to whites. On the 
other hand, where more blacks participated, Thurmond, 
because of this black vote, received a smaller percent­
age. An earlier but less extensive study made by Key 
also supported this conclusion as did a later study made 
by David M. Heer, senior student at Harvard. He analyzed 
Thurmond's vote in South Carolina, county by county and 
found that his support varied directly with the black 
population. Heer found a difference in attitudes toward 
race between the rural and urban populace in the South 
Carolina counties, a factor reflected in the votes for
5Thurmond. But in general the rural-urban factor did not 
appear to be of significance except where the Negro popu­
lation was also a factor. Urban and rural counties both 
were found among the strongholds as well as the weak spots 
of the Dixiecrat movement and as many prominent state 
Dixiecrat leaders came from the large cities as well as 
small towns.
kIbid.
^David M. Heer, "The Sentiment of White Supremacy: 
An Ecological Study," American Journal of Sociology, LXIV 
(May, 1959), 5 9 2-9 8 .
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Dixiecrat supporters, when analyzed, were found to 
be "southerners most firmly wed traditionally to the Demo­
cratic p a r t y . T h e y  came from areas that in 1 8 6I pro­
moted secession and in I928 remained loyal to A1 Smith.
To illustrate the correlation between the Dixiecrat 
strength and the black belt areas. Heard compiled the 
following chart.
Estimated Percentage








North Carolina 26.6 8.8
Arkansas 22.4 I6 . 5
Virginia 22.2 10.3
Florida 21.8 I3 . 6
Tennessee I6 .I 13.4
Texas 11.5 9.3 ^
The Deep South, that is, the first five states 
listed, all have high proportions of blacks. Here as 
in the rest of the South the Dixiecrats sought to win 
the votes of the regular Democratic electors in a strug­
gle that involved the New Deal and anti-New Deal or
gliberal-conservative factions of the party.
^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 252. 
^Ibid., p. 2 5 3 -
QKey, Southern Politics, p. 340.
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Mississippi, the state with the largest number of
9blacks, gave Thurmond his highest percentage of votes.
Here, the Dirciecrats, in complete control of the voting 
machinery, had placed the names of Thurmond and Wright 
on the ballot as the Democratic nominees while the "loyal 
Democrats" were lucky to get Truman and Barkley on the 
ballot at all.^^
The state with the second largest number of blacks. 
South Carolina was where the first sign of an open break 
with the national party occurred. In Jasper County, (64.1 
per cent black), the Democratic committee in February had 
called a county convention to discuss the feasibility of 
a bolt. Later, this county along with several others 
agreed that South Carolina's electoral votes should be 
withheld unless Truman renounced his civil rights policies, 
a position which the upcountry counties opposed. As Heard 
noted. South Carolinians who remained loyal to the Demo­
cratic party were the poor farmers and mill workers, "red 
necks and lent heads" or the people of the uplands.
Louisiana, unlike the other Deep South states that 
voted for Thurmond, was not always safely in the Dixiecrat 
camp. W. H. Talbot, the national committeeman and Governor 
Earl Long publicly supported Truman and openly stated
9 Heard, A Two Party South? p. 253 
^^Key, Southern Politics, p. 340. 
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 275
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opposition to the bolt. Supporting the revolt, conserva­
tive state politicians such as former Governor Sam Jones 
and John U. Barr headed the drive for signatures to get 
the Dixiecrat candidates on the ballot, but made no effort 
to steal the Democratic electors. Then suddenly in March, 
Talbot turned Dixiecrat and by September the Democratic 
state executive committee during the absence of Long listed 
Thurmond and Wright as the officia] nominees of the Demo­
cratic party. At this point it appeared that Truman and 
Barkley would not even appear on the ballot. Not to be 
outdone in his own state. Long, a conservative but a loyal 
Democrat, called a special session of the legislature which 
voted to have Truman's name placed on the ballot but not
under the rooster, the southern emblem of the Democratic
+ 12 party.
Although the full story explaining the Louisiana 
coup is not known. Key mentions without elaborating that 
some hinted at a connection with tidelands oil. Key sug­
gests that the senatorial primary of August 31, between 
Robert F. Kennon and Russell Long was a factor since Ken- 
non sought to exploit Long's non-committal attitude toward 
civil rights in the upcoming election. Thurmond attributed
13the situation to differences in local politics there.
^^Key, Southern Politics, p. 34l. 
^^Ibid.
2 k 3
In Alabama where Truman's name did not even appear
on the ballot, the Democratic electors had been committed
by virtue of the primary to oppose Truman. Since no state
law required the listing of the Democratic nominees, many
old-time Democrats who might have voted for Truman other-
14wise, were forced to vote for Thurmond. If the voters 
had had a choice of candidates, the outcome doubtlessly 
would have coincided with the popular votes for delegates 
to the Democratic national convention. Delegates who were 
pledged to walk out if Truman were nominated by the con­
vention were supported by black belt areas, whereas dele­
gates who favored remaining loyal to the party regardless 
of the candidates chosen were supported by voters outside 
the black belt a r e a s . A s  election time neared, Governor 
Folsom openly campaigned for the Democrats, but in vain.
In Georgia, politics were split into the conserva­
tive group led by Governor Talmadge and the anti-Talmadge 
group, or the loyal Democrats, led by former Governor 
M. E. Thompson. After Talmadge won the gubernatorial pri­
mary in September and control of the state committee, ru­
mors spread of the Talmadgites' intention to see to it that 
Georgia's electors supported the Dixiecrats. The Atlanta 
Journal reported in September that James S. Peters, the
^^Ibid., p. 340.
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 2?8.
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state chairman, promised Gessner T. McCorvey, Alabama state 
chairman, that Georgia would unquestionably support the 
Dixiecrats. This statement was confirmed by the Alabama 
state chairman of the SRD. Although Talmadge himself 
avoided involvement in the bolt, many of the States' Rights 
electors were Talmadge men.
Yet ultimately the committee endorsed the Truman 
electors relegating the SRD candidates to a spot on the bal­
lot outside the Democratic column. Key suggests that Tal­
madge feared a split in the Democratic ranks in Georgia over 
the presidential election would cause a stronger contest in 
the gubernatorial election and this he did not want.^^
In Florida, Texas, and Arkansas there was no strong 
Republican party nor were there as many Negroes in these 
states as in the Deep South. Politicians in all three 
states remembered the I9 2 8 bolt and feared similar reprisals 
should they follow the same pattern in 1948. The struggle 
in these states was a familiar one between the black belt 
conservatives and the liberal loyal Democrats.
Led by Frank D. Upchurch, a member of the state Demo­
cratic executive committee and a foe of Senator Pepper, con­
servatives from Florida began toying with the notion of a 
bolt. As early as February, Upchurch proposed that Florida 
work in conjunction with other southern states for the de­
feat of Harry Truman. As the year progressed various
^^Key, Southern Politics, pp. 341-42.
2k3
segments of the state condemned Truman's civil rights pro­
gram while the Democratic executive committees from several 
counties passed resolutions stating their objections to 
Truman.
As the primary campaign for convention delegates 
and electors got underway in Florida the battle lines 
were clearly drawn : one group proposed bolting if Truman
or a similar liberal candidate were nominated for Presi­
dent while the other group opposed both Truman and a bolt. 
Out of a delegation of twenty, Upchurch and States' Rights 
sympathizers won eleven and a half votes which under the 
unit rule gave them control of the delegation. Four of 
Florida's eight presidential electors promised to vote 
against the Democratic nominee in November, but control 
of the state Democratic executive committee was retained 
by Senator Pepper and the liberals. The voter, however, 
was given a clear choice through a special legislative 
session which provided for the listing of the names of 
the presidential candidates on the ballot without party 
designations.. The increasing strength of the Republican 
party in Florida ultimately aided the liberals in holding 
the state for Truman. Following the familiar pattern, the 
votes that the Dixiecrats received came from regions pri­




In Texas the Dixiecrats only slightly, if at all, 
recruited votes from the Republican ranks. Instead they 
relied on black belt areas which were traditional Demo­
cratic strongholds. An earlier bolt in the state by the 
Texas Regular movement in 1944 was created primarily to 
protest New Deal economic policies, but it found its sup­
port concentrated not in black belt areas but in the ranks 
of the former Republicans. If in 1944 some Democrats were 
on the verge of splitting from the party over economic 
philosophies, this appeared not to be the case in Texas
by 1948; instead, the Dixiecrats "constituted a throwback,
l8a revolt in reverse, among race-conscious whites."
Nonetheless, many former Texas Regulars •spearheaded 
the Dixiecrat movement in the state in 1948. The struggle 
at the May convention between liberals and conservatives 
ended with neither faction winning. The Texas Regulars 
failed to win adoption of a plan in which delegates would 
walk out of the national convention if the two-thirds rule 
were not restored. Likewise, liberals fighting for dele­
gates pledged to Truman also failed. Governor Jester, who 
opposed the bolt, controlled the convention with the aid
of labor and other liberals who had earlier opposed his
19election as governor.
1 oHeard, A Two Party South? p. 261.
19Key, Southern Politics, p. 339*
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In Texas when the Negro population of 1950 was
compared with the Thurmond vote, Dixiecratic strength was
found to be strongest in the black belt areas; conversely,
areas with the lowest numbers of blacks were areas where
Thurmond gained a relatively low percentage of votes.
Generally speaking, then, Thurmond won his greatest votes
in the counties of East Texas while his support from West
20Texas counties was minimal.
In Arkansas, Dixiecrat leaders came from the delta 
planter corporation faction of the Democratic party. With 
headquarters in Marianna in Lee County, over $0 per cent 
black, the original leaders were members of the Free Enter­
prise Association which consisted of plantation operators 
and Little Rock corporation executives with their lawyers. 
This association, which sponsored a right to work amend­
ment to the state constitution, had long opposed the New 
Deal on economic grounds. "Business Ben" Laney, a member 
of this association, was the state chairman of the Dixie­
crats while John L. Daggett, business leader, acted as 
executive secretary. Their opposition, the liberals in 
Arkansas, included Carl Bailey, former Progressiva gover­
nor; Sid McMath, who handily won the gubernatorial nomina­
tion; and Senator William Fullbright, a devout advocate of 
party loyalty possibly because he feared Governor Laney's 
opposition in 1950.
20Heard, A Two Party South? pp. 254-55
248
In the end, however, the Free Enterprise Association
lacked the necessary votes to swing Arkansas' electoral
count for the Dixiecrats. Conservatives were defeated by
the threat of Republicanism, the growing liberalism, and
21traditional Democratic regularity of the state. Thurmond 
garnered most of his votes from the eastern and southern 
counties in Arkansas where the blacks were most heavily 
concentrated. More than one-fourth of the Dixiecrat votes 
came from fifteen counties in which blacks made up more 
than one-fourth of the population. While the Republican 
vote remained steady or increased in most southern states 
between 1944 and 1948, in Arkansas it dropped from 29.8 
per cent to 21.0 per cent, giving possible substance to
the charge that the Dixiecrats won some Republicans to
• 22 their ranks.
In states where the basis of the two-party system 
was more firmly established, Tennessee, North Carolina, 
and Virginia, voters were heavily influenced by the Repub­
lican threat. Tennessee, which had voted for a Republican 
President twice between 1920 and 1948 further strengthened 
the contention that areas with large numbers of blacks were 
the areas in which Thurmond received his strongest support. 
For Tennessee this meant the southwestern corner of the 
state, the Memphis area, where politics were long dominated
^^Xey, Southern Politics, pp. 338-39«
p PHeard, A Two Party South? p. 262.
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by Democratic boss, Crump, leader of the conservative fac­
tion, who had openly supported Thurmond in the presidential 
race. Although his own men were defeated in the primary in
1948, Heard believed that he was still a factor in aiding
23the Dixiecrats in that area. In the gubernatorial and 
senatorial primaries the Crump men lost to the liberals 
led by Estes Kefauver. The liberals, once in control of 
the party machinery, sent an uninstructed delegation to 
Philadelphia. Although they were not overjoyed with the 
civil rights program, they supported most of the other 
administration policies. Ifhen Senator McKellar, a conser­
vative, announced support for Truman, it was clear that the 
strong Republican threat was forcing even the opponents
away from the Dixiecrats because they feared losing the
, . . 24election.
In North Carolina, however, the southern state in 
which the Thurmond appeal was weakest, he was especially 
weak in the black belt, a traditionally liberal Democratic 
area while he was strongest in the largely white counties. 
As early as May, North Carolina, announcing support of 
Truman, urged all Democrats to join forces in order to 
defeat the rising Republican threat. When at the state 
convention the delegation from Granville County (51 per 
cent black) proposed instructing delegates to vote against
^^Ibid., pp. 2 6 3-6 4 .
24Key, Southern Politics, p. 337.
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Truman or any other civil rights advocate, they were imme­
diately put down.
Leading Dixiecrats in this state, David Clark and 
Philip S. Finn, Jr., were described as the same group who 
supported Dewey in 1944 and Wilkie in 1940. Opposition 
to Truman in North Carolina was due to their dislike for 
his economic policies, rather than his civil rights pro­
gram. Thus, sharing the convictions of the Texas Regulars, 
it appeared that conservative North Carolinians would have 
opposed Truman regardless of the civil rights issue, but 
this opposition would not have taken the form of a bolt. 
Furthermore, the black belt of North Carolina contained 
more poor whites than did the black belts of other south­
ern states, and so race consciousness was replaced by the 
economic liberalism of this large voting class. But there 
is little evidence to support the contention that the 
Dixiecrats received more votes from the Republicans than
25from the Democrats.
Although the Republican threat was not as strong 
in Virginia as in North Carolina it was a factor of such 
grave concern that it silenced the conservative support 
of the Dixiecrats. Two factions dominated in Virginia: 
Martin Hutchinson led the liberal wing of the Democratic 
party while Senator Harry Byrd and Governor William Tuck 
led the conservative faction. In February Governor Tuck
^^Heard, A Two Party South? pp. 269-73*
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and Senator Byrd sponsored a plan whereby the state party 
convention or a designated committee could decide after 
the Democratic convention which candidate the state elec­
tors would be instructed to vote for. But liberals in 
the legislature led by Representative John W. Flannagan 
and Martin Hutchinson, liberal leader in the legislature 
refusing to acquiese to the Byrd machine, forced Tuck and 
Byrd to accept a watered down version of their bill. Al­
though Governor Tuck and Byrd made no comment concerning 
their presidential preferences following the national 
convention, earlier comments indicated that their sympa­
thies lay with the Dixiecrats. Meanwhile the Democratic 
state central committee declared its neutrality in the 
presidential election, thus there was no assertive Demo­
cratic party leadership available. They did encourage 
the public, however, to vote Democratic for other offices, 
Here again, Thurmond won most of his votes from counties 
containing the largest number of blacks. There were no 
conclusive results in the ig48 election to prove that the 
cities voted Democratic and the rural areas voted Dixie­
cratic; rather, as in other states, the concentration of
2 7blacks was the decisive factor.
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that even 
in the Deep South sentiment for the Dixiecrat bolt was not
26
^^Key, Southern Politics, p. 336. 
^^Heard, A Two Party South, pp. 2 6 5-6 8 .
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universal. To many voters, traditional Democratic loyalty, 
fear of Republican victory, and a favorable inclination for 
the overall economic policies of the Democrats was more im­
portant than the civil rights issue. It is very likely 
that Truman won in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina simply because he was named the Democratic
28nominee in those states.
The one dominant and constant factor emerging from 
this analysis of the Dixiecrat vote is that the Dixiecrats 
derived the bulk of their support from whites who lived in 
close proximity to large numbers of blacks. Fearful that 
the major parties would upset the status quo with regard 
to social and economic patterns, these people cast their 
votes for the Dixiecrat party. While economic policies 
were a source of discontent to many former Democrats, with­
out the issue of civil rights their dissatisfaction would 
have smoldered unnoticed.
In general the liberals in each state supported 
Truman, but on occasion conservatives whose fear of Repub­
licans exceeded their ideological incompatibility with the 
Democrats supported the Democrats. Southern voters in 1948 
appeared to vote just the opposite of the way they voted in 
1 9 2 8 ; the white counties were most loyal to the Democrats 
while the whites in heavily black counties voted for Thur­
mond. Where variations occurred, traditional party
28Key, Southern Politics, p. 342.
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loyalties cemented by Democratic-Republican competition
29explained the deviation.
Since the Dixiecrat support came from the southern 
black belts, regions where blacks constitute from 40 to 80  
per cent of the population, it should be noted that these 
southerners, though a minority, historically have set the 
tone of southern politics. These whites living in close 
proximity to large numbers of blacks have been the ones 
most concerned with white supremacy; consequently, the 
politics of a particular region of the South has varied 
according to the number of blacks living there. Despite 
the small area of the black belt settlements, the whites 
of these regions have managed to wield political influ­
ence disproportionate to their number. A source of in­
terest then to the student of southern politics is to 
determine what sort of people lived in the black belts 
that supported Thurmond. From a survey of recorded ob­
servations it appears that the Dixiecrat supporters were 
a motley group who defy rigid classification. Ralph 
McGill, a southern journalist, observed that the Dixie­
crat party was "the most infamously hypocritical and in­
tellectually dishonest political organization ever cre- 
30ated." Seeing the movement as a cover up for special
^^Ibid., pp. 3 5 2-5 3 .
^^Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1 9 ^ 3 iS?•
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interest groups, McGill consistently denounced the 
movement.
The description of the Dixiecrats as "plantation- 
minded Southerners and political 'Outs' who were exploit­
ing the racial issue," make it almost plausible for one 
to subscribe to a "displaced elite" thesis to explain 
the membership of this party. They were not all, how­
ever, elite; many, indeed, were far from it. As Fuller 
suggests, the best people along with the least desirable 
types frequented Dixiecrat meetings; thus, it was not 
unusual to find leading citizens and outcasts together 
filling the ranks of the party. Headquarters for the
rebels could be found in the best hotels in every size-
31able southern town.
One source claimed that the Dixiecrats consisted 
of "a Southern upper crust of mill owners, oil men, to-
32bacco growers, bankers and lawyers, voting Republican." 
Sometimes the representatives of northern corporations 
who lived in the South were the leaders in the movement. 
Fuller pointed out that Palmer Bradley, Houston lawyer 
and the puppet of Standard Oil of New Jersey, Roy Cullen, 
Dallas attorney and Republican oil man, Fessner McCorvey 
of Mobile, Alabama and lawyer for Standard Oil and other
^^Fuller, "The New Confederacy," pp. 12-13»
32„Third Parties: Southern Revolt," Time,
October 11, 1948, pp. 23-27»
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leaders in the movement were closely associated with big 
33industries.
Political scientist, William Carleton, on the other
hand, found that the party consisted of "the poor white
elements--crackers, Hill-billies, and rednecks . . . and
the piney wood folk and those who resent the rise of the
Negro as reflecting on their own relative place in so- 
34ciety." With their reactionary racial and religious
prejudices, they tried to retain the status quo that was
under attack by a strong federal government determined
to ensure civil rights to all citizens. And as J. T.
Graves, southern journalist, described the array of
Dixiecrat supporters :
. . . it was a grass roots revolt. . . . There were
scoundrels in it; also fools. There were schemers, 
professionals, political hacks and has-beens, reac­
tionaries antedating Mark Hanna in point of view;
Ku Kluxers, Negro baiters--and haters, Confederate- 
flag-waving-Dixie-singing-sentimentalist, wife- 
beaters, dog poisoners, eaters of popcorn in the 
movies, and many who wear wool hats in the summer 
(a crime high in the categories of Time and Life). 
There were men who believed that the states rather 
than the federal government should have tidewater 
oil rights, a belief somehow deemed sinister al­
though the great American oil steal at Teapot Dome 
was from the federal, not a state government.
There were Republicans in the movement, too, 
although hell trembled at +he hideous name.35
^^Fuller, "The New Confederacy," pp. 12-13*
34Ader, Dixiecrat Movement, p. 5-
35John Temple Graves, "Revolution in the South," 
Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVI (Spring, 1950), 190-203-
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While Dixiecrat strength came from a cross-section 
of the country, most authorities agreed that the party 
itself was not representative of the South as a whole. 
Although southerners in general disliked Truman's civil 
rights program, they saw little to be gained by supporting 
a single issue party like the Dixiecrats who were led by 
minor professional politicians advocating an outdated 
issue which most people could not buy.
Unfortunately the party was not always able to 
choose its following. Just as the Communists supported 
Wallace so the extreme right supported the Dixiecrats.
The party, after all, represented some of the same be­
liefs that the reactionaries held, beliefs which even the 
leaders encouraged their supporters to soft pedal. Thur­
mond frequently cautioned his followers to avoid making
references that would make them "vulnerable to charges
37of racial intolerance and bigotry." It was difficult, 
if not impossible, for the Dixiecrats to keep these reac­
tionary elements from attending and participating in their 
rallies. At one point in his campaign Thurmond openly 
repudiated the support of avowed racists, saying "we do 
not invite, and we do not need, the support of Gerald K. 
Smith or any other rabble-rousers who use race prejudice
Q Oand class hatred to inflame the emotions of our people."
"Danger from the Dixiecrats," New Republic, CXIX 
(August 2, 1948), 1 1 9 .
37 38Memorandums, Gibson Papers. Ibid.
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After the Birmingham meeting, when the press ques­
tioned Thurmond about Smith's presence, he claimed he did 
not know that Smith was there, that he had never met Smith, 
and that Smith had no part in the conference. In his 
statement Thurmond exclaimed that "the Southern fight is
not a race fight but an effort to protect the principle
39of States' Rights."^/ According to Thurmond, the opposi­
tion was working "to smear our efforts with the false
kotrappings of race hatreds." The party's interest, he 
said, was not in racial matters primarily but in protect­
ing the rights of states to control their internal affairs. 
What Thurmond really believed cannot be proven but he was 
shrewd enough to recognize that it was a political neces­
sity for him to denounce the support of the "political 
skum" such as Smith, who could do nothing but discredit 
the Dixiecrat movement.
Some of Thurmond's supporters, however, took issue 
with his condemnation of Smith. Such a man was George 
Armstrong, chairman of the board of the Texas Steel Com­
pany in Fort Worth, who wrote to Thurmond that he was sorry 
to know that Thurmond was "not conscious of the race prob­
lem that threatens the peace of our country, and I am also 
sorry that I cannot support you." How many other similar
^^Statement, J. Strom Thurmond, August 7, 1948, 
Thurmond Papers, States' Rights File.
4°Ibid.
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supporters Thurmond had and lost due to his repudiation 
of Smith is unknown; yet, it is doubtful that these people
4lvoted for any candidate other than Thurmond.
Since the membership in the Ku Klux Klan is not 
easily obtainable, there is no way of accurately deter­
mining how its members voted in 1948. However, the Dixie­
crat party's ideology, without question, was closer to the 
beliefs of the Klan than were the programs of the other 
parties. According to Leslie Velie, a journalist, the 
SRD's, in so many words, may not have encouraged increased 
Klan activity, but they did give the Klan a party to rally 
around. Since it was Harry Truman's civil rights message 
that bolstered the membership in and increased the activi­
ties of the Klan, it could be safely assumed that Klansmen
42voted the Dixiecrat ticket in 1948. Attorney General 
Albert Carmichael of Alabama denounced the SRD in an ad­
dress to the Methodist Committee on Social Action, claim­
ing that the southern bolt was caused by a few extremely 
selfish people "whose sole political, economic and per­
sonal interest is that of bringing about a national regime 
favorable to the clients they represent." He also tied 
the Ku Klux Klan to the Dixiecrats claiming that the 
States' Righters included "a small bunch of thugs, bums
4lLetter, George Armstrong to Strom Thurmond,
July 22, 1948, Laney Papers, States Rights Committee File.
4 2Lester Velie, "The Klan Rides the South Again," 
Collier's, October 9, 1948, pp. 13-14.
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and hoodlums, covered by sheets," who carried out the
43orders of the leaders of the Dixiecrat party. States'
Righters consistently denied connection with the Klan.
Dixon, for example, repeatedly stated that his personal
record was clear. "For every one against whom the charge
of bigotry might lie, there are a thousand against whom
our most reckless enemies could not establish such a 
44charge." ks long as the racial issue lay at th: heart 
of the States' Rights movement, however, there was as 
little chance for its members to avoid the charge of 
racial bigotry as there was the possibility of eliminat­
ing extreme right wing support of their party.
The Dixiecrat leaders, Thurmond and Wright, were 
symbolic of the old b '.sis of southern solidarity that was 
declining. Both were governors of the two southern states 
containing the highest proportion of blacks--they were 
spokesmen of the black belt. Heard saw Dixiecrat leaders 
as planters, financiers, and industrialists--people who 
disagreed with the Democratic party, not on civil rights 
only, but those who disagreed on "labor legislation, eco­
nomic controls, taxation, Federal jurisdiction, and many 
other domestic issues." According to Heard, they found
^^Ibid.
44Letter, Frank Dixon to Editor of Richmond Times 
Dispatch, August l4, 1948, Dixon Papers, States Rights 
Correspondence File.
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 247-
2o0
a means of protest in the uproar over civil rights. While 
this was undoubtedly true, the above mentioned areas of 
disagreement were relegated completely to the central 
issue of civil rights. Although information on most of 
the active Dixiecrat leaders is lacking or so incomplete 
as to be misleading, it appears from available sources 
that the majority of the leaders had nothing but contempt 
for any and all civil rights programs.
Following the analysis of the Dixiecrat vote and 
the Dixiecrat voter an evaluation of the movement itself 
is in order. Clearly enough the Dixiecrat candidates 
did not win the election of 1948 nor did they succeed in 
harnessing enough votes to throw the election into the 
House of Representatives. As far as the Democrats and 
the rest of the public were concerned, then, the Dixie­
crat movement was a failure. The States' Rights leaders, 
however, disagreed, stating among other things that their 
cause had strengthened "constitutionalism" in the United 
States. To dispense with shadowy claims of success or 
failure, the movement can be more accurately measured by 
comparing its objectives with its concrete accomplishments. 
Considered in this light the States' Rights movement was 
"one of the most conspicuous failures in American political
46history." One of the major objectives of the Dixiecrats,
46Harry S. Ashmore, "The South's Year of Decision," 
The Southern Packet : A Monthly Review of Southern Books
and Ideas, ÏV (November, 194Ô) , 2"!
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to defeat the civil rights program of the Democratic 
party, was not realized. By relaying to the South +heir 
interpretation of the implications of civil rights legis­
lation they alarmed many southerners, but not enough to 
frighten the majority of them from the Democratic party. 
What the Dixiecrats actually accomplished by their action 
was to call attention to the plight of the Negro in the 
South; instead of arresting the progress of the blacks, 
they may have advanced it. It is true that southern Demo­
crats aided by conservative Republicans managed later to 
delay civil rights legislation, but only temporarily.
Failing in their advocacy of state ownership of the 
tidelands, the Dixiecrats fell short of the larger related 
goal--that of restoring more power to the states by remov­
ing it from the federal government. The Dixiecrat attempt 
to channel the trend of government toward conservatism was 
in vain because under Truman gains of the New Deal were 
extended and jlidified.
The stated objectives of the Dixiecrats as related 
to the Democratic convention also were aborted. They had 
advocated the re-instatement of the two-thirds rule, a 
strong states' rights plank, and the complete omission of 
civil rights. They failed on all three counts. Since the 
Dixiecrats failed to realize any of their major goals, the 
movement must be classified as a failure, and the reasons 
for this are worth noting.
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Emile Ader, political scientist, explained that the 
Dixiecrat failure was due primarily to their inability to 
get support in their home territory. Tradition and herit­
age accounted for the refusal of many southerners to vote 
for the Dixiecrats. Persisting still in the South was the 
belief that all southerners must vote for "papa's party,"
that is, the Democratic party, regardless of the princi-
k7pies it espoused or the men it sponsored. Apparently 
the Democratic tradition in the South was too strong to 
be broken suddenly even over an issue as explosive as
• • T • 48civil rights.
Party discipline and fear of losing patronage caused 
many influential figures to stay with the Democrats even 
though their personal beliefs may have been closer to those 
of the Dixiecrats. Since the Democratic party offered cer­
tain advantages to the loyal such as appointments to fed­
eral jobs, even white supremacy men like Herman Talmadge
of Georgia could not afford to lose their connections with
49the Democratic party. On the other hand, some supported 
the Dixiecrats because they believed Harry Truman would be 
beaten, thus, they would have nothing to lose by bolting 
the p a r t y . I t  is possible also that some southern
^^Ader, Dixiecrat Movement, p. 3 6O.
/. p ̂Kirkendall, "Presidential Politics," p. 424. 
^^Ibid.
^^Statement, Gessner T. McCorvey, n.d., Montgomery,
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leaders who voted the Dixiecrat ticket made no public 
display to that effect. They, therefore, failed to con­
vince others to vote the Dixiecrat ticket, thereby weaken­
ing the movement. Since the South failed to stick to­
gether solidly enough to make their effort effective, 
party loyalty undermined the movement throughout the
51campaign.
A continually growing southern liberalism perhaps 
prevented many southerners from being hoodwinked into 
following a racist-ridden party. The South was changing, 
economically and politically, and even southerners who 
felt that these changes were too rapid realized that to 
support the Dixiecrats would amount to social and politi­
cal regression. In short, racism was losing its respect­
ability in the South as evidenced by the fact that many 
southerners could not classify themselves with such people 
as Gerald K. Smith and others of his type. Fortunately, the
Dixiecrats did not represent all of the South, but rather "a
5 2minority segment within a minority regional group."
Many distrusted the aims and motives of the Dixie­
crats, thinking, perhaps that they were the tools of the
Alabama, State Department of Archives and History, Chauncey 
Sparks Papers, Democratic National Convention of 1948 File.
^^Letter, Frank Dixon to John Sheffield, Decem­
ber 291 1 9 4 8 , Dixon Papers, States Rights Correspondence 
1948 File.
52Hodding Carter, "A Southern Liberal Looks at Civil 
Rights," New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1948, pp. 10,
20-25.
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Republicans. Also Truman's argument that a vote for any 
party other than the Democrats was a vote for the Repub­
licans, fell on sympathetic ears in the South. Perhaps 
others saw the leaders of the Dixiecrats as political 
opportunists greedy for fame and power at the expense of 
the public. They might have felt that these men really 
did not care about settling the race issue but preferred
to keep it alive, thereby exploiting it for their own
53selfish political purposes. Many were convinced that 
the party was a pawn of special interest groups and big 
business and was thus unconcerned with the South as a
54whole.
Internal dissension was another contributing factor 
in the decline of the Dixiecrats. Lack of agreement on 
specific aims and on means of implementing these aims led 
to poor coordination of the whole movement. The public, 
for example, never was informed clearly Dixiecrat objec­
tives and strategy nor were they properly informed of 
current Dixiecrat rallies and meetings. This was due, 
partially, to the fact that the leading southern journals 
either ridiculed or condemned the movement, leaving only 
a few minor papers to publicize the Dixiecrat cause. Had 
the bolters been able to convince the southern press to 
support them, their campaign might have been advanced
5 3Ader, Dixiecrat Movement, p. 36O. 
^^Kirkendall, "Presidential Politics," p. 424.
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considerably. Even when the Dixiecrats managed to get 
press coverage, however, the conflicting reports that 
were issued made it difficult for the public to know 
exactly what was going on.
The pettiness and jealousy that existed among 
the leaders of the movement added to the confusion. 
Thurmond and Laney provided a striking example of this 
in that both wanted to run the party according to their 
own personal tastes. Leaders disagreed on enumerable 
topics ranging from the number of party buttons to be 
distributed in a particular area to disputes concern­
ing the time and place for speaking engagements. They 
also could not agree on when and where a convention 
should be held and ultimately resorted to having two 
conventions instead of one. Since the Dixiecrats num­
bered few professional politicians, many amateur or 
would-be-politicians assumed positions that required 
experience and know-how. This absence of political 
knowledge was evident throughout the life of the Dixie­
crat movement.
That the Dixiecrats were poorly organized may be 
at least partially explained by the hurried manner in 
which they built their campaign machinery. The party was 
not created formally until after the Birmingham Confer­
ence, leaving its mentors little more than three months 
in which to build an organization capable of attracting
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55significant numbers to their cause. As E. H. Ramsey, 
Dixiecrat leader in Florida, observed, the chief weakness 
of the movement was that "we were trying to do a job in a 
matter of months that would have required a minimum of
56four years." The odds against the Dixiecrats were 
overwhelming. Third parties in the United States have 
traditionally succeeded in doing little more than expos­
ing issues and voicing protests, their success has not 
been in winning elections. The fact that the Dixiecrat 
party was essentially a negative party damaged it from 
the beginning. It was widely known that the Dixiecrats 
were against civil rights for blacks, against centralized 
government and against Truman in general, but the dissi­
dents never made clear what they were for. Had they 
stood for some definite and positive goals they might 
have appeared more convincing to the public.
Insufficient financial support was another para­
mount reason for the lack of success of the Dixiecrats. 
Without money the party was unable to advertise properly, 
unable to hire capable personnel in their various offices, 
and in general unable to conduct the vigorous campaign 
required of any minor party movement. If big oil men had 
contributed as freely as it was charged, perhaps the
^^Letter, Ben Laney to Seton Ross, November 8, 1948, 
Laney Papers, Dixiecrat File.
^^Letter, E. H. Ramsey to Een Laney, Laney Papers, 
Dixiecrat File.
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Dixiecrats would have been less restricted in their ef­
forts. Although Laney and other leaders donated gener­
ously to the cause, it was not nearly the amount required 
for such a project. Inefficiency and mismanagement may 
have existed to a degree, but the central problem was 
the inadequate treasury.
Perhaps Harry Truman's handling of the southern 
problem, that is, ostensibly ignoring it, caused its 
importance to diminish in the eyes of southerners and 
northerners alike. Had Truman reacted violently against 
the Dixiecrats and resorted to name calling and wild 
accusations, some who otherwise would not have considered 
supporting the southern bolters might have been drawn to 
them. But Truman, in an uncharacteristic display of 
polite politics, met the challenge shrewdly.
Thus measured against their stated objectives the 
Dixiecrats fell far short of success. Setting out to 
save the United States from "totalitarianism and a police 
state" they caused little more than a ripple upon the 
overall immediate political scene. However, their long 
range effects seem to be considerably more impressive.
CHAPTER IX 
THE DIXIECRATS AFTER 1948
Although relations between Truman and Thurmond had 
never been cordial, following the 1948 election their re­
lationship seemed even more strained. Upon learning of 
Truman'= vicvory, Thurmond sent him a telegram assuring 
him of his cooperation "in every constitutional endeavor 
looking toward the progress of our people and a lasting 
p e a c e . T h e  word "constitutional" carried with it con­
notations that Truman understood well, because throughout 
the campaign, Thurmond had attacked Truman's programs as 
unconstitutional.
During Truman's inauguration parade when Thurmond 
and his wife passed in front of the Presidential review­
ing stand, Thurmond raised his hat in a gesture of friend­
liness. Truman not only refused to return the greeting, 
smile, or even doff his hat, but when Vice-President Bark­
ley attempted to wave to Thurmond Truman forcibly re­
strained him from doing so. Through these gestures Truman
^Statement, J. Strom Thurmond, November 3, 1948, 
Thurmond Papers, States Rights File.
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finally publicly displayed his attitude toward the Dixie- 
crats. Immediately following the parade, Thurmond, who 
considered this action an insult to his wife, left Wash­
ington and thus for the moment severed himself completely
2from the Administration.
Shortly after the inauguration, rumors spread con­
cerning disciplinary measures to be taken against dis­
loyal Democrats. Senator McGrath announced early in the 
year that few purges of the disloyal would occur, except 
perhaps with regard to the leaders of the Dixiecrat party. 
The Democratic credentials committee voted to refuse ad­
mission to the following Dixiecrats: Marion Rushton from
Alabama; William Talbot from Louisiana; J. B. Snyder and 
Mrs. Hermes Gautier of Mississippi; and S^rom Thurmond, 
who actually had already resigned from the committee; and
3Mrs. Albert Agnew of South Carolina.
Truman later delivered a speech in which he asked 
the former Dixiecrat supporters to rejoin the party on 
his terms--that was to accept the 1948 Democratic platform. 
Many leading Dixiecrats agreed with Gessner T. McCorvey 
who said that since he had never belonged to Truman’s 
Democratic party he did not intend to join now. McCorvey 
stated that he would remain a member of Alabama's Democratic
2Washington Times-Herald, June 17, 1950.
3"Democratic Committee asked to Oust Dixiecrat State
Committeemen," Rushton Papers, Correspondence 1949 File.
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party, which, unlike the national Democratic party, still
kespoused traditional Democratic principles. The Admin­
istration also encouraged the loyal Democrats in the 
various states to regain control over the Democratic 
machinery in their state. The national committee, how­
ever, announcing that it had no intention of interfering 
in struggles within the state, wanted the outcome of 
these intra-party battles decided by the up-coming pri­
maries and conventions at which delegates and electors 
would be chosen.^
Party bolters throughout United States political 
history have received either very lenient punishment, or 
no punishment at all. When discipline was necessary it 
usually consisted of being deprived of committee assign­
ments, of seniority, or of exclusion from the caucus.
Most southern officials, even if they favored the bolt, 
had been careful not to publicize their position. Few 
Congressmen campaigned openly for the Dixiecrats, and 
Eastland of Mississippi was the only Senator who stumped 
for Thurmond.^
Some loyal Democrats had strong feelings against 
the southern dissidents and thought they should be purged 
from positions of importance. Eleanor Roosevelt, United
^Ibid.
^Heard, A Two Party South? pp. 24-25.
6.Ibid.
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States representative to the United Nations, requested 
the permanent removal from the party of all important 
Dixiecrats but her proposal was ignored by the Dixiecrats
7as well as by the Democrats. McGrath urged Democratic 
members of Congress to decide on awarding the chairman­
ships in the new Congress so that the national committee 
would not have to engage in any such struggle. McGrath's 
plan was to reward the loyal Democrats without executing 
reprisals against the disloyal, for he knew that a whole­
sale system of reprisals would only hinder their attempt
to solidify Democratic support of Truman's legislative 
gproposals. If southerners were denied chairmanships of 
committees that were due them under the seniority rule, 
it would jeopardize the Democratic majority in the Senate 
and would hurt their margin in the House as well.
McGrath explained that the national committee 
could not remove party officers in the South even if it 
wanted to. Members of the national committee were nomi­
nated by the members of the party by their various states 
and then elected to a four-year term by the party's na­
tional convention making them members of the national
9committee until they resigned or were removed. On the 
other side, McGrath worked diligently to persuade Wallace
^"New Commentator," Time, November 26, 1948, p. 46 
8Providence Bulletin, November 1948.
^Washington Post, January 17, 1949-
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supporters to return to the Democratic party. Senator 
Glen Taylor of Idaho, for example, was allowed to keep 
his seniority and committee standing as before.
In spite of all the talk of purge, which the press 
played up, the disloyal Democrats were given assignments 
along with the regular Democrats. Actually, the only 
real weapon to wield against disloyal members of the 
party was the withholding of patronage. But since some 
southern members of the Senate were responsible for con­
firming the appointments of postmasters and judges, the 
administration would have to be careful not to irritate 
the South unduly. For example. Senator Eastland was a 
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee which had con­
trol over judgeships, attorney, and marshal appointments. 
Senator Walter F . George of Georgia, another SRD supporter, 
was chairman of the Senate finance committee and in charge 
of appointing revenue and customs collectors. Democratic 
leaders announced that patronage posts in the future would 
be tokens of party loyalty measured by the performance of 
Congressmen in their home districts and not based upon the 
way they voted in Congress. However, on the following day
Truman, at his press conference, said that patronage would
12be distributed on voting performance in Washington. “ In 
an effort to mold a more responsive Congress, Truman had
l°Ibid., May 9, 19^9- ^^Ibid.
12Providence Journal, January 17, 19^9*
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used poor judgment in this statement since he desperately 
needed votes, including those of southern Democrats.
The relative leniency of the Democrats, however, 
did not end the Dixiecrat movement. Although the Dixie­
crats were disappointed at their showing in the election, 
they had no intention of giving up the fight or of admit­
ting defeat; as Thurmond told his supporters, his party
had made "a definite contribution to constitutional gov-
13ernment in America." His implication was that the 
cause of "constitutional" government was still very much 
alive.
Follovring the election, the southern governors met
in Savannah where they stated their intention to continue
opposition to Truman's civil rights bills and the increased
l4centralization of government. States' rights was the 
underlying issue around which the conference was structured. 
Resolutions were passed condemning the proposed federaliza­
tion of the National Guard, requesting state control of the 
tidelands, and promising "equal" educa nal opportunities 
for all on a segregated basis. In a summary resolution, 
the governors demonstrated that their rebellious spirit had 
not been dampened by the Truman election victory.
13Statement, J, Strom Thurmond, Thurmond Papers, 
States Rights File.
^^Ibid.
^^Statement, W. W. Chaplin, Thurmond Papers, Corre­
spondence In File.
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On February 7 ■> the SRD established a national 
bureau to defend the rights of the states. At an execu­
tive meeting in Birmingham, with Governor Laney presiding, 
the bureau was instructed to establish offices in Washing­
ton, to publicize all federal proposals aimed at limiting 
local self-government, and to fight all unconstitutional 
limitations on the rights of states. By the terms of the 
resolution adopted, the bureau was declared not to be a 
political organization, nor was its purpose to start a 
new political party but rather it was to preserve the 
constitutional principles upon which the Democratic party 
was founded. After naming the organization the National 
States Rights Committee, the committee sent out invita­
tions to states not previously represented and requested 
that each send two representatives to join their league. 
The committee then established a States Rights Institute 
for educational purposes with a newsletter to circulate 
their information to the nation.
Leander Perez, political boss of Louisiana, was 
named head of the Washington office and was given the 
task of coordinating efforts in the various states to 
elect conservative governors, senators, and congressmen, 
and to keep the state committees informed on the political 
activities in Washington. The function of the office, 
Perez explained, was to warn the public of the dangers to
^^New York Times, February 7, 1949*
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constitutional government resulting from the votes of 
congressmen. Feeling that these "liberal" representa­
tives were betraying long-standing American principles 
such as local self-rule, free enterprise, and individual­
ism, Perez and his associates believed if the people were 
aware of this continual erosion of democracy, they would 
act to stop it. The SRD would perform its duty to the 
nation by saving the country from Communism and totali­
tarianism. Laney characterized the Washington informa­
tion center as an office for the "spying on the Federal 
government," while he referred to P^rez the "watch 
dog."^7
The next Dixiecrat meeting of significance was 
held in Dothan, Alabama, in April, 1949. Some $00 Dixie­
crats from Alabama and nearby states met to honor con­
gressmen who had opposed Truman's civil rights program 
and to hear the Dixiecrat journalist John Temple Graves 
speak. Suggesting that the Dixiecrats work with the Re­
publicans in the future, he suggested a coalition of 
southern Democrats and conservative Republicans who could 
oppose the civil rights and labor program of the Demo­
crats. The mere hint of such action, however, upset some 
Dixiecrats. But in spite of this, the majority declared 
their willingness to work with any national party or group
1?Ben Laney, Private Interview, Magnolia, Arkansas.
April, 1970.
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that protected the rights of the states and constitutional
government: "Principle is above any party. We invite all
X 8Americans to work with us."
On the second anniversary of the founding of the
SRD, May 10 19^9, some 325 Dixiecrats from nine states
met to discuss the future of their party. They adopted a
"Constitution and Declaration of Principles" and formally
established the National States' Rights Committee. Ben
Laney was selected as chairman, while Leander Perez and
Wallace W. Wright were chosen as vice-chairmen. All three
emphasized that the party was a national and not a regional 
19one. The three-hour meeting was keynoted by Laney, who 
stressed the dangers of a growing centralized government 
and the diminishing role of the states. In a proposed 
amendment to the Constitution which curtailed the powers 
of the federal government and advocated that Congress 
should not be allowed to make any law conflicting with 
state laws in areas of education, elections, civil rights, 
race, labor, zoning, and the transfer of property; they 
asked that there be some assurance that neither labor, 
business, or industry would be nationalized. They re­
quested that any kind of aid from the federal government 
be administered by the states and finally in dealing with
1 fiNew York Times, April 9, 19^9-
19 "Report of the Jackson Meeting: National States'
Rights Committee," May 10, 1949, Dixon Papers.
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economic issues they called for an end to deficit spend-
20ing except in times of war. Their committee like their 
amendment received virtually no support from the public.
Nationwide a series of States' Righters suffered 
defeat in the southern states in the election of 1948. 
Governor Ben Laney of Arkansas was defeated by his oppo­
nent Sid McMath, while Dixiecrats in Alabama lost their 
majority on the Democratic state committee to supporters 
of loyalist Senators John Sparkman and Lister Hill. 
Thurmond was defeated by Senator Olin Johnston, who had 
expressed Dixiecrat sympathies but had refused to bolt 
the party. Senator Russell Long, foe of Leander Perez, 
the national director of the Dixiecrats, won in Louisiana; 
and in Georgia, Governor Talmadge, who also refused to 
support the Dixiecrats, was re-elected. Again in Florida
and in North Carolina the victors denied formal connec-
21tions with the Dixiecrats. Fielding Wright who had
been practicing law since the end of his term in 1952
was defeated in the gubernatorial primary race in 1955
and in May of the next year succumbed to a heart attack.
Thurmond, however, was elected to the Senate in 1954 
22and in I9 6O. In spite of these setbacks the southern 
Democratic-Republican conservative coalition effectively
2°Ibid.
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. l64.
22Lachicotte, Rebel Senator, pp. 229*55
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blocked much of Truman's legislative program. While many 
Dixiecrats clung to their beliefs, the party as a viable 
political organization virtually ceased; only in a tech­
nical sense did the Dixiecrat party continue to exist.
They held meetings periodically and adopted resolution 
after resolution condemning the Administration. Yet, the 
party itself, as it had existed prior to the election, was 
defunct.
From the time that the public learned of the Novem­
ber election results, this election began to assume a 
unique position in American history. This contest, char­
acterized not only by its unpredictable outcome but also 
by its array of unorthodox candidates and campaigns was 
also filled with contradictions, ironies, and paradoxes 
that would make it one of the most memorable to the voting 
public. Future underdog candidates would point to this 
election as proof that the polls could be misleading. The 
most obvious and frequently repeated question of the day 
was how Truman won. Historians who have done the most re­
cent research on the question conclude that the basic ex­
planation for Truman's victory was that he won votes from 
the old Roosevelt coalition. However, Truman did not carry 
the same areas that Roosevelt had won: Truman lost New
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, and four states 
in the former Solid South. Prior to the election, the ex­
istence of third parties was interpreted as meaning that
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the Roosevelt coalition was dead; these parties, however, 
drew only marginal support and actually helped Truman by 
solidifying the votes of some groups. For example, Truman 
was not accused of being too easy on the Communists or of 
being too radical because Wallace and his Communist con­
tingency were so obviously vulnerable to this charge.
This paved the way for some former anti-Roosevelt groups
such as the farm belt German Catholics and urban Irish to
23vote for Truman.
In a similar sense, the Dixiecrats solidified for 
Truman the black vote, a block of votes which Wallace's 
managers expected to win. According to political scien­
tist Samuel Lubell's figures, l8 per cent of the blacks 
voted for Truman, 10 per cent for Dewey and less than 1/2
of 1 per cent for Wallace while the majority of the Ne-
2^groes did not vote in the election. The fact of the 
Dixiecrat revolt had served to convince black voters that 
Truman was indeed sincere in his civil rights program.
Had he not been genuinely interested in civil rights, 
they reasoned, he would have modified his position to 
prevent the bolt. It appears that few Negroes believed 
political expediency Truman's primary motive. In light 
of this, it appears that had Truman's civil rights plank 
won at the convention, his margin of Negro votes might
^^Lubell, Future of American Politics, pp. 196-204. 
2^Ibid.
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have been decreased considerably. Other factors serving
to convince blacks of his concern for them were his execu-
25tive orders on race relations and his Harlem speech.
Truman also won the votes of the poor, the union 
members and the ethnic minorities as Roosevelt had done 
before him. According to the Michigan survey on the 
election, 57 per cent of the Truman voters annually 
earned under $3,000 as compared to 33 per cent of the 
Dewey voters while 53 per cent of the Truman supporters 
came from working class families, only 21 per cent of 
Dewey's supporters came from this class. And, on the 
other hand, 9 per cent of Truman's supporters were in 
managerial or professional jobs while 37 per cert of 
Dewey's supporters were in this bracket. Lubell noted 
that the Jewish vote was not as strong for Truman as it 
had been for Roosevelt and concluded that for a variety 
of reasons Truman did not rank with Roosevelt among Ameri­
can Jews.^^ Because of his support from the blue-collar 
and ethnic minorities Truman did manage to carry the 
cities, though not as heavily as Roosevelt had. Arthur 
Holcombe, historian, theorized that the farm vote which
27Truman won was the essential element that elected Truman.
^^Kirkendall, "Presidential Politics," pp. 421-27*
^^Lubell, Future of American Politics, pp. 207-8.
2 7 Arthur Holcombe, Our More Perfect Union; from 
Eighteenth-Century Principles to Twentieth-Century Practice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 117*
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While this thesis may be debatable, the farm vote was, at 
least important, if not crucial, to Truman's victory.
A number of other factors aided in the election of 
Truman. His personal warmth and identification with the 
ordinary citizen may have drawn votes away from the more 
aloof, sophisticated Dewey. Republican overconfidence 
which led to moderate campaign efforts must also be taken 
into account as well as the possibility that the record 
of the Eightieth Congress cut into Dewey's appeal. In an 
effort to offset this, Dewey espoused enough of the Truman 
program to appear as a "me too" type candidate. A series 
of related factors, then, worked for the election of
28Truman.
Richard Kirkendall concludes that Truman won because
of two factors: party strength and effective campaigning.
Truman succeeded in identifying himself enough with the
New Deal to convince former Roosevelt men to vote for him.
Continuing the New Deal program, Truman appeared to be a
friend to labor, the farmer, the Negro, and the common 
29man. Long hours of campaigning and planning along with 
the execution of clever tactics and maneuvers were all 
instrumental in the Democratic victory.
Just as historians may long debate the reasons for 
the Democratic success, and the degree of importance of
28New York Times, November 4, 1948.
^^Kirkendall, "Presidential Politics," pp. 421-27.
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the various factors involved, they may also disagree on 
the significance of the election as a whole. This elec­
tion did not serve to realign a significant portion of 
the population thereby creating a new party balance, for 
this realignment had been accomplished in the 1 9 3 0 's, a 
factor which Truman benefitted from. But the 1948 re­
sults worked to preserve the gains of the New Deal-Fair 
Deal years. The election also marked a continuing move­
ment to the left for the Democratic party, at least on 
domestic issues. The election of the Democrats also 
indicated that the populace accepted the guidance of the 
national government in coping with the social and economic 
ills of the nation. If Roosevelt had seemed liberal to 
some, Truman could be considered more so, if measured by 
similar standards. While Roosevelt achieved far-reaching 
reforms Truman also advocated measures such as civil 
rights, compulsory medical insurance, and federal aid to 
education, ideas not fully implemented until the Lyndon 
Johnson Administration. When the Democrats, many of whom 
were considered liberals, won majorities in the House and 
Senate, it appeared initially at least that the forces of 
liberalism had won. It soon became evident, however, that 
conservative elements could ban together to defeat much of 
the Administration's proposed legislation.
The returns of 1948 also convinced Republicans that 
if they were to win the next presidential election they
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would have to find a nonpartisan candidate with widespread 
appeal to the masses. They found him in the person of 
General Eisenhower who won a personal, rather than a 
Republican victory in 1952 and 195^. The arch conserva­
tives in the Republican party who championed the nomina­
tion of Taft in 1948, 1952, and 1956 were still dissatis­
fied and in 1964 aligned themselves with Barry Goldwater.
The election of 1948 warned political predictors 
to take a more sophisticated look at intra-party strug­
gles. The simplistic view taken in 1948, that the split 
within the Democratic party doomed it, was proven false. 
Lubell demonstrated that when certain segments of a coali­
tion break away, other segments just as important may re­
place them, thus defeat does not necessarily follow the 
breaking up of a coalition. Without the Dixiecrats and 
Progressives it is possible that Truman might have lost
other elements in the party which might have gone to Dewey
30and made him the victor. The mere existence of the 
Dixiecrat party, then, was significant in shaping the out­
come of the 1948 election.
The legacy of the Dixiecrat party, hardly venerable, 
assumes an increasing importance that corresponds to the 
growth of current right wing movements. While historians 
are eager to assess and analyze liberal ventures, most find 
the conservative counterparts less attractive. Yet to
^^Lubell, Future of American Politics, pp. 194-95*
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dismiss such movements as the George Wallace American 
party as inconsequential does not necessarily serve to
decrease its role in the body politic.
Perhaps the most significant factor concerning the 
Dixiecrat party was its failure to achieve its major objec­
tive of nullifying the civil rights program. Contrary to 
the picture that some of the Dixiecrat chiefs wanted to 
portray, the party was constructed around and depended upon 
the issue of racism The SRD demonstrated that racism 
alone could no longer solidify the South into a political 
unit. After appealing to all the old long cherished ideals 
of the South, they could not so much as gain the support of 
the politicians from their own region. No politician who 
aspired to a position in the national political arena could 
afford to shackle himself with the sectionalism of the Dix­
iecrats, because, by the late forties, issues that were of
greatest significance were of a national, not a regional
31nature. The southern Democrats used racism at a particu­
larly vulnerable time, when the Democratic party seemed de­
feated and when Communists were threatening the United 
States from abroad, and yet they failed to get the response 
they envisioned. In spite of all these circumstances fav­
orable to their success, the Dixiecrats proved "only that 
white supremacy, in its classic form at least, is a dead
31Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., The Democratic South (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., I965 ), pi ?8.
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32issue. . . The racist followers of the Dixiecrat
party helped make racism unrespectable by presenting a 
picture of extreme backwardness and reaction, a model 
that few people cared to emulate.
Ironic as it may seem, one of the most significant 
contributions of the Dixiecrats was the impetus they pro­
vided for black progress. In spite of the Dixiecrats 
goal to stifle Negro progress the lot of the Negro im­
proved. With increasing voting privileges, the Negro be­
came an object worthy of political consideration, a fact 
of which Truman had long been aware. Clarence Mitchell, 
N.A.C.P. worker, noted:
Many Southern officeholders, looking at the rising 
number of registered Negro voters, are learning to 
pronounce the word "Negro" with a long e and o in­
stead of saying "Nigra," the time honored Southern 
way of insulting colored people without actually 
using an epithet. In the last erection the Negro 
vote in the South punctured the Dixiecrat balloon 
so badly that no sensible man dares run under the 
banner in November.33
By bringing the race issue to the forefront, the 
Dixiecrats paved the way for more black progress. In 
spite of the efforts of a few of the Dixiecrat leaders to 
play down racism, they succeeded in fooling few if any in 
regard to their real motives. According to Howard Odum, 
student of black-white relations, national disavowal of
^^Ashmore, "The South's Year of Decision," pp. 1-3,
’' Clarence Mitchell, "Democrats v. Dixiecrats," 
Nation, CLXXV (September 27^ 1952), 268.
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the Dixiecrats in 1$48 could be interpreted, in part at
least, as reflecting a desire of many Americans to have
34civil liberties for all citizens. Editorials on civil 
rights from southern papers were reprinted and read through­
out the North causing the editors of northern magazines 
such as Time to look more deeply into the race problem in 
the South, thereby giving these problems more publicity.
As these researchers studied the problem in the South, 
they also became aware of northern hypocrisy in racial 
segregation. In both cases, the Negro was the beneficiary. 
The Dixiecrat debacle also marked a decline in the
35political influence of whites from the black belt region. 
While the South's traditional politicos had long been aware 
of their decreasing importance, they suddenly realized by 
the Dixiecrat defeat that they were now stripped of their 
former power. It has been demonstrated that black belt 
whites throughout history had dominated southern politics 
through the one-party system. For years plantation-minded 
whites from the black belt repeatedly warned southern vot­
ers that strict adherence to the Democratic party was the 
only way to prevent blacks from rising to positions of 
power. By a variety of tactical maneuvers, Negroes were 
carefully excluded from participating in the political
34Howard W. Odum,"This is Worth Our Best," The 
Southern Packet, V (January, 1949), 2-4.
35Key, Southern Politics, p. 10.
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process. Simultaneously the Republican party was por­
trayed as a treasonous affiliation. But by 19^8 these 
traditional southern Democrats were in a curious predica­
ment. The party which served them so faithfully in the 
past was now deserting its original doctrines, thus caus­
ing the Dixiecrats to question and to challenge it.
However, the Dixiecrats unwittingly gave rise to the 
two-party system in the South even though they were "reluc­
tant midwives, loath to abandon permanently the Democratic 
monopoly which has served them so well."^^ It was when 
southern Democrats succeeded at saddling the "nigger" label 
on the Democratic party that many southerners were forced 
to consider the virtues of alternative parties. Because of 
their aims and because of the volatile nature of political 
parties, the Dixiecrats in 1948 faced a self-destructive 
dilemma. The Democratic party which had maintained them 
in power while simultaneously suppressing blacks, was now, 
with its new philosophy the object of their destruction.
Yet by destroying and or discrediting this party they not 
only jeopardized their own positions but opened the way for 
black political power. The Dixiecrats, who had worked so 
hard to block the Negro's participation in the political
process, actually "contributed materially to breaking down
37the party machinery that shackled him."
Ashmore, "The South's Y^ar of Decision," p. 3« 
^^Ibid.
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Although the introduction of the two-party system 
to the South brought few immediate gains to blacks, a 
greater opportunity for political participation existed 
than had previously. In theory, at least, voters were 
given a choice of candidates and parties, a benefit of 
democracy long denied to the South. As long as only one 
party, the Democratic party "southern style," existed, 
blacks had no hopes whatsoever of being represented.
But with the rise of the two-party South, the politically 
domineering black belt whites gradually lost their power 
over the politics of the region thereby removing a major 
obstacle to the political opportunities open to blacks.
On the other hand, perhaps, the Dixiecrat movement 
was a serious setback to the coming of the two-party sys­
tem in Dixie. To Harry Ashmore, political journalist, 
the Dixiecrats were simply Democrats who underneath were
o Q
actually Republicans. Many who might have voted Repub­
lican for the first time had there been only the two major 
parties running were not forced to do so; instead, they 
could take a half-way step and vote the Dixiecrat ticket.
It is also possible that these "real Republicans" might 
not have voted at all.
Another result of the Dixiecrats was their service 
of sharpening factional lines within the Democratic party, 
thus emphasizing the liberal and conservative groups. While
^^Ibid.
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this was nothing novel in United States political history, 
the splinter party did accentuate the trend. Such an align­
ment has continued until the present day rendering party la­
bels useless for purposes of ideological identification.
The Dixiecrat effect on liberalism in the South is 
more difficult to assess. Southern liberals like Senators 
Hill an(i Pepper were targets of criticism of the Dixiecrats. 
By forcing liberals into the pro-civil rights camp, they 
perhaps lost some of their support. Other southerners, 
liberal on non-racial issues but fearful of being mis­
represented by the Dixiecrats temporarily suppressed their 
liberalism. In the long run it appears that southern lib­
eralism suffered no devastating setbacks. If anything, 
southern liberalism emerged strengthened, a factor most 
easily explained by economic changes, however.
The Dixiecrat experience gave impetus to the inde­
pendent electors movement, the attempt to deadlock the 
Electoral College. Particularly since 1948, this has been 
an expected ritual around presidential election time. The 
South threatens to withhold its electoral vote from both 
major candidates thereby throwing the election to the
House where the South fallaciously believes thr t states'
39rights sympathizers may be elected. Mississippi, along
39Samuel Du Bois Cook, "Political Movements and Or­
ganizations," in The American South in the 1960's, ed. by 
Avery Leiserson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
pp. 142-44. Hereinafter referred to as Cook, "Political 
Movements."
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with Alabama, followed such a course in 1944 and in I9 6O 
but both were abortive efforts.
Since the SRD planned on thwarting the electoral 
method by throwing the election to the House, arguments 
for and against the Electoral College were widespread.
The Dixiecrac bolt stimulated a considerable amount of 
talk suggesting the altering of or perhaps even the abol­
ition of the Electoral College. Several proposals were 
mentioned, one taking the form of an amendment written by 
the States' Righters but nothing concrete was accomplished.
The creation of the Dixiecrat party marked the first 
outward signs of significant dissatisfaction with the wel­
fare state trend in this country. This distaste for in­
creasing centralization though long present was a condition 
which southerners could tolerate especially if they were 
reaping benefits, such as economic aid, from it. But when 
the emotional issue of civil rights, supported and enforced 
by the federal government surfaced, southerners viciously 
denounced big government. Without the issue of civil 
rights there would however, have been no revolt of the 
right in 1948.
The States' Righters had their own ideas about the 
significance of their movement. Thurmond, for example, 
wrote that the Dixiecrats showed the leaders of the nation 
that the South could stand alone and stand up for a prin­
ciple. His movement, he said, "demonstrated that the South
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will no longer be the political doormat for any politician 
and cannot-he kicked around by any Party.” It did show 
that the Deep South could withhold its electoral vote from 
the national party if it so desired, and perhaps, in this 
sense, called attention to the fact that the South was no 
longer bound to the Democratic party. On the other hand, 
one might conclude that since the Dixiecrats were unsuc­
cessful in their attempts to alter the tenets of the Demo­
cratic party toward their philosophy, their weakness within 
the Democratic party was proven. With the election of Tru­
man who defied the wishes of the South it appeared that 
this region could be ignored by the national party with 
impunity. This course, however, would depend upon numerous 
other favorable circumstances.
Although the Dixiecrat party was not active nation­
ally in the fifties, its ideology pervaded the attitudes 
of a large number of southerners. Some Dixiecrat sympa­
thizers such as Senators Harry Byrd and James Eastland suc­
cessfully ran for offices while other southerners still 
yearned for the nomination of states' rights candidates at 
the national conventions. Many former Dixiecrats eventu­
ally joined the Republican party believing that it was at­
tuned to states' rights conservatism and "constitutional 
4lgovernment." Countless former Dixiecrats and Democrats
koLetter, J. Strom Thurmond to Frank Dixon, n.d.,
Dixon Papers, States Rights Correspondence File.
4l^ Ibid.
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merged and voted Republican in 1952 and in 1956, thus be­
coming "Eisencrats." In I9 6O although to a lesser degree 
this trend from Dixiecrat to Republican was still evident 
in the voting returns. According to historian Dewey 
Grantham, southerners voting Republican did so primarily
because they disliked New Deal economic policies and not
42solely because of racial policies.
Many of the ’’Democrats voting Republican," however, 
became hostile toward Eisenhower over the integration 
question raised in 1954. Again the racial problem gave 
rise to another political party, similar to the Dixie­
crats, the National States' Rights Party (NSR?) with its 
headquarters in Birmingham. Characterized by its anti­
integration stand and generally militant racist posture, 
it was created in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1957 from the 
fragments of the United White Party, a pro-Nazi group
43dedicated to "Negro-hating and Jew Baiting." In I9 6O 
the NSRP nominated Governor Orvil Faubus of Arkansas for 
President, an honor which he declined as did J. Strom 
Thurmond in 1964.^^ It could safely be assumed that 
their support went to George Wallace in I9 6 8 .
The new round of civil rights measures of the six­
ties further stirred the anti-civil rights forces in the
42Grantham, The Democratic South, p. 79. 
^^Cook, "Political Movements," pp. 142-44. 
^^Ibid.
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South. When in 1964, conservatives captured the Republi­
can convention under the leadership of Senator Barry Gold- 
water, many former Dixiecrats rallied to his banner. It 
has been noted that Thurmond, who considered Goldwater as 
having views nearer to his own than those of any other 
Senator, campaigned vigorously for him. Thus, if the 
leader of the Dixiecrats gave such strong support to 
Goldwater's brand of conservatism it is likely that other 
former Dixiecrats voted similarly. Even though many of 
the issues in 1964 differed from those of 1948, former
45Dixiecrats offered wholehearted support to Goldwater.
The Dixiecrats, pioneers of the present day Wallace 
conservatism, provided the framework within which such a 
dissident right wing element could function. This move­
ment has undoubtedly benefited from the experiences of 
the Dixiecrats. The need for an independent party to 
champion their cause was evident. The minor numerical 
success of the Dixiecrat candidates as measured by actual 
votes and their inability to convince either of the major 
parties to adopt their reactionary attitude toward blacks 
convinced future states' rights men that for their pro­
gram to continue, their independent status must continue. 
In states where the Dixiecrats had appropriated the Demo­
cratic label, regular party men would be more alert to
45Merritt Gibson, Private Interview, Longview, 
Texas, April, 1970; and Ben Laney, Private Interview, 
Magnolia, Arkansas, April, 1970.
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such a possibility again. Consequently, the offspring of 
the Dixiecrats, the American party of the sixties, ran as 
a separate and independent group.
That the "Cause" lives on may be of some comfort 
to the former Dixiecrats who found a hero in George C. 
Wallace of Alabama. Marshall Frady, critical biographer 
of Wallace, noted that Wallace, an alternate delegate to 
the 1948 National Democratic Convention, wore a campaign 
card that read "Unalterably opposed to the nomination of
46Harry S. Truman and the so-called Civil Rights Program."
Wallace stated later that his chief concern at that time
was to vote against the civil rights program and have a
47record to verify it. If his objective was to establish 
himself as an anti-civil rights man, his success is un­
questionable. Once defeated for Governor by race baiter 
John Patterson, Wallace swore "I'm not goin' to be out
48nigguhed again." His party echoes many of the same 
complaints that Dixiecrats voiced earlier. Wallace, like 
the Dixiecrats, ignores economics completely and concen­
trates on three major issues: the federal government,
49the Negro, and the Communist menace. Wallace consistently
^^Marshall Frady, Wallace (New York: The World Pub­
lishing Co., 1 9 6 8 ), p. l4l.
4 7 Gladys King Burns, "The Alabama Dixiecrat Revolt 
of 1 9 4 8" (unpublished M.A. thesis. Auburn University, I9 6 5),
p. l4l.
48Frady, Wallace, p. 12?.
^^Sherrill, Gothic Politics, p. 304.
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rails against integration and frequently alludes to "mon- 
grelization laws" much as the earlier Dixiecrats did. He 
also receives support from the Ku Klux Klan and Gerald L. K. 
Smith, formel Dixiecrat supporter frequently seen at Wal­
lace rallies and in behind-the-scenes activities, Prior 
to his own candidacy in I968 Wallace was attracted to the 
more conservative Republican party especially in 1964 when, 
according to Sherrill, he wanted to switch parties but was 
"upstaged by Strom T h u r m o n d . A f t e r  his own ambitions 
were subdued Wallace tacitly supported Barry Goldwater and 
a program, attractive to former Dixiecrats, designed to 
refute the whole New Deal. The Deep South states that
voted for him did so, according to Lubell, primarily to
5 2halt black progress.
But by 19 6 8 Wallace had his own show. In the elec­
tion much of his support came from small towns and farms 
and from those, similar to the Dixiecrats, with an anti- 
Negro, pro-fundamentalist point of view. Unlike the Dixie­
crats, however, Wallace also garnered a considerable number 
of voter from the blue collar northern laborer. Wallace 
and Thurmond both carried four states from the Deep South 
--Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In addi­
tion Wallace won Arkansas, due in part to the efforts of
5°Ibid., pp. 3 1 3 - 1 8 and 353-56.
^^Ibid., p. 3 5 1 .
^^Lubell, Future of American Politics, pp. 9-l6.
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former Goveruoi' Laney, whereas Thurmond won South Carolina
in 1948 but in 1964 held it for the party he had so re-
5 3cently joined, the Republicans. Thurmond's winning of
South Carolina for the Republican party was a part of the 
so-called "Southern Strategy" whereby Thurmond would work 
to put the South in the Republican column while national 
leaders would agree to the selection of a Vice-President 
with pro-southern sympathies.
When it was discovered that Texas oil men raised 
two million dollars for the Wallace campaign in I9 6 8 , the 
charge that he was catering to special interests was rem-
54iniscent of the earlier Dixiecrat "conspiracy thesis."
Some view Wallace as a Neo-Populist pointing to his blend
of liberalism in economics and conservatism in civil rights
matters. Such an interpretation perhaps was responsible
for Goldwater's chiding Wallace for not being a true con- 
5 5servative. Wallace, is, however, conservative enough 
for the former Dixiecrats, many of whom are George Wallace 
supporters today. Both Ben Laney and Merritt Gibson were 
active in the Wallace movement in Arkansas and Texas,
Robert T. Riley, "The Social Psychology of the 
Wallace Phenomenon," in Racially Separate or Together? ed. 
by Thomas F. Pettigrew (MeGraw-Hi11, Inc., 1971J, PP• 232- 
36 and 2 3 2. Hereinafter referred to as Riley, "The Social 
Psychology."
^^Sherrill, Gothic Politics, pp. 3 6 6-6 8 .
^^Frady, Wallace, p. 1375 and Riley, "The Social 
Psychology," p. 250.
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respectively. And both expressed a similar belief that 
Wallace was the last bastion of hope to save this country 
from socialism.
While conservative southern politics embellished 
with racism continues to thrive today, other forces are 
at work to undermine this conservatism. Of all the fac­
tors revolutionizing southern politics today none is more 
significant than the economic revolution which is serving 
to industrialize and urbanize the South. As factories 
and plants began to dot the map of the South, large migra­
tions of "foreigners" began to infiltrate the region in­
troducing different ideas and attitudes to the inhabitants
Natives of the South began forsaking the plows and flock-
57ing to the cities in search of work.
The growth of cities, industry, and labor unions 
are facilitating the rise of the Negro and strengthening 
liberalism in general. Black progress which occurs more 
easily in the city indicates that urbanism may be replac-
J" Oing sectionalism in politics. With the rise of a new 
urban middle class liberal notions have begun to be re­
spectable at the expense of white supremacy. Also, the 
steadily increasing number of black votes is making its
Ben Laney, Private Interview, Magnolia, Arkansas, 
April, 1970 ; and Merritt Gibson, Private Interview, Long­
view, Texas, April, 1970.
^^Grantham, The Democratic South, pp. 79-80.
^^Heard, A Two Party South? p. 244.
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impact on the political front. As Grantham noted, all 
these conditions creating new social and economic divi­
sions in turn create new political alliances thus under­
mining traditional politics and more specifically, black 
belt dominance.
While the economic basis of the South is changing 
it seems that politics should automatically follow. This 
is not the case, however. Social and economic changes 
require time before affecting the politics of the people 
--it takes longer to change attitudes than it does con­
ditions shaping these attitudes. Youth are taught the 
prejudices and pride of the older generations, and this
59contributes to the political lag in the South. This 
social conservatism which thwarts change still serves to 
support racist demagogues like George Wallace. Rural 
areas still have disproportionate political power and 
thereby exert political views which tend to be reaction­
ary. The most outspoken opponents of the integration 
movement have come from the rural, economically deprived 
regions of the South, whose leaders, feeling their de­
clining social and economic status, latch onto southern 
traditionalism.
Hopefully the forces for change are much more num­
erous and powerful than are the forces of reaction in the
^^Girantham, The Democratic South, pp. 8O-8I; and 
Heard, A Two Party South? p. 24^.
^^Grantham, The Democratic South, pp. 87-88.
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modern South. If they are, the South will merge with 
the rest of the nation in ideology as well as in practice. 
Before much progress is possible, southerners must first 
emancipate themselves from that domination by the race 
question which helped to account for so desperate and un­
promising an adventure as the Dixiecrat movement in 1948.
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